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INTRODUCTION, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.1 Introduction
This report deals with energy options relevant to ameliorating the
buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere in future years, hence also
to ameliorating the predicted consequent climatological and other effects.
The problem arises primarily because of burning of fossil fuels,
aggravated by the injection of other antropogenic gases into the atmosphere;
these are transparent to visible light but absorb infrared radiation. Thus
Earth's surface warms up via incoming sunlight, but its cooling mechanism--
re-radiation of infrared heat--is impaired. The natural concentration of
CO2 and water vapor now does this to a considerable extent, raising what would
have been a global average temperature of about 255*K to an average 285*K.
The consensus grows that enhancement of this phenomenon will cause substantial
global changes, some of them deleterious.
Our report accepts a number of phenomena as given (including relevant
uncertainties). Principal among them are:
1. CO2 put into the atmosphere, mainly by burning fossil fuel, will
be partly absorbed in the upper ocean and perhaps by increased biomass,
but some 40 - 60% of it will remain in the atmosphere for centuries, in
quasi-equilibrium with the slowly-changing ocean.
2. Increased CO2 will raise the mean global temperature. Typical
numbers are 1.5 - 4.5*C for a doubling of preindustrial atmospheric CO2 level
with larger increases at high latitudes.
73. CO2 temperature rises of this order (coupled with contributions
from other greenhouse gases such as NO , chloro-fluoromethanes, etc.) are
much larger than anything in recorded history. Global agriculture and
other basic activities will be substantially affected in ways hard to
predict at present.
4. No good ways have yet been proposed for extracting the CO2 from any
significant fraction of the world's fossil fuel combustion and sequestering
it, in the ocean deeps for instance (But Section 4.1.4 has a further comment,
on this).
We do not suppose all climate changes, even large ones, are necessarily
harmful. However, civilizations tend to organize and optimize their
activities with respect to their current environment; thus, changes are
on that account more likely to be harmful than beneficial at least in the
short term. Also, it is only prudent to explore in advance the energy option
space available, in case later action is decided 'on. By the term "option
space," we mean the range of energy futures that appear possible (with trade-
offs) taking into account technological, economic and environmental
opportunities and constraints. That is what we have done.
At the end of this short chapter we list our Findings and Conclusions. After
that, our study contains several major parts. First, in Chapter 2, we take up the
question of energy modeling for an uncertain future, and discuss methods and long-
term energy scenarios developed by others, in particular the recent work of
Nordhaus and Yohe, and Hamm on highly aggregated global energy-economic
models. We have developed a set of our own scenarios, incorporating a
range of future energy costs, resource availabilities (including cutoffs and
moratoria), end-use efficiencies, etc. using a disaggregated energy model due to
Edmonds and Reilly of the Institute for Energy Analysis (IEA). A discussion of
8this model, our reasons for choosing it instead of some other, and descriptions
of the scenarios are in Chapter 3.
It is well appreciated that the energy use and carbon emissions predicted
by models depends sensitively on the values of exogenous parameters such as
efficiencies of energy use and the relative costs of various fossil and non-
fossil energy alternatives. For this reason, we have devoted considerable
attention to an assessment of the current status and long-term trends in
these areas, and summarize our findings in Chapter 4. These "mini-assessments"
of both fossil and non-fossil options and of opportunities to improve energy
productivity have been made in a way that they can stand alone, irrespective
of CO 2-climate.
Both those major parts build on our prior work on energy options which
are responsive to the CO2 challenge: (Perry et. al. 1982), and (Araj 1982).
The basic conclusion of these studies was that high fossil fuel use into the early
21st century and low asymptotic CO2 levels were incompatible because of the
long time required to change patterns of energy use significantly--in particular,
to make a transition from predominant use of fossil energy to either renewable
and/or nuclear technologies. Half a century was typical, suggesting that
results expected by the year 2040 should guide our activities in the near
future.
Over such long developmental and transition times, many opportunities
will appear for increasing energy productivity both in its supply and in its
use, as well as reducing costs. We have taken special notice of this, both
in the mini-assessments and in their incorporation into several of the
scenarios.
9Many of the new energy options are non-fossil, therefore naturally
in the direction of ameliorating the CO 2-climate problem. The new options
are also substantially electric (e.g., nuclear power, solar photovoltaic,
wind). This coupled with the convenience of electricity as an energy
carrier implies that the current trend toward a more-electric world will
continue. Thus we consider it important to inspect the status of electric
system integration (Chapter 5), in particular, the incorporation of energy
storage and non-dispatchable sources. The state-of-the-art here is rapidly
changing, both on account of new technologies of dispatch and control, and
on account of new developments in computer simulation of electric power systems.
In Chapter 6 we review a thorny issue that arises in all attempts to
account for costs and benefits over time: how to discount the future.
The problem is particularly acute for CO2 , because of the long times between
commitment and payback, extending over generations. It is also acute because
the climate impacts are predicted to occur at times much longer than the usual
time nerspectives inherent in the U.S. political process and those characteristic
of free-market economic decision making, whereas the potential benefits of
increased coal exploitation (for example) seem both certain and immediate.
We find discounting to be useful for comparing options that are (for example)
similarly spaced in time, but not for judging present cost/benefit of far future
events.
New energy options require materials, and Chapter 7 gives our
estimates for what would be required early in the 21st century in our MIT/IEA
scenarios. The ones involving high solar penetration are very materials-
intensive.
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The global character of energy-CO 2-consequences implies that any
substantial responses must be international, and one can ask whether the
debate about it is going on at the right level, internationally. Is it
time to consider international protocols, as protocols about acid rain
and other transboundary pollutants are being discussed, and sometimes
implemented? We conclude, after studying acid rain and other examples,
that the time is propitious for enlarging the global discussion.
11
1.2 Findings and Conclusions
Well-recognized uncertainties exist in both the timing and consequences
of CO2-induced climate changes as well as the possibility of similar impacts
due to other so-called greenhouse gases. On this basis, stringent measures
to restrict the use of fossil fuels now are both unjustified and infeasible.
However, given the potential for severe impacts, the possibility that such
impacts will have a negative synergism with other environmental stresses
occuring at the same time, and the inertia in the energy supply and demand
system, it makes sense to develop now strategies for reducing future fossil
fuel carbon emissionsrather than relying solely on research to narrow
uncertainties and/or ameliorative measures, such as building dikes and
developing new strains of "greenhouse-resistant" crops.
We now present below our general findings and conclusions, and follow
these with more detailed topical ones.
GENERAL
1. On the basis of current understanding of the effect of CO2 on climate
and trends in global energy use, a significant CO2 warming in the next century
probably cannot be avoided. However, the rate of increase of atmosphere
CO2 due to fossil fuel consumption can be significantly reduced via the
adoption of realistic energy strategies that are relatively "C02-benign."
That is, while technical and other limits bound the range and composition
of future global energy use, the bounds appear to be fairly wide, with a
spread of a factor of several in annual carbon emissions by the middle of
the next century. By "CO2-benign," we mean an atmospheric CO2 increase from its
present 340 ppmv to about 420 ppmv by the year 2050, corresponding to a
"CO2 doubling time" of several centuries.
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2. Early action will help to minimize later difficulties, because the time
from conception of a new energy supply technology to its widespread adoption
is half a century or longer.
3. The most important and effective options relate to increasing energy
productivity on a world-wide scale, an activity that is beneficial quite
apart from its impact on CO 2-climate, and that can lead to a halving of the
global energy requirements per unit of production or service in less than
50 years.
4. It will be impossible to develop global consensus for any one simple set
of energy options, because of different stages of industrialization,
different available resources, different perceptions of climatological or
economic winning or losing, etc. However, the time seems propitious.for
extending the global debate on CO2-climate, based on recent attention to
other international environmental problems, to the benefit of all.
5. The trend toward a more-electric future world, coupled with the fact
that most non-fossil energy options are electric, indicates the need for
and benefit of studying future electric systems closely.
6. Electric power systems that incorporate storage, interactive load control
and other operations involving joint generator-user decisions and technologies
will make electric power systems much more versatile and responsive to
demand, and result in cheaper average costs of electric power.
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MODELS AND MODELING
1. The large spread in projections of future global energy demand are in
the main due to the normative content of the modeling process, particularly
in the modeler's view of the feasibility and desirability of significant
reductions in energy demand due to corresponding increases in the efficiency
of its use.
2. Several long-term energy CO2 models that represent a significant
improvement on the prior state-of-the-art, have been developed recently.
However, more work is needed in this area, particularly on how to account
for the possibility of CO 2-climate changes on the energy-economic system.
3. It is customary to take population growth as a given in energy demand
modeling. Such growth is an important constraint on limiting future increases
in energy use since some minimum level of per capita energy consumption is
required for a decent living standard and considerations of justice, and
equity require that this be provided. A concomitant effort to limit population
growth would ameliorate the demand for energy, as well as be beneficial in
many other ways, such as reducing stress on land use, food, and social order.
COAL
1. A CO2-greenhouse effect of the magnitude presently discussed would require
a major global shift to coal. There isn't enough oil and gas, and shale
looks like a less likely prospect.
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2. Coal's adoption for major global energy will not be prevented by:
* Resource limitations.
* Lack of wide distribution.
e Cost of extraction and use by present technology or improvements
of it.
* Lack of knowledge of how to burn it without SO2, particulates
or other emission problems (except CO2 ).
e Less surely (but probably) concern for the CO2 issue alone (because
of wide divergence of views and goals) before substantial CO2 buildup.
3. Coal's adoption would be limited by:
* High cost of less-polluting technology of combustion (but we think
the cost will not be prohibitive).
* Environmental and other problems of mining or alternatively the
cost of ameliorating them (but we think they could be overcome,
except for CO2 itself).
" Wide acceptance of nuclear power, mainly for electric power production,
but also for industrial processes and district heat.
* Lowering of the cost of photovoltaic power by a factor about 5 below
the best present technology(economically attractive windpower--a likely
prospect--would also help, but the resource base is more limited).
" A continuing shift toward a more technologically sophisticated world,
for which electricity is better matched than heat by flames,
a shift that reduces demand for all combustible fuel, not just coal.
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NUCLEAR FISSION
e In Western Europe, Japan, parts of the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and
China, and elsewhere, nuclear power appears to cost significantly
less than coal power, especially given environmental restrictions
against coal typical of present U.S. practice. Nuclear power
will be cheaper almost everywhere that environmental restrictions
on coal are significantly increased.
* Polarization of views about nuclear power in the U.S. and some other
countries and even the present virtual stagnation of the U.S. nuclear
sector will not prevent vigorous development in other regions.
" Leadership in nuclear technology and commerce is likely to pass to
Japan and/or Europe in the next decade, in particular, when Japan
enters the international market on some opportune occasion.
" Public concern about nuclear wastes will abate (but not disappear),
to the extent that progress is visible on implementing the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982.
NUCLEAR FUSION
It will not be ready for significant commercial power production during
the critical period before (say) 2050, because of:
* Extreme technological demands on materials to withstand neutron
irradiation, to breed tritium, to withstand ion bombardment, and other
tasks.
" Difficulties with hot maintenance (if the fuel cycle involves production
of neutrons, as presently envisaged).
* Susceptibility to many criticisms that are also applicable to fission.
Beyond 2050, we cannot be sure.
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BIOMASS
" The sustainable yeild is moderate at best, 4.7 TW maximum, more likely
2 - 2.5TW.
" Environmental costs are liable to be high, leading to biomass being
used for premium needs only (e.g., some ethanol and methanol) or
by people living near exploitable forests who are not part of a
money economy, or for conversion of wastes associated with other
primary uses.
SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC (PV)
# Eventual costs for complete systems will almost surely lie in the
range 60 - $3.00 per peak watt, but it is too soon to be much more
definite. With 0.2 effective capacity factor, this is $3000 - $15,000/kw
average output. The lower number is attractive for wide adoption, the
upper is prohibitive.
* Substantial deployment of solar PV (10% of electric power generation, for
example) could not take place until after year 2000, because of the need
for cost reduction, establishment of new manufacturing facilities,
and re-structuring of the electric utility sector to accommodate
dispersed non-dispatchable generators.
* PV is an order of magnitude more material and land intensive than
nuclear or coal power.
e The competition between flat plates vs. concentrators will probably
not be resolved -for another decade.
* PV and wind have the advantage of implementation in small arrays
at moderate unit expense, a decided advantage.
* Solar PV plus storage is generally cost-inferior to nuclear or
coal plus storage, if the latter are allowed on the system.
17
WIND
* Attractive in selected regions, perhaps with a limit 1 l TW globally.
* Large machines are more effective than small ones, to capture steadier
and stronger winds aloft.
* Marginally economic now without subsidy in favorable locations, if
compared with oil-powered generation.
* Combinations of wind/hydro and perhaps solar PV/hydro can be regionally
very attractive, especially if the water flow tends to be counter-
correlated over the course of seasons of the year.
ENERGY STORAGE
a It benefits electric power principally.
o It aids both baseload (coal or nuclear) power and also solar and wind,
but the latter systems plus storage look much more expensive than
baseload plus storage.
* Both batteries and hydro will be good candidates. Batteries are
presently within a factor 2 of fulfilling the requirement,
and are likely to permit many new electric system arrangements.
e If cheap baseload is allowed on the system, energy storage generally
decreases the attractiveness of non-dispatchable sources, unless
the latter are as cheap per unit of energy output as baseload power--
an unlikely prospect.
* Large hydrogen storage systems will probably be subsequent to a
much more electric world, which presumes other technological options
at earlier times.
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REDUCING ENERGY CONSUMPTION
" Energy per unit of GNP in constant money units or per unit of
physical output can decrease at the rate of about 1%/year without
adversely affecting GNP, because of long-term technological
improvement and system replacement. This improvement seems
achievable in all regions and sectors.
* Opportunity exists to continue this long-term trend in decreased
energy use.
* Under exceptional circumstances such as rapidly rising energy costs,
the 1%/year rate rose to about 2%/year in the U.S.
" This is the most important single opportunity to ameliorate CO2
buildup, and appears attractive in its own right, both
economically and environmentally.
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Chapter 2
ENERGY MODELS AND MODELING
2.1 Introduction
The problems involved in using analytic models to forecast the supply
of, demand for, and price of either individual energy sources (e.g. oil,
coal, nuclear power, solar photovoltaics),or total energy in a given country,
region or globally have become the subject of an increasing literature.
See, e.g., (Landsberg 1982), (Koreisha and Stobaugh 1983), (Robinson 1982 a,b).
In this chapter, we briefly consider this issue, with particular reference to
those energy models which have been devised with the CO2 problem in mind.
Critiques of energy models and modeling can be broadly grouped under
the following categories.
(1) Analytic Structure: The ideal model would, on the one hand, be
detailed enough to capture basic features of the real world, (e.g., some
level of disaggregation by geographic region and fuel type, and the impact
of resource depletion and technological change on the price of fuels and
energy technologies)and, on the other, be sufficiently transparent and
tractable to enable both the model developer and others to derive results
under a variety of input conditions with a clear understanding of how the
model translates these inputs into outputs. The recent trend has been
towards formal models which are relatively simple in structure--we discuss
several in the following--and to a greater emphasis on their use for
determining the sensitivity of alternative futures to differences in the
value of various exogenous parameters, (e.g., energy price and income
elasticities, and the pace of technological change) rather than on prediction,
per se. This is mostly to the good, but it would be nice to "have one's cake
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and eat it too." That is, to have both simplicity and the ability to gain
insight into such issues as: the feedback of CO 2-induced climate change
on the global economy, the effect of a moratorium on nuclear power and of
a sudden cutoff in the supply of oil from the Middle East, and the possible
capital, land use, or material constraints in the introduction of new energy
technologies. In these terms, the state of the modeling art still leaves much
to be desired.
(2) Validity of Input Data: Having all the right "knobs to turn" in
terms of analytic structure is an illusory benefit if the appropriate settings
are poorly known or unknown. Unfortunately, this is the general
situation with regard to data on past and present energy use and resources
in many developing countries and the centrally planned economics.
(See, for example (Smil 1981) for a discussion of how little is known about
non-commercial energy use in developing countries). The data base for
the OECD countries is much better, but this is a mixed blessing as far
as energy forecasting is concerned since there is a natural tendency to
extrapolate past trends into the future. Since 1973 this has lead to
systematic overestimates of energy use in the OECD countries, particularly
the U.S. However, some energy forecasts have also had the opposite bias;
e.g., projections of OECD energy use in the decade 1960-1970 were consistently
underestimated (Freidman 1981).
Energy models for projecting future CO2 emissions are inherently global
and long-term; this has the advantage of being relatively insensitive to
short-term phenomena such as constraints in the supply of certain fuels
due to the present lack of the required infrastructure (e.g., gas pipelines,
coal ships), yearly fluctuations in energy demand due to variable weather
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conditions, and perturbations in birth rates. On the other hand, uncertainties
compound over time, and it is quite likely that the world 50 years hence will
be quite different in terms of geopolitical and economic structure, with marked
implications for energy use and the CO2 problem (Ausubel 1983).
(3) Mind-Sets, Biases, Hidden Agendas, Etc.
In the introduction to their essay on limits to models Koreisha and
Stobaugh tactfully note that model results are: "often modified by
personal judgments to make the results correspond more closely to the
specialists' understanding of the real world." This process is well
illustrated by a comparison of two well-known energy demand forecasts for
the year 2030 (Lovins et al 1982), (IIASA 1981). The former adopts the
same economic and populations growth assumptions of the latter to make
the point that these assumptions can be satisfied using only about one-fourth
the energy, provided that the energy/GNP ratio is reduced by the same factor.
Moreover, according to Lovins, such a reduction is not only technically
feasible, but also makes good sense from an economic, environmental, and
sociopolitical perspective. In particular, since such a modest energy
demand can be met almost entirely by decentralized renewables, there would
be no need for centralized fossil or nuclear energy sources, so that both
the CO2 problem and all the ills Lovins attributes to nuclear power fade away.
The IIASA agenda is not as explicit, but the view of both centralized
nuclear and fossil plants (including those that produce synthetic fuels)
is much more benign; indeed they are preferable to the radical changes'
in energy productivity and lifestyle that IIASA feels are implied by the low
energy futures of Lovins et al.
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Here then are two energy forecasts which are, in reality, largely
"backcasts" (Robinson 1982b). That is,the driving force is either an
explicit or implicit view of what constitutes a desirable energy future,
and the model input assumptions with regard to elasticities, prices, resources,
technological change, etc. are used to show how one can get from here to
there.
In practice, most modeling attempts are combinations of forecasting and
backcasting, or, to say the same thing in different words, of "positive"
and "normative" approaches (Ausubel and Nordhaus 1983). For example, in
previous work, (Perry et al 1981) we have developed scenarios of non-
fossil energy use over time based on the assumption that certain atmospheric
CO2 concentrations should not be exceeded, and that total energy use follows
the IIASA and World Coal Study (WOCOL 1981) projections.
4) To What End?
Because of past embarrassments with forecasts of energy supply and
demand which have proved to be quite wide of the mark, the emphasis in
recent work has been on using models in an "if... then" manner to explore al-
ternative futures rather than on making predictions. For example,
Edmonds and Reilly provide the following rationale for their work (Edmonds
and Reilly 1983):
In shor.t the future, and particularly the distant future, is
impossi'ble to predict. What is hoped for is that conditional
scenarios can be constructed to explore alternatives in a logical,
consistent, and reproducible manner. The model is not a crystal
ball in which future events are unfolded with certainty, but rather
an energy - CO assessment tool, of specific applicability, which
can shed insight into the long-term interactions of the economy,
energy use, energy policy, and CO2 emissions.
23
On the other hand, the model results and corresponding implications
for policy which are most often quoted in the published literature usually
refer to one or at most a few base or reference cases. Thus, at the end of
the above-cited paper, Edmonds and Reilly summarize their base case results,
and conclude that:
The pattern emerging from the modeling effort, continued slowing
of CO2 growth in this century followed by a jump in the rate of
increase, should caution policy makers and researchers from being
lulled in believing the CO problems will "go away" on the basis
of present trends and shor -term forecasts.
Similar remarks apply; e.g. to the previously cited work of Perry et al
those prescription for deriving the amount of non-fossil energy required to
avoid exceeding various CO2 limits is general, but whose illustrative
examples are based on the IIASA and WOCOL study demand scenarios principally
in order to demonstrate that those high-fossil-energy scenarios and low CO2
limits are virtually impossible to reconcile.
The danger is that the projections, scenarios, constraints, etc.
derived on the basis of specific assumptions will be taken out of context
and used to justify government policy decisions to, e.g., subsidize the
development of various renewable resources, modify the licensing procedures
for nuclear reactors, place a "CO2 tax" on coal, etc. In the
real world, a wide variety of long-term futures are possible, and it is
important to make explicit the underlying basis for key assumptions which
largely determine the results. As previously indicated, these are often
normative, and involve such factors as: the possibilities for innovation
in both fossil and non-fossil energy supply to technologies and for more
rational energy use, structural changes in the world economy, (the
inevitability of) population growth, and the feasibility of alternative
paths of economic development.
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In summary, criticisms of energy modeling focus on their use for
forecasting supply and demand in the long-term. Given especially the
sensitivity of outcomes to the values of a small set of uncertain exoge-
nous parameters, and the impossibility of taking into account unexpected
events such as wars, formation of oil cartels, breakthroughs in the
development of new technologies, the timing of economic cycles, and the
discovery and utilization of significant new energy resources (e.g.
deep-pressurized gas), it would be folly to attempt to draw implications
for present policy on the basis of specific predictions of energy supply
and demand in say, 2050. What is useful is to expose this sensitivity
of the model results to a wide range of possible values of the exogenous
parameters in a consistant and objective manner. We say possible rather
than plausible because it is very difficult for the modeler to avoid his
own normative judgements about what assumptions are "beyond the pale".
Moreover, the model should be sufficiently disaggregated to enable the
user to ask questions about, e.g., the ease of substitution between
specific fossil and non-fossil fuels as a function of place and time, while
retaining a transparent analytic structure unencumbered by knobs to turn for which
the data are non-existent or unreliable, or whose meanings are inscrutable.
The model we have chosen for our own work is the one developed by
Edmonds and Reilly which we have previously mentioned. To place this
model in context, we first briefly discuss two other recent energy-economic
models which were devised specifically to address the CO2 issue, and which
complement the Edmonds and Reilly model in various ways. These are due
to Nordhaus and Yohe (Nordhaus and Yohe 1983) and Hamm (Hamm 1983). A
discussion of the Edmonds and Reilly model along with our own results,
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and a summary comparison of all three models is given in Chapter 3. We
also note that Ausubel and Nordhaus (Ausubel and Nordhaus 1983) have
prepared a more extensive critique of models which have been used to
predict CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use, and that Hamm has assessed the
application of input-output analysis to modeling the CO2 problem. (Hamm
1982)
2.2 The Nordhaus and Yohe (N/Y) Model
The goal of Nordhaus and Yohe is to construct a simple and transparent
model of the global economy and CO2 emissions over a 125 year time horizon
(1975-2100), and to use this model to investigate the sensitivity of the
results relating to CO2 emissions to current uncertainties in the value of
ten exogenous parameters. The model is based on an aggregate global pro-
duction function of the Cobb-Douglas form:
X(t) = A(t) L(t) d t)E[1-d(t) , (1)
where X(t) is the global GNP, A(t) is the neutral productivity growth
factor, L(t) is the world population, [1-d(t)] is the share of GNP devoted
to paying for energy, and E(t) is a weighted sum of the aggregate non-fossil
and fossil energy consumption, En t) and Ec (t):
E = [bE (t)r + (1-b) En (t)r 1/r (2)
Here b is a fixed parameter which reflects the relative consumption of
Ec (t) and En (t) at t=o, and (r-1) 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between E (t) and E n(t), i.e.,
-l = d ln (Ec (t)/E (t))(r-1) =d ln (Pc (t)/pn(t)) (3)
where P( t) and Pn (t) are the respective prices.
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These prices in turn are determined by the relative rate of technological
change in the fossil and non-fossil industries and also, in the former case,
by the effects of resource depletion.
A noteworthy feature of the model is that by allowing the parameter d
to be a function of time, the production function is not constrained by
unitary income and price elasticities of demand as would be the case if
d were a constant in Equation (1). In the N/Y model d(t) is a function of
the weighted aggregate price of energy, P(t), and (q-l)~ , the elasticity
of substitution between total energy and labor. The latter represents
the aggregate of all nonenergy inputs into production; i.e.,
d = [K P(t)/-l + 1]-1 (4)
(q - 1)- = d (ln E(t)/L(t)) , (5)
d (ln P(t)/W(t))
where K is a constant and W(t) represents the wages paid to labor.
To run the model, values are chosen for r and q as well as for the para-
meters which specify population and neutral productivity growth, technological
change, and the size, composition, and depletion of the fossil fuel resource
base. The resulting outcome for fossil fuel consumption along with a para-
meter representing the marginal airborne fraction of CO2 gives the CO2
atmospheric concentration. To account for the current uncertainties in the
values of the ten parameters, high, medium and low estimates are used for
each, giving a total of 310 different possible outcomes.
The reported results, based on sampling 100 of 1000 outcomes,
can be summarized as follows:
(1) The annual growth rates of key output variables calculated as the
probability weighted means of 100 random runs are as shown in Table 2.1.
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Noteworthy is the large increase in non-fossil fuel consumption and the
large decoupling between energy and GNP to the year 2000. After 2000,
both economic and energy growth slow, and the decoupling between the two
is much smaller. These trends, plus the tendency to substitute non-fossil
for fossil fuels as a consequence of the increasing relative prices of the
latter, result in modest increases in the CO2 atmospheric concentration;
e.g., the nominal doubling level (600 ppm) is reached around the year 2070.
(2) A random sample of 100 outcomes for CO2 emissions and concentrations
shows that the odds are equal whether the 600 ppm level will be reached in
the period 2050-2100 or outside that period. There is one-in-four chance
that this concentration will occur before 2050 and one-in-twenty that it
will occur before 2035. (In the next chapter, we compare the outcomes
corresponding to the 5, 25, 50, 75 and 95th percentile of carbon emissions
with our own results using the Edmonds and Reilly model and other selected
scenarios.)
(3) Two different techniques were used to compute the relative contribution
of uncertainties in the ten exogenous parameters to the overall uncertainty in
the CO2 atmospheric concentration in 2100. In one method, the contribution
is calculated as the uncertainty induced when a particular parameter takes
its full range of uncertainty and all other parameters are set equal to their
most likely values. In the other method, the contribution is the difference
between the case in which all parameters vary according to their full range
of uncertainty and the case in which all the parameters again vary according
to their full range except the one of interest which is set at its most likely
value. In both methods, the three most sensitive parameters in order of
decreasing importance are: the ease of substitution between fossil and
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non-fossil fuels, general productivity growth, and the ease of substitution
between energy and labor. The authors consider this result to be an important
surprise, suggestive about research priorities in the CO2 area.
(4) The impact of taxes on fossil fuels as a means of reducing their
consumption and hence the growth of CO2 concentrations was considered. (The
efficacy of this policy has been investigated previously by Nordhaus and by
Edmonds and Reilly; (Nordhaus 1980) (Edmonds and Reilly 1982); in the latter
work, the impact of both global and US only taxes were considered.) The
major finding is that a significant reduction in CO2 requires a significant
tax; e.g., global taxes of about $60 per ton coal equivalent reduce the year
2100 CO2 concentrations by only 15% from the base case. (We note that
achieving global consensus on such a tax would be very difficult.)
2.1.1 Critique of the Model
The N/Y model has both the advantages and the drawbacks inherent in a
high degree of aggregation. Regarding the former, the model includes many
parameters of obvious importance in the determination of CO2 atmospheric
concentrations; e.g., the impact of resource depletion and technological
change on the prices of fossil and non-fossil fuels, the ease of substitution
between energy and labor and between fossil and non-fossil fuels, and neutral
productivity growth. Moreover, the fact that only ten parameters need to
be specified implies that the effort of uncertainty in these parameters on
the model results can be assessed using a relatively small sample of all
possible outqomes. On the other hand, models without either disaggregation either
geographically or within the fossil and non-fossil fuel categories have
obvious limitations. For example, the substitution of either nuclear
reactors or photovoltaic cells for coal in the electric sector would reduce
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CO2 emissions, but these two non-fossil technologies are quite different
in such matters as economic scale, environmental impact, grid integration,
prospects for technological change, etc. This implies that both the ease
of substitution between fossil and non-fossil fuels and the non-CO 2
implications thereof may vary in ways which cannot be captured by highly
aggregated models. However, the question of what degree of aggregation
is most useful is a difficult one.
Three final points: (1) Although the model does incorporate techno-
logical change on the supply side, there is no handle to account for the
possibility of improvements in energy end-use efficiency which are not
driven by price; (2) As previously noted, the model incorporates exo-
genous elasticities of substitution between labor and total energy, and
between fossil and non-fossil energy. These can be estimated from the
price elasticities of demand for both total energy and fossil fuels, and
the value share of energy in GNP using relations between these quantities
which follow from the definition of the production function; See e.g.
(Hogan 1979). However, the income elasticity of demand, d(ln X)/d(ln E),
at constant price cannot be specified exogenously. Rather the fact that
d(ln X)/dln E) is not fixed but varies over time in this model is a con-
sequence of the changing price of energy. Thus the effect of changes in
income elasticity as a function of economic development cannot be captured.
(3) Finally, the model does not account for the possibility of feedback
from CO2-produced environmental change to energy policy.
2.3 The Hamm Model
Like Nordhaus and Yohe, Hamm uses a highly aggregated production
function to model the global economy, and emphasizes the importance of
sensitivity analysis to identify those parameters whose range of
uncertainties cause the greatest variation in the model outcomes.
However, there are significant differences between the two models which
can be summarized as follows:
(1) While Nordhaus and Yohe use an equilibrium model, Hamm's approach
is to choose an optimum path for economic development based on maximizing
the value of objective function J which is given by:
T T
-tJ E (1+6) log Ct + KT - 0 Z Ft (6)
t=0 t=0
where: t is the index of time in the model; t = 0 is the year 1975 and t = T,
the terminal time, is 2050.
6 is the social discount rate. (There is a voluminous literature on the
appropriate value for 6; see, e.g. (Lind 1983) and the discussion in
Chapter 7.)
Ct is the dollar value of consumption in year t, and Log Ct is commonly
taken to represent the flow of value or utility from consumption at time t.
Thus the first term in Equation (6) is the utility flow discounted at the rate 6
and summed over the time horizon T.
Kt is the terminal capital stock and D is a measure of the tradeoff between
present consumption and future capital; e.g., a value of D = 6.67 x 10-15 implies
that society is indifferent between a $1 increase in present (1975) consumption
and a $30 gain in capital stock in 2050.
Ft is the fossil energy use in year t and 0 is a measure of the tradeoff
between present consumption and fossil energy use; e.g., a value of 0 = 2 x 10~4
implies that society is indifferent between a $1 increase in present consumption
and an increase of one ton coal equivalent in fossil energy resource left to
future generations. Note that the 0 term means that the effective price
of fossil energy (in utility terms) is raised by 0 above its market price.
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In sum, the conventional feature of this objective function is the term
which represents discounted utility; the unconventional features are the
inclusion of terms which represent concern for future generations through the
value placed on stocks of capital and fossil fuel resources left at the end of
the time horizon. (Both fossil and non-fossil energy are taken into account in
deriving the consumption, C t; the last term in the objective function represents
an extra fossil diseconomy.)
(2) The production function is a generalization of that used by
Nordhaus and Yohe in two respects: (a) capital and labor are independent
inputs to the production process instead of being lumped together in a
single nonenergy factor. There is a unit elasticity of substitution
between both capital and labor and also between fossil and nonfossil
fuels. (Recall that in N/Y the latter can be specified exogenously.)
Also, there is a constant elasticity of substitution between the pairs
of inputs: (capital, labor) and (fossil, nonfossil energy) which can
be specified exogenously. (b) CO2 feedback effects on production are
included both as a decrease in the productivity of all resources and as
an increase in depreciation of capital stocks with increasing atmospheric
CO2 concentrations.
(3) Fossil energy enters the model as a "choice" variable. That is,
three possible future paths of fossil energy use over time (high, nominal,
low) are specified exogenously and the objective function chooses the
optimum path. Nonfossil energy use is determined as a percentage of
total fuel use; this percentage, the market share, is assumed to increase
linearly with time along one of three exogenous paths. The other choice
variable is the investment rate given as a percentage of the GDP. Choices
are limited to three discrete values: high, 22%; nominal, 16%; and low, 10%.
(4) The cost of fossil/nonfossil energy is assumed to increase/decrease
with time, driven primarily by resource depletion and technological progress,
respectively.
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The model runs by specifying values for the choice variables and exogenous
parameters, and calculating values of GDP and the objective function J. With
regard to the choice variables, Hamm's basic finding is that with all exo-
genous parameters at their nominal values, the combination which maximizes
both GDP and the objective in 2025 and 2050 is nominal fossil fuel use and
high investment. This is true both with and without the inclusion of the
effects of CO2 on productivity and depreciation. Sensitivity of the results
to variations in the value of the exogenous parameters is tested by letting
a specific parameter take on its extreme values with all other parameters
set at their nominal values. By this criterion the most sensitive para-
meters are found to be: (1) e, the incremental shadow price of fossil fuels cons
before 2050. For example, if 6 is increased from its nominal value of a
$1 decrease in 1975 consumption per savings of one ton coal equivalent in
2050 to $4 per ton, the optimal fossil fuel path is shifted from nominal
to low; (2) the rate of nonfossil energy introduction. For example, a
change in the nonfossil market share from nominal to high (e.g., 30% to
65% in 2050) causes the optimal fossil fuel path to again shift from
nominal to low; (3) the overall rate of technological improvement as
given by the neutral productivity growth factor. An increase in this
parameter from 0.4%/yr to 1.2%/yr shifts the optimal fossil fuel path
from nominal to high. This somewhat paradoxical result can be explained
as follows. In most energy models, the GNP is specified first; then
technological improvement gives the same economic output with, e.g., a
smaller energy input. By contrast, in Hamm's model, fossil fuel use is
specified along one of three possible paths; then technological progress
gives a higher level of output with a given fossil fuel input; in
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particular, the highest GDP occurs at the highest energy. This is true
notwithstanding the inclusion of CO2 feedbacks because the range of
fossil fuel paths chosen does not lead to significant differences in
atmospheric CO2 ; e.g., the CO2 level in 2050 is 1.7 and 2 times the pre-
industrial level for the low and high fossil fuel paths, respectively.
2.3.1 Critique of the Model
In a useful self-assessment of his work, Hamm, like Nordhaus and
Yohe, stresses the importance of narrowing the uncertainty in key energy/
economic variables such as the investment rate, the rate and distribution
of technological progress, and the ability to substitute among different
inputs to production. His major criticisms of the model itself are that
the treatment of technological change, particularly relative change between
fossil and nonfossil inputs, needs improvement, and that the range of the
choice variables, investment rates, and fossil fuel use was too limited.
We are in basic agreement with these comments, especially regarding
relative technological change. In the N/Y model this aspect is handled
in a more transparent manner. Beyond this, the Hamm model, like N/Y, is
highly aggregated geographically and with regard to fuels. However, it
can accommodate CO2 feedbacks, and it also makes explicit the centrality
of societal choice in energy/economic decision-making via the choice of
objective function and associated parameters such as the social discount
rate and the incremental shadow price of fossil fuels.
Table 2.1
GNP
Energy Consumption
Fossil Fuel Consumption
Nonfossil Fuel Consumption
Price of Fossil Fuel.
Price of Nonfossil Fuel
CO Emissions
Concentrations
Annual Growth Rates of Key Output Variables
In The Nordhaus and Yohe Model
[percent per annum]
1975-2000
3.7
1.4
0.6
5.6
2.8
0.5
0.6
0.3
2000-2025 2025-2050 2050-2075 2075-2100
2.9 1.5 1.5 1.5
2.7 1.2 1.1 1.2
2.5 0.9 0.5 0.4
3.1 1.8 2.0 2.0
0.3 1.2 2.9 1.1
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
2.6 1.2 0.9 0.4
0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
Note: These are calculated as the probability weighted means of the 100 random runs.
3 !
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Chapter 3
THE EDMONDS AND REILLY MODEL AND
DERIVED SCENARIOS
3.1 Introduction
In addition to the N/Y and Hamm models discussed above, we considered
using a number of other more elaborate energy models. Eventually, we chose a
model devised by Edmonds and Reilly at the Institute of Energy Analysis. The
basic reason for this choice is that we wanted to test the sensitivity of
CO2 outcomes to uncertainties in the price and availability over time of a
variety of fossil and nonfossil supply technologies. The Edmonds and Reilly
(E/R) model includes most of the technologies of interest, and therefore
we have used it to develop eleven energy-CO2 scenarios to the year 2050. These
scenarios are discussed in Section 3.4 of this chapter; further details are
in Appendix B. To place these results in context, we first briefly describe
and critique the model itself.
The two most interesting approaches, aside from E/R, that we considered
are exemplified by the Leontief world model (Leontief 1966) and the PILOT
model (Dantzig 1981). The former is an input/output model, based on input/
output tables from a number of different countries, plus a world-trade sector.
Input/output modeling has the virtue of richness: one can include a large
array of technologies by adjusting the appropriate coefficient. The problem
with the input/output approach based on the world model is that it would be
necessary to add our own pollution sector.
PILOT is a linear programming model, and also can accommodate a virtually
inexhaustible array of energy technologies. However, it is a U.S.-only model,
whereas we needed one with global coverage. Also a pollution sector would
have been needed here as well.
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After considering these possible models, as well as others such as
ETA-MACRO (Manne 1981) we concluded that each of these alternatives would
require a substantial additional development effort before it could be useful
for our purposes. The E/R model, on the other hand, was basically available
and ready to run.
3.2 E/R Model Overview
The E/R model has been extensively documented by the developers and
their coworkers; for a fuller discussion, see in particular (Edmonds and
Reilly 1983), (Edmonds and Reilly 1983a).
The model forecasts energy paths and determines atmospheric carbon
release by fossil fuel type and world region to the year 2050. Its key
features can be summarized as follows:
(1) The world is divided into nine regions (Figure 3.1). More
detail is provided for in the OECD regions than in the nonmarket economies
or less industrialized countries because of the better quality of the
OECD data base. The time horizon is from 1975 to 2050. Projections car. be
developed for any year, but three benchmark years have been chosen for
scenario development--2000, 2025, and 2050.
(2) Nine primary energy sources are considered separately: coal,
conventional oil, unconventional oil (e.g., heavy oil, tar sands, shale),
conventional gas, unconventional gas (e.g., deep-pressurized gas), biomass,
and three nonfossil electric sources: hydro, solar (e.g., photovoltaic and
wind), and nuclear. Nonelectric solar (e.g., for low temperature heat) and
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noncommercial fuels are not considered. For the determination of energy
demand, the nine supply sources are aggregated into four secondary energy
types: solids, liquids, gas, and electricity. Trade across the model's
world regions is allowed for in solids, liquids, and gas, but not in
electricity.
(3) Energy prices are adjusted in successive iterations until
global supply and demand for each traded fuel balance within a pre-
specified bound.
(4) CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are accounted for at each stage
of the fuel cycle. For example, synthetic gas from coal will release
CO2 at the gas conversion stage and again when it is burnt.
3.2.1 Calculating Energy Demand
The major determinants of the level and composition of energy demand
in a given region are: population, GNP, and the relative prices of the
various energy types. The actual calculation of demand is rather
complicated; to give an indication of the level of detail in the model, we
outline it below and in Figure 3.2.
(1) The regional price for a given primary fuel type (e.g., coal in
the U.S.) is the sum of an assumed base world market price corresponding
In our work, we have attempted to account in part for the consumption
of non-commercial fuels by having part of the biomass resource available
at very low cost (corresponding to gathering sticks, rice, straw,
dung, etc.).
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to domestic production in coal-rich areas, transport costs, and any taxes
or subsidies. The price of a secondary fuel type (e.g., electricity or
synthetic gasoline from coal) can then be calculated by taking into account
conversion efficiencies and nonenergy costs.
(2) The cost of providing energy services to energy end-use sector k
using secondary fuel type j, Pjk (e.g., automobile transportation using
synthetic gasoline from coal, with price per passenger-mile as the measure)
then follows from assumed end-use conversion efficiencies and nonenergy
costs.
(3) The aggregate cost Pk of energy services in sector k is a
weighted sum of the P jk where the weights are exogenous shares for fuel
j in sector k, Sjk'
(4) Pk' together with assumed values for the following exogenous
parameters: base GNP*, population, and price and income energy service
elasticities, determine the total demand Ek for energy services in sector k.
(5) The Ek from (4) is combined with: values of endogenous fuel
service shares S jk* (calculated from the P.k and values of fuel-specific
exogenous price and income energy service elasticities), the fuel require-
ments per unit service gjk, and value of an exogenous parameter, TECHjk
which accounts for the possibility of future improvements in end-use energy
productivity which are not driven by price. This gives Fjk the total
*
The actual GNP is endogenous, depending on both base GNP and energy prices
through an energy-GNP feedback mechanism.
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demand for fuel j in sector k.
(6) Summed over all sectors, the result is the region's total demand F.
J
for secondary fuel type j. The total regional demand for primary fuels
then follows from secondary demand and the relevant conversion efficiencies.
3.2.2 Calculating Energy Supply
For price-supply modeling, the nine primary energy types are divided
into three categories:
(1) Resource-constrained nonrenewable resources; e.g., conventional
oil and gas. Their production over time is assumed to follow a Hubbert bell-
shaped curve. This implies that maximum production occurs when half the
resource is exploited and that cumulative production follows a logistic
curve. Prices do not affect the exploitation of these resources.
(2) Resource-constrained renewable resources. This category is
further divided into resources whose production over time is or is not
price-responsive. The most important example of price-insensitive resources is
hydroelectricity; these are modeled as being phased in over time as determined
by a logistic curve with total resource and prices as exogenous inputs.
The only example of price-sensitive resources treated in the model is
biomass. Both biomass from waste as well as biomass from farms are
included. The waste resource base is considered to be proportional to
the level of economic activity, while that available from farms is inde-
pendent of it. Since biomass and coal have many common characteristics,
e.g., they can be consumed as solids or converted to liquids or gases,
the price of coal is assumed to govern the price of biomass feedstocks
except that, as previously noted, part of the resource is made available
at very low cost to represent consumption of non-commercial fuels.
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(3) Unconstrained or backstop technologies. These include unconventional
oil and gas, coal, solar electric, and nuclear. Their supply is specified
in terms of: production cost, P, the ratio of output at time t, Qt, to a
base output Q*, g = Q t/Q*, and three exogenous parameters a, b, c, by the
equation:
P = a exp ( )c
This equation is depicted in Figure 3.3. It is seen that P increases as
Qt increases, and that there is no production if P falls below a, the
breakthrough price. If more output is demanded from the backstop sector
than its base rate, prices rise in the short-term above the long-term
*
backstop price P , and vice versa. The price elasticity of supply E
follows from Equation (1)
BlnQ _ (g/b)-c
3lnP c (2)
Technological change in the supply side is accommodated by decreasing the
breakthrough price as a function of time.
3.3 Critique of the Model
In comparison with the models of Nordhaus and Yohe and Hamm - see
Chapter 2 - the Edmonds and Reilly model is highly disaggregated; hence,
useful in principle for determining how future energy paths and CO2 emissions
depend on the relations between the economy, energy supply
and demand, and technological change. The price the user pays
for this flexibility is not an excessive amount of computation--
a run takes only seconds of CPU time--but the need to specify over 60
categories of inputs (See Appendix A), many of which can be further dis-
aggregated by region, fuel type, and year. Testing sensitivity in the
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manner of Nordhaus and Yohe then becomes a heroic task; the overriding
issue, however, is whether the level of detail in the E/R model is
optimum for deciding about CO2 and energy policy.
Beyond this general point, there are several specific areas in which
the model could be improved. Some of these have also been noted by Edmonds and
Reilly, and by others; e.g., (Reister, 1983).
(1) Additional energy end-use categories. We have previously mentioned
two additional energy end-use categories we believe to be important: low-
temperature heat and non-commercial fuels, particularly firewood. The
importance of both is well recognized; for example, the former accounts for
about 40% of end-use energy consumption in OECD countries, while the latter is
the primary energy source in the rural sector of many developing countries.
(2) Modification of the supply function for backstop technologies.
Two aspects of the specification of supply functions for backstop technologies
are problematical. First, the impact of technical change is currently modeled
as an exogenous decrease in the breakthrough price over time. It would be more
realistic to have the breakthrough price at a given time depend on the
cumulative production of the resource to that time.
A second problem is that the supply function in Equation (1) slopes
steeply upward if the exponent c is high. After experimenting with the
model, Reister reports that the supply function for coal is almost
completely inelastic in the region where the model calculates its
equilibrium prices. This implies that the coal output in each year is
constrained to be very close to the base output (i.e., very close to Q*).
Consequently, the exogenously chosen base outputs appear to play too large a
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role in determining the equilibrium. Reister does not present alternative
estimates of the supply elasticities for backstop technologies. However,
we believe such estimates are readily available, and it would be advantageous
to have the supply functions for backstop technologies recalibrated in the model.
(3) Making the supply of conventional oil and gas price-responsive.
We have noted that the resource-constrained non-renewable resources (conventional
oil and gas) used Hubbert curves. As noted later in this report, we feel
that the extraction cost estimates for these resources are higher than
specified in the E/R base case. The lack of an explicit supply function
made it necessary to resort to awkward adjustments to E/R model parameters in
order to adjust the extraction costs.
(4) Inclusion of CO feedback in the economy. As noted in Chapter 2,
only Hamm's model includes this link. It is modeled there as a non-linear
decrease in overall productivity and an increase in the depreciation rate of
capital with rise in CO2 concentration. This is rather rudimentary but,
given the current state of knowledge about the impact of climate change, it
is difficult to see how it can be improved upon.
(5) Capital formation and depreciation. Capital formation and
depreciation are not considered in the model. That is, every 25 years the
slate is wiped clean in terms of energy facilities, and the mix of
technologies is determined anew on the basis of current prices. However,
the buildup and depreciation of a capital stock are important
factors in the penetration of new technology. For instance, a world where a
significant investment had been made in the infrastructure required for a
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major increase in coal use would be less likely to reduce coal use significantly,
even in the face of clear indications of adverse CO 2-induced climate change.
The reason capital has to be omitted is probably related to the
equilibrium modeling methodology used in the E/R model. If capital were
present the computational burden would rise because equilibria in all time
periods would have to be calculated simultaneously. More importantly, it
would be necessary to specify rules for saving and investment in different
energy sectors and regions. This would necessitate an additional elaboration
of the macroeconomic side of the model.
Table 3.1 gives a summary comparison of the Edmonds and Reilly, Nordhaus
and Yohe, and Hamm models. In noting the differences, it is important to keep
in mind that the intent of the modelers is different. Thus, Nordhaus and
Yohe are mainly interested in determining the effect of current uncertainties
in various energy-economic-carbon cycle parameters on the range of possible
future paths for energy use and CO2 emissions. Hamm's analytic framework
is more ambitious: rather than deriving future energy paths, the model seeks
optimum futures in terms of an objective function which includes both
discounted consumption and the effects of resource depletion, as well as a
production function which accounts for CO2 feedbacks to the economic sector.
The basic similarity is that both Nordhaus and Yohe and Hamm use a highly
aggregated approach in an attempt to gain insight into the relative importance
of uncertainties in the parameters which drive the energy-economic system.
By contrast, the Edmonds and Reilly model is intended as an analytic tool for
those who want to explore how alternative energy-CO2 futures depend on a much
more detailed specification of the energy-economic system. As previously
noted, this makes the model more difficult for the user to deal with--both
in terms of understanding the analytic structure and specifying inputs--but also
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gives the user more degrees of freedom to explore.
3.4 Scenarios Developed Using the Edmonds and Reilly Model
In this section we briefly describe the eleven scenarios which were
developed for this study using the Edmonds and Reilly model; they are
referred to in the following as the MIT cases. All are variations on
an Institute of Energy Analysis (IEA) scenario which we call the IEA
base case. Noteworthy features of the latter are the availability of large
quantities of inexpensive fossil fuels, particularly coal, and an increase
of energy end-use efficiency of 1%/yr. in the industrial sector of OECD
countries. However, no increases in end-use efficiency are assumed in the OECD
transportation and residential/commercial sectors nor in the non-OECD countriEs.
(End-use is not disaggregated in the latter.)
A detailed characterization of the IEA base case and the MIT varia-
tions thereof is given in Appendix B; Figure 3.4 is a summary map of the
relations between the cases. The resultant projections of global primary
energy demand and carbon emissions to the year 2050 are shown in Figures
3.5 and 3.6, respectively. For comparison purposes, the latter Figures
also show the energy and carbon emission projections of IIASA, Colnmbo and
Bernardini, and Lovins, (IIASA 1981), (Lovins et al 1982), while Figure 3.7
has superimposed the outcomes of the Nordhaus and Yohe model corresponding
to the 5, 25, 50, 75, and 95th percentiles of carbon emissions. Finally,
Tables 3.2 compares the GNP and energy use projections in the year 2025 for
the IEA base case and the MIT cases.
3.4.1 MIT Case Summaries: Some "CO,-Benign" Results
The MIT cases are summarized below. All assume increased end-use
efficiencies as compared with the IEA base case, and, except for case K,
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have higher synfuel costs. In addition, as indicated in Figure 3.4 and
the summaries, we have explored the impact of both evolutionary and
abrupt changes in energy supply conditions. The former include higher/lower
costs for fossil fuels/solar electricity; the latter are a cutoff in the
supply of oil from the Middle East and a moratorium on nuclear-generated
electricity. The results are as expected; in particular, the high fossil
fuel and low solar electric prices and the increased end-use efficiencies
which characterize cases L, J, and M lead to substantial reductions in both
total energy use and carbon emissions and a significant penetration of solar
in the electric sector as compared with the IEA base case and the IIASA
and Colombo and Bernardini scenarios.
The relatively CO2-benign scenarios, J, L and M in particular, are
not low-energy in a Draconian sense; Figure 3.5 shows them comparable to
that of Colombo and Bernardini. They would require global awareness and
collaboration, starting very soon. While perhaps at the lower limit of
possible realities, these scenarios do not appear to us impossible; recall
that energy projections for the early 2000's now being made are much below
what people believed possible only a decade ago.
What future atmosphere CO 2-levels do these scenarios imply? Their
carbon emissions are on the average not much different from today's values,
about 4.8 GT/year. If we assume a constant atmospheric retained fraction
of 0.53 and no other complications, we would find an increase of 80 ppmv to about
420 ppmv at the year 2050. The "CO2 doubling time," often used to gauge
the degree of difficulty, becomes about 250 yearsbeyond all predictable sight.
These scenarios are not quite benign, but show that an option space exists
in which the CO2-climate problem is much ameliorated.
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Case A
In this case, oil and gas prices were increased, and biomass resources
were substantially reduced. Since the conventional oil and gas are not
price responsive in the model, the effect of increased prices were simulated
by moving a portion of the conventional oil and gas resources to the
unconventional oil and gas resource category and raising the breakthrough
prices of the latter.
Biomass is viewed as being competitive in price, but difficult to
sustain. The global biomass resource specified is 1115 EJ/yr.
In addition, nuclear costs were raised to account for current trends.
Transmission and distribution costs are included in these estimates.
Case B
For this case, coal reserves were reduced and prices increased. These
changes were made to simulate the effect of non-CO2 environmental constraints
on coal use. The changes result in a large decrease in coal use and in
carbon emissions. For example, the projected average price of coal in
Japan in the year 2000 is $3.60/GJ (1975$), an increase of about a factor
of 4 compared with the base case. The current coal price in Japan is
about $3.00/GJ M $80/tonne. This is equivalent to $1.75/GJ in $1975
assuming a (1.08)~1 deflation factor.
Case C
This case is a combination of Cases A and B: higher fossil fuel
prices, smaller coal reserves, higher nuclear costs, and less biomass
resource. The resulting energy consumption is 60% of the energy consumed
in the IEA Base Case.
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Case D
The new feature of this case is an optimistic view of the development
of photovoltaic technology. That is, it is assumed to be available in
the year 2010 at $0.30 per peak watt (1980$) for finished modules. At
(1.08)~l deflation, this is $.205 per peak watt in 1975$. Assuming
equivalent balance-of-system costs and a capacity factor 0.2 (corresponding
to mid-latitude average insolation day/night-summer/winter, etc.), the total
system cost is $2.05 per watt, or $9.50/GJ electric, assuming a capital
charge rate of 15%/yr.
Thus, the differences from the base case include: increased
efficiencies, higher synfuel costs, and the new solar price. Note that
this case has the same coal values as the base case: large reserves at
inexpensive prices.
Case E
Case E is a combination of all changes from the previous cases except
for the higher nuclear costs. In other words, this is Case C with the
optimistic solar minus higher nuclear costs. Main characteristics are:
higher fossil fuel prices, less biomass resource, lower solar prices,
and less coal available. Total energy consumption decreases 65% with
a large shift from fossil fuels to solar. However, nuclear demand
remains very high as in the baqe case.
Case F
The output of this case is very similar to Case C since the solar
photovoltaic price of $0.63 per peak watt = $20/GJ electric is approxi-
mately the same solar price as the base case.
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Case G
There is no case G.
Case H
This case includes a nuclear power moratorium: existing reactors
are shut down and no new plants are built after the year 2000. This is
modeled by making the breakthrough price of nuclear energy very high. Hence,
by the year 2025 there is a negligible amount of nuclear capacity worldwide.
This is combined with the assumptions of Case E, producing a further decrease
in energy consumption from the IEA base case. The energy supplied by
nuclear in Case E partially shifts to oil and coal, and to an even greater
degree to solar.
Case J
The changes from Case E are a higher unconventional oil price, a
cut-off in oil from the Middle East in 2000, and increased end-energy
efficiencies everywhere, in all sectors. That is, these efficiencies
increase geometrically from 1%/yr. in 1975 in all end-use sectors of all
countries. The result is a 20% decrease in global energy consumption
as compared to Case E.
Case K
The inputs changed in this case are nuclear costs, end-use effi-
ciencies, and the Mideast oil supply. The nuclear breakthrough price
is considerab'ly higher in this case than in the other cases except H.
The efficiencies for the OECD industrial sector and in all of the non-OECD
regions are higher than those specified in cases A through H. Compared
to Case J, the efficiency for OECD industrial sector is equal, but the
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efficiency increase in the non-OECD regions is much lower than in J.
Furthermore, the OECD residential/commercial and transportation sector
efficiencies are higher in all the other cases. The Middle East oil
supply is cut off by the year 2000, as in J. However, since this case
has large reserves of coal at cheap prices, as in the base case, the
liquid fuel demand is met by synfuels whose use grows by about 50%
compared to the base case.
Case L
As compared with Case E, this case is characterized by a large
decrease in unconventional resources, a slight decrease in coal prices,
and increased end-use efficiencies. This case highlights the impact of
increased end-use efficiencies on primary energy consumption.
Case M
Case M is similar to Case L, however it also has higher coal prices
and lower coal reserves. Moreover, unconventional resources are essentially
eliminated. Thus, the main characteristics of this case include: high end-
use efficiencies, small coal reserves, high coal prices, small biomass re-
source, no unconventional oil, and low solar prices.
General Features
Energy
Geographical Supply
Disaggregation Types
Technological
Change Elasticities
Zdmonds and Reilly
Nordhaus and Yohe
Hamm
Equilibrium; Disaggregated
by Fuel Type and Region;
Projects Energy Use and
CO2 Emissions; No CO2 Feed-
back to Economy or Energy
Sector.
Equilibrium; Highly
aggregated; projects ener-
gy use and CO2 Emissions;
No CO2 feedback to economy
or energy sector.
Optimizing; highly aggre-
gated; energy use a choice
variable; CO feedback to
economy; explicit con-
sideration of capital
sector.
Nine global
regions; end
use in OECD
regions di-
vided into
industrial,
transport,
and commer-
cial/resi-
dential sec-
tors.
None.
None.
Nine primary; On energy supply via
four second- changing prices over
ary; solids, time for backstop
liquids, gas- technologies; on ener-
es, electri- gy demand via energy
city. productivity para-
meter.
One Fossil;
one non-
fossil.
One fossil;
One non-
fossil.
!On energy supply via
price adjustments over
time for fossil and
non-fossil fuels;
overall change via
neutral productivity
factor.
On energy supply via
price adjustments over
time for fossil and
non-fossil fuels;
Overall change via
neutral productivity
factor.
Exogenous regional income
and price elasticities by
secondary fuel type;
elasticities of substitu-
tion between fuels in logit
share formalism.
Exogenous elasticities of
substitution between fossil
and non-fossil fuels and
between energy and non-
energy sectors of production.
Unitary elasticities of
substitution between capital
and labor and between fossil
and non-fossil fuels; exo-
genous elasticity of sub-
stitution between capital
labor and fossil/non-fossil
input pairs.
Table 3.1
Summary Comparison of Edmonds and Reilly, Nordhaus and Yohe and Hamm Energy-CO2 Models
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Table 3.2 Comarson of EA Base Case and MIT Cases .
Values in 2025 (Base Case = 1.00, (1975))
Scenario
Base Case
Case A
Case B
Case C
Case D
Case E
Case F
Case H
Case J
Case K
Case L
Case M
GDP
1.00
($25.4 x
0.99
0.99
0.97
1.00
0.98
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
ENERGY
1.00
(921 EJ)
(28.6 TWyr)
0.77
0.71
0.59
0.78
0.65
0.59
0.59
0.52
0.71
0.55
0.52
ENERGY/GDP
1.00
(36 MJ/$)
(9.9 kwh/$)
0.71
0.72
0.61
0.78
0.66
0.60
0.61
0.53
0.72
0.56
0.53
52
Kow: 1. UA: 2. OECD Wat: 3. OECD Aa.- 4. Carady srned Europe: 5. Camrliy ptand Asa: 6 WwW Eat: 7. Atnca 8. LnMrca: 9. South and Eat As.
Figure 3.1
Geopolitical Divisions in the Edmonds and Reilly Model
MIN
Coftverns &f- S,~
w flja~ails . InSe ,k
NMb4 *NnjW
UM
Ecz end(
FjCdtbe.
Figure 3.2
Calculating Energy Demand in the E/R Model
LI'
W-
'Thans
74 ypzs
or
CO
vcattg
o,... ,
0F e
Figure 3.3
o
Supply Schedule for Backstop Technologies
54
increased end-use efficiency
decreased sat. of gas flared
increased price of synfuels
IEA BASE CASE
increased end-oue
effictent les. but
less Itan cases A-J
huigher nuclear costs
Hid past oil supply in
cuat of I at year 2010
higher nuclear costs
smaller Hid East oil supply
higher oil & gas prices
smaller biomass resource
. A
higher coal prices
smaller coAl reserves
lower solar prices
K
lower solar coats
but greater than 0
F
no nuclear Inut.-
lation after the
year 21000
C H
nuclear costs
as In Base Case
el E
Increased uncon-
ventional oil
price
increased end-use
efficiencies
Hid Last oil supply is
cut off at year 2000
higher coal prices
smaller coal reserves
Figure 3.4
Summary 11ap of IEA Base Case and MIT Cases
tn
Lii
L
Hid last oil
restored
Figure 3.5 56
Global Primary Energy Projections: MIT Cases and other Scenarios
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Global Carbon Emissions: MIT Cases and Other Scenarios
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Chapter 4
MINI-ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND TECHNOLOGIES:
FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS
In Chapter 3, we delineated a range of possible energy futures using the
Edmonds and Reilly model as an analytic framework together with values of
the required input data. In the latter, the primary focus of our work has
been on the supply side; that is, on the price and availability of various
energy resources and the technologies to exploit these resources. (The
need to consider both is easily seen, e.g., the resource endowment of
uranium was irrelevant to the evaluation of energy supplies until the
development of a technology to convert uranium to usable energy through
nuclear reactors, and the amount of usable energy that can be derived from
this resource depends on whether the reactors are burners or breeders of
fissile material.) (Vogelyl983). In this and succeeding chapters, we
attempt to provide justification for these inputs and support for the
results in the form of mini-assessments of selected energy supply and demand
options, and issues related to their implementation. In particular, we
consider: coal, solar photovoltaic (PV), wind, biomass, nuclear fission
and fusion, materials use, energy storage, efficiencies in energy end-use,
and the problems involved in integrating intermittent energy sources
(e.g. PV and wind) in an electric grid. No attempt has been made to
provide comprehensive overviews of these areas. Rather we have tried to
identify those current developments and long-term trends which are
particularly relevant to the CO2 problem; e.g., what are the long-term
prospects for such generating technologies as fluidized bed combustion of
coal, thin-film photovoltaics, battery storage, and advanced fission? That
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is, our emphasis is on assessing the state of future knowledge: what
we may be able to do in say, 25-50 years, and the consequences thereof
for CO2, rather than short-term problems and opportunities.
4.1 Coal
The relevance of coal to the CO2 problem can be seen from Figure 4.1.1
In brief, combustion of all estimated recoverable oil and gas resources will
not raise the atmospheric CO2 concentration above about 450 ppm. However,
combustion of any significant fraction of the large coal resource base--here
estimated to be 5000 Gtce of recoverable resource--will increase atmospheric
CO2 well above 600 ppm, which represents a doubling of the preindustrial
CO2 concentration, and is often used as a benchmark for the onset of serious
adverse climatic impacts. There are some obvious caveats to this
identification of the CO2 problem exclusively with coal. Thus, on the one
hand, there may be serious climatic impacts at much lower CO2 concentrations
and, on the other, large additional amounts of carbon are contained in
sources which are not now in commercial production (e.g. oil shale,
heavy oils, tar sands, and perhaps unconventional sources of natural gas),
but which may be exploited in the future. Taking these factors into account,
it would probably be more accurate to say that a risk-averse position
with regard to CO 2-induced climatic impact would involve limiting the
use of all fossil fuels. Still, given: (1) the large size and wide
geographical distribution of coal resources, (2) the array of technologies
now under development to extract and burn it in a more cost-effective and
environmentally benign fashion, and (3) the fact that significant
exploitation of sources such as oil shale and tar sands poses environmental
problems just as daunting as that involved in coal use, if not more so, a
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focus on coal seems justified.
An interesting perspective on the linkage between CO 2-induced climate
changes and the use of coal has been explored by Ausubel. (1983). He
points out that such climate changes, if they occur, will not occur in a
vacuum. That is, the world in say, 2030, may, for example, be populated by
twice as many people as today, many of whom will live in countries
characterized by both social inequity and technological sophistication,
including the capability to make atomic weapons. The geopolitical impact
of such changes, and their possible synergism with CO 2-induced climate
change, is difficult to predict. However, as Ausubel points out, the
assumptions which lead to increased levels of CO2 also directly imply
changes in human settlement, international trade, industrial structure, as
well as other aspects of the environment; he surveys, in particular,
the health and environmental consequences of greatly increased coal extrac-
*
tion and use. Exploring these non-CO 2 implications of the assumptions
which produce CO2 is important because it may indicate whether the world
will be "saved" from potential CO 2-induced problems by technical, economic,
and environmental constraints which preclude reaching dangerous CO2 concentrations
in the first place. Before commenting on this, we summarize some information
on coal resources and reserves, extraction, combustion, and conversion to
gases and liquids.
It is worth noting that the assumptions that lead to significantly reduced
levels of future CO2 emissions also imply marked technical, economic, and
sociopolitical changes.
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4.1.1 Coal Reserves and Resources
Table 4.1.1 taken from (IEA 1982), compares two recent estimates of coal
resources and reserves. While the bulk of reserves and--to an even greater
extent--resources are located in a small number of countries, we note that
the estimated resource base outside of the three largest, the U.S., U.S.S.R.,
and People's Republic of China, is roughly a factor of two larger than
estimated total global oil resources. Moreover, estimates of both resources
and reserves have been continuously revised upwards in recent years (see
Table 4.1.2) and given the fact that known deposits are not always reported,
and that there has been little exploration activity in many regions (e.g.,
much of Africa, Central America, Western Siberia, Northern China) (Wood 1983),
the technically and economically recoverable resource estimate of 5000 Gtce
used in Figure 4.1.1 may well prove to be conservative. At first glance this
appears academic from the perspective of potential CO2-induced climate
change since this is already enough coal to increase atmospheric CO2
concentrations many-fold over pre-industrial levels. However, to the
extent that coal is found more widely in otherwise energy-resource-poor
developing countries, the future of CO2 emissions will not lie in the hands
of very few countries, and hence, the possibility of international
cooperative actions to limit coal use because of climate change seem
both necessary and (unfortunately) increasingly unlikely.
4.1.2 Coal Mining and Transportation
The labor intensity characteristic of coal extraction, particularly
underground mining, is larger than that of other nonrenewable resources, and
this is sometimes seen as a possible constraint on a significant expansion of
coal use. That is, given the fact that coal mining involves higher probabilities
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of occupational health and disabling injury than almost any other trade, and
also that the mines themselves may be located in inhospitable regions (e.g.,
Western Siberia), it may not be possible to attract the required labor force
to sustain production at significantly higher rates. On the other hand,
increased demand for coal usually leads to more favorable work incentives
(e.g. increased pay, health benefits, and job training) in regions where
alternative employment is often scarce; moreover, more strip mining, innovations
in underground mining, and the opening of new and larger mines should
increase labor productivity. For example, in the U.S. labor productivity
has been increasing since 1979, after a steady decline in the 1970's. In the
People's Republic of China, where one-third of coal output comes from
more than 20,000 small rural mines and pits, and only one-third of all coal
mining operations are mechanized, a modernization and mechanization program
is underway with foreign participation. In sum, labor availability may
well be a problem in the short term, but should not constrain ultimate
production to levels which would have a negligible impact on the CO2 problem.
The same general comment applies to transport of coal from mine to user.
There are well-recognized inadequacies in the entire transport chain, including
inland transport and the ports and ships required for a greatly increased
international coal trade. The bill for remedying this will not be cheap, e.g., the
World Coal Study (WOCOL 1980) estimates that for the OECD countries alone,
infrastructure costs (including new mines) required to support an increase
in coal use to a level of 2000 mtce/yr by the year 2000 will be on the order
of $200 billion (U.S. 1978 $). However, WOCOL also notes that this sum
is less than 1 percent of the estimated aggregate capital formation of these
countries during the period to the year 2000. Moreover, just as in the case
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of mine labor productivity, new technological developments such as coal
slurry pipelines and economies of scale in ocean transport using large
carriers should facilitate increased coal use.
4.1.3 Coal Combustion
Although coal causes environmental impacts throughout its fuel cycle
from extraction to end-use, combustion is the part of the fuel cycle which
elicits the greatest public concern, particularly on what comes out of the
stack. This includes carbon dioxide, sulfur and nitrogen oxides, particulates,
trace metals and metalloids such as arsenic, chromium, beryllium and cadmium,
organic compounds, and radionuclides. Recently, the focus of concern,
especially in industrial countries, has shifted from environmental impacts
in the neighborhood of the stack to the long-range transport, conversion,
and deposition of the sulfur and nitrogen oxides--the acid rain problem
(see Chapter 8). In the U.S., emission controls require desulfication of
flue gases, usually by scrubbing with lime or limestone. This is expensive,
both in capital and operating cost, and creates a sludge which is
difficult to dispose of. Although coal washing to remove most of the
inorganic sulfur and the development of dry scrubbing techniques can
ameliorate the problem somewhat, a better solution, particularly for high
sulfur and high ash coals, is fluidized bed combustion.
A fluidized bed is formed when a bed of finely divided particles
is subjected to an upward air stream of such velocity that the particles
become turbulently suspended and resemble a bubbling liquid. The bed is
heated up by burners directed into the surface, and, when a temperature
of about 6000C is reached, crushed coal is introduced at the base of the bed
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and is burnt, continuously maintaining a temperature of 800-9000C, which
is below the fusion temperature of most coal ash. Because coal is only a
minor constitute of the bed, consisting mainly of ash, limestone or dolomite
can be added and is effective in suppressing 80% to 90% of the SO2
emission; the sulfur emerges with the solid residues as calcium sulfate.
Moreover, at temperatures of 800-9000C, which are much lower than those in
conventionally-fired boilers (%1400 0C), nitrogen in the air is no longer
"fixed," and the quantity of NO formed is determined solely by the nitrogen
content of the coal. This lower combustion temperature also results in a
reduction of the quantity of trace metals emitted.
For power generation, which is currently the largest market for coal,
pressurized fluidized bed combustion may be even more advantageous. This is
because the high heat transfer rate in fluidized beds allow the larger heat
release rate of pressurized combustion to be matched by an appropriate heat
transfer surface in a unit of modest dimensions. As in an atmospheric
fluidized bed, steam is raised in tubes immersed in the bed, but after
a hot gas cleaning stage, the high pressure off-gases can be used to drive
a gas turbine, thus combining the efficiency advantage of combined cycle
operation with the environmental benefits of reduced SO and NO emissions.
x x
Fluidized bed combustion is an active area of research, development,
and demonstration in the U.S. and Western Europe. These range from basic
studies on the fluid mechanics of beds to the operation of various pilot-scale
atmospheric and pressurized facilities. The atmospheric version is more
highly developed at the present time, but in the longer term, pressurized
combustion seems very attractive for utility power generation, in comparison
with both conventional coal combustion with flue gas scrubbing as well as
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nuclear power and such renewable options as wind, photovoltaic, and hydro.
4.1.4 Gasification for Power Generation
An alternative method for generating electricity which can achieve both
high thermodynamic efficiency and minimal environmental impact is to first
gasify the coal and then use the gas, after scrubbing to remove sulfur and
particulates, to fire a gas turbine from which the exhaust gases are used
either to raise process steam or to drive a steam turbine in a combined cycle.
(The potential advantage of the latter as compared with combined cycle operation
using pressurized fluidized beds is a limitation on the efficiency of bed
combustion, due to the fact that at temperatures above about 10000C there is
an increasing risk of softening, agglomeration, and subsequent defluidization
of the ash particles.)
Note that the fuel gas need not have a high energy content since it is
burnt on site rather than transported long distances. Two major areas of
current technology development in coal gasification systems are high temperature
gas turbines and gasifiers which are insensitive to coal type. Like
fluidized beds, such systems would be attractive for utility power generation
as well as topping cycles for industrial cogeneration.
Some proposed versions of these coal conversion plants have the CO2
effluent appearing fairly clean and concentrated; the main original purpose
was to produce CO for oil recovery and other industrial uses. Our conclusions2
that: (a) only coal could cause a large CO2-climate problem, (b) much of that
coal would be used to generate electricity, (c) effluent controls would probably
become much more severe (apart from CO2 considerations) offers a glimmer of
hope for sequestering a substantial amount of CO2. Much of the CO2 extraction
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and concentration, tasks that seemed hopeless in conventional combustors,
will be done as a natural part of the cycle. But exploring the practicality
of this would require a whole separate study.
4.1.5 Coal and the Liquid Fuel Problem
Supplying liquid fuels for transport after conventional oil effectively
runs out is often called "the energy problem within the energy problem."
Many alternatives have been suggested including electric vehicles, hydrogen,
oil shale, and the alcohol fuels, methanol and ethanol. The prospects
for the non-alcohol alternatives can be briefly summarized: (1) Although there
has been a significant effort to develop batteries with the specific energy,
cycle life, and cost required for electric vehicle applications, none are as
yet available (Cairns 1981). Moreover, even if a breakthrough occurs, it will take many
years to put the necessary infrastructure into place. Given this, an
optimistic view is that electric vehicles are a serious option in the next
century, particularly for urban transport. (2) Like the substitution of
electricity for petroleum, the use of hydrogen requires a new distribution
system and a new fuel tank. The latter is a significant design problem. More
fundamental still is the question of where the hydrogen will come from.
Currently, most hydrogen is manufactured by steam reforming of methane;
some is also made by coal gasification. The only significant non-fossil option
is electrolysis of water using cheap hydroelectric power, which, unfortunately,
is not generally available. Many alternatives to electrolysis for hydrogen
production have been suggested, e.g., solar photolysis of water and irradiation
of semiconductor/liquid junctions, but this work is still at the laboratory
stage. Overall, we judge "the hydrogen economy" to be, at best, a distant
prospect. (3) Although the resources of oil shale are estimated to be larger
than those of conventional oil (\400 vs. %250 Gtoe respectively), only a
small fraction is exploitable with present technology, and commercial production is
currently limited to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and a little
Brazil. On the one hand, above-ground retorting at present requires substantial amount
of fresh water and creates a substantial waste disposal problem, while
underground combustion is hard to control. Nevertheless, improvements
in recovery technology and corresponding increases in production are probable,
although it is difficult to predict how large a fraction of the ultimate resource
will be recoverable. If the fraction is high, it would have a significant,
negative impact on the CO2 problem since the C02 release per unit of energy
produced from carbonate shale is about a factor of two greater than that
characteristic of liquids derived from coal, because of the partial
calcining of the carbonate rock during the retorting process, which both
releases CO2 and leaves the alkaline spent shale residue.
In sum, shale is a large resource, although still small compared with
coal. If environmental problems in its exploitation can be overcome,
particularly in the U.S., it could significantly extend the life of
petroleum as a transport fuel, with a disproportionately large impact on CO2 '
Turning now--and again briefly--to the alcohol fuels, recent
attention has focused on the ambitious effort by Brazil to largely replace
imported petroleum as a motor fuel with ethanol derived from sugar cane.
This program has been extensively described and critiqued in the literature,
and useful overviews have been given by Goldemberg (1981), (1982) covering
technical and economic considerations, socioeconomic impacts, and the
applicability of the Brazilian experiences to other countries. We note that
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there has been considerable skepticism about the unsubsidized cost of both
the Brazilian program and the corn to ethanol (gasahol) program in the U.S.;
from this perspective, non-economic factors such as security of energy
supply and opportunities for increased employment in rural areas are used
to justify programs which cannot pay their own way. On the other hand,
these factors, as well as others which have more negative implications such
as the morality of producing fuels rather than food from agricultural
sources and the long-term environmental impacts are clearly important.
Indeed, biomass-to-alcohol programs, particularly in developing countries,
raise the issue of the distribution of costs and benefits of energy policies
to different societal groups in particularly acute forms. Unfortunately,
further exploration of this would carry us too far afield; see; e.g., Smil (1983),
which is both well-documented and pessimistic.
The relevance of the above to coal is that methanol from biomass appears
to be within limits of its availability, the cheapest and most appropriate of
biomass fuels. This is because it can be made from a wide range of carbonacious
materials, e.g., short rotation forestry, which does not compete directly with
food production, and also because the production technology is potentially cheap.
However, methanol can also be derived from coal, and especially in countries where
coal is relatively plentiful and cheap; e.g., U.S., U.S.S.R., P.R.C.,
Austrailia and South Africa, it seems clear that this will be the feedstock
of choice. Indeed, studies by the Volkswagen Company in Germany (Bernhart et al
1981), predict that by the end of the century only half of the cars in the world
will run on gasoline; of the remainder 15% will use diesel, 3.5% biomass
ethanol, 23% coal methanol, some off LPG, and a little off electrical
drive systems.
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The above should not be taken to denigrate the potential importance
of biomass-derived fuels in selected countries. As Goldemberg (1982)
points out, the lack of abundant fossil fuels, the abundance of land and
forests, a highly developed urban sector, and external debt are common
characteristics of many Latin American and some African and Southeast Asian
countries which are favorable to a sustained economic development based on
locally produced liquid fuels from biomass. Moreover, many of these
schemes have a large biological and engineering development potential and
can be implemented efficiently in a relatively decentralized manner.
Nevertheless, on a global basis, it appears that coal will be the preferred
future feedstock for liquid fuel.
4.1.6 Conclusion
Within the coal community it is conventional wisdom that while there
are problems in increasing coal use in the short run, its long-term future is
assured. The concern about the possible impacts of CO2-induced climate change
aside, we would agree that there are good grounds for optimism about the future
prospects for coal. The resource base is considerable, and the use of new
technologies, particularly improved methods of combustion and efficient means
of conversion, could significantly mitigate the adverse non-CO2 health and
environmental impacts that coal use on an expanded scale would otherwise
have. Thus, it is unlikely that the coal resource will be largely unexploited
because it will price itself out of the market or it is perceived to be
a dirty fuel. Rather the saving grace from the CO2 perspective probably lies
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in: (1) further opportunities for energy end-use efficiency, especially
in developed countries, (2) the increasing penetration of various renewable
resources, and (3) the possibility that technology innovation and institutional
reform will lead to a revival in the future of nuclear power in the U.S. and
elsewhere. Taken together, these developments imply that fossil energy
use need increase slowly, if at all. The CO2 problem does not disappear,
but the possibilities for preventive or remedial action are greatly enhanced.
72
Table 4.1.1
World Coal Resources and Reserves, Comparison of Estimates
WEC ' WOCOL 3
Bice % Btce %
Technically and Economically
Recoverble Resrves
WEC ' WOCOL 2
Bice % Bice %
United States
USSR
People's Republic of China
United Kingdom
Germany
India
Republic of South Africa
Australia
Poland
Canada
Others
TOTAL
Largest Five Countries
Largest Ten Countries
2570 25.4 2570 23.9
4860 48.0 4860 45.2
1438 14.2 1438 13.4
164 1.6 190 1.8
247 2.4 247 2.3
57 0.6 81 0.7
58 0.6 72 0.7
262 2.6 600 5.6
126 1.2 140 1.3
115 1.1 323 3.0
230 2.3 229 2.1
10127 100.0 10750 100.0
9377 92.6 9791 91.1
9897 97.7 10521 97.9
177 27.8 167 25.2
110 17.3 110 16.6
99 15.5 99 14.9
45 7.1 45 6.8
35 5.5 34 5.1
33 5.2 12 1.8
27 4.2 43 6.5
27 4.2 33 5.0
21 3.3 60 9.0
10 1.6 4 0.6
53 8.3 56 8.5
637 100.0 663 100.0
466 73.2 481 72.5
584 91.7 607 91.5
1. Estimates by World Energy Conference. 1978.
2. Estimates by World Coal Study in 1980.
Table 4.1.2
Changes in World Coal Resource Estimates
(billion tce)
Ratio of:
Geologcal
Resources Resources Production
(%I (yearel
1974 (WEC) 8603 473 5.5 189
1976 (WEC) 9045 560 6.2 207
1977 (WEC) 10124 637 6.3 230
1980 WOCOL Estimate 10750 663 6.2 239
1. Technically and economically recoverable reserves
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Figure 4.1.1
Atmospheric CO 2 concentrations produced
by combustion of estimated recoverable
resources of fossil fuels for airborne
fraction of 0.55 or 0.45. A. Oil resources;
B. Gas resources; C A + B, all oil and gas;
D. Coal reserves (636 Gtce); E. C + D;
F. Coal resources (including reserves);
G. C + F.
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4.2 Solar Photovoltaic Energy
Much has been written about this; rather than attempt a detailed assessment,
we note the existence of several reviews (see the annotated bibliography) and
briefly summarize the facts and trends that are relevant to the global energy-CO2
problem.
We believe that if solar PV power is to be a major global energy opLion (i.e.,
at the terawatt level), it will consist in the main of multi-megawatt solar PV
farms tied to local or regional power utilities. Several reasons exist for this.
First is the increased electrification of the world (as described endemically in
this report), which is happening, solar PV or not. Second is the increased
ability of electric utility grids to accept energy from decentralized sources
(see Chapter 5). Third, the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs associated
with small stand-alone systems are estimated to be very large. In this last
c.ontext, the SCI report (see' bibilography) estimates O&M costs of 3.5 mills/kwh
(1979 dollars) for 10 MWe systems, rising sharply for smaller installations.
(These estimates are based on experience with diesels, batteries, fuel cells,
etc.: the specific technology seemed less dominant in determining costs than
were issues such as the need for travel time between sites because of lack of
permanent personnel (SCI 1980). Note that 10 MWe systems are still capable of
capturing many of the benefits of reduced transmission and even some distribu-
tion (T&D) costs and losses. Such systems are still "small" by most electric
utility standards. Current plans for multi-megawatt systems described below
support this view. Various tax incentives can favor either the end-user or
the utility; this is a redistributional problem, of secondary importance.here.
Focussing on these "large" systems simplifies the arguments to follow.
The driving force for development and cost reduction of both modules and balance
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of system (BOS) will come via such systems; in any event, whatever smaller
systems that eventually develop will benefit from the spinoff. We think that
kw-size applications will be limited to remote locations and some special needs,
and not to the roofs of the world's houses. Regarding this latter application:
(1) the need for keeping the temperature low and the efficiency high conflicts
with the usual schemes for saving energy in the home by insulated roofs;
(2) a PV-covered roof gets dirty, and cannot be safely walked on; (3) despite
claims by some PV enthusiasts that people will delight in caring for their own
energy systems, most do not now service their own applicances or (usually) cars;
this is related to the observation by many that efficient and reliable PV
modules will be made in large (centralized) factories, from which will naturally
flow the capability of service; (4) the capital cost is higher, in addition
to O&M; this is particularly so for the cost of power-conditioning equipment.
4.2.1 Recent Relevant History
Sales and contracts for solar PV systems have grown by a factor of 2 or more
in each of the past several years; from 1.5 to 2 million dollar installations in
Colombia and North Africa in 1980-81 (Hag 1981) to $10 million and larger projects
in service today. The largest and most advanced of these are in California,
stimulated by a combination of Federal and State support, tax incentives, more
public receptivity, relatively cloud-free sites, etc. Table 4.1 summarizes
most recent information about these California installations.
According to Solar Age, April 1982, the market share of the three major US
photovoltaic suppliers was:
Solarex (AMOCO, etc.) 38%
ARCO-SOLAR 26%
Solar Power (Exxon) 15%
ARCO-SOLAR has now overtaken Solarex, at least temporarily.
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4.2.2 Some Future Cost Projections
The Department of Energy 1978 forecasts of $.50/W (in 1978 dollars) in
1986 will not be met. In the 1978-83 period, improvements seem to have come at
about half the 1978-expected rate.
Discussions with senior Jet Propulsion Laboratory personnel (Daniel et al.
1982-83) confirmed the view that modules, probably polycrystalline silicon,
would be available for 1985 delivery at $4-5/Wp. If all the technology
available in the US were put under one factory roof, we would be able to
supply finished modules at a price of $2.70/W in 1980 dollars. Advances now
foreseen and very probable would bring this down to an asymptotic $1.50/Wp
For multi-megawatt systems, the power conditioning is expected to be only
10-15% of the module cost at most.
What might be a rock-bottom ultimate cost? A reasonable backing for any
2
panels is expected to cost about 600/ft , or 6C/W at 10% efficiency. This
p
and other costs leads to an estimate of about 300/W (1980 dollars) for modules
alone. We see here a factor of 5 between the extremes for asymptotic module
cost. If past experience is any guide, the balance of the system (not including
storage) will approximately double these costs (see SMUD phases I-III), although
some of the engineering design and other costs will be non-recurrent. Taking
a factor 2 as a guide, we have $.60 and $3.00/W for entire systems.
What does this amount to in electric energy cost? At 20% capacity factor,
a good day-night-summer-winter average, we have $3000-$15,000/kwe, on a con-
tinuous basis. At 15%/year rate of return on investment, this comes to
5.1e-25.5c/kwh, or $14.3-$73.3/GJ. The higher number would make solar PV
prohibitively expensive except for special purposes, hence unfeasible for large-
scale penetration. The lower one would allow solar PV to compete very well for
daytime intermediate and peaking power. But intermittent electricity at
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a generation cost of 5.1e/kwh is still much too expensive to be stored (in
batteries, for example) for off-peak use, provided either coal or nuclear power
are available. Any solar PV system which costs much in excess of this lower
asymptote will face severe problems in adoption, without either large incentives
and/or subsidies, or prohibitions of both coal and nuclear power, and perhaps
even on oil. Furthermore, this lower asymptote seems far enough away that
significant penetration of PV is unlikely this century; however, utilization of
these technologies on a small scale is well-suited to current paths of low growth
in electricity demand.
These asymptotic costs are used in our global energy scenarios worked out
in conjunction with IEA. Deflated back to 1975 prices (the calculational basis),
they are $9.50 and $47.50/GJ; we also try an intermediate value of $20/GJ.
The path to improved and cheaper PV (and wind) systems could be in some ways
smoother than the path to developing new nuclear reactors or (especially)
controlled nuclear fusion. Very importantly, both solar PV and wind can be
developed technically with relatively small units, hence without the necessity
of constructing billion-dollar or even more costly proof-of-principle experiments.
4.2.3 Future Technical Trends
The low costs of PV modules needed to permit their entry into the bulk
electric market must come via substantial technological and perhaps scientific
advances. Principal considerations are these:
(a) Sawn single or polycrystalline silicon will probably not do. Semicon-
ductor grade silicon sold for $80/kg in 1982. There is much optimism that this
cost can be reduced to $14/kg (Deb 1982) and new techniques may reduce it to
$7/kg. It is expected that advanced sawing technology will not produce more
than one slice per mm of ingot (0.5 mm blade width, 0.5 mm sawn slice). At
2$7/kg, this comes to $16/in of wafers, or 160/W for the refined silicon ingots
p
7')
alone, which is half the 300/W for modules in the low-cost estimates. The
various technologies to grow silicon ribbon from melt look more promising
(Deb 1982). A ribbon thickness of 0.2 mm with small material waste would be
adequately frugal of silicon use, even at $16/kg (6.4/W p).
Much research has gone into development of amorphous silicon made by a
silane process (a-Si:H) or by sputtering. The band-gap can be modified somewhat
by inclusion of appropriate impurities. Efficiencies up to 8% have been reported,
but the work is not nearly so far advanced as single- or poly-crystalline silicon.
(b) Thin films look promising. These can be a-Si, as mentioned above, or
possibly other materials. The attractiveness of thin films lies principally in
the hope that very cheap automated techniques can be developed to make them.
Here, a high photon absorption coefficient is a great advantage, because the
film can therefore be relatively thin; for example, a Ga-As cell need be only
a few microns thick. R&D work is intense, much of it proprietary.
Ga-As films are particularly attractive because the band gap 1.4 ev is
almost optimal for absorbing solar photons, and offers a theoretical maximum
conversion efficiency of 26% (leading to 15.%-20% in practice, one hopes).
Ingenious methods are being developed to grow it even in very thin single
crystals. For example, the CLEFT technique developed by Fan and co-workers
(Fan 1981, 1982a) of growing micron-thick crystals of 5-10 cm2 area epitaxially
on a reusable substrate, then cleaving them off without damage, is a remarkable
accomplishment, and gives hope for even more future advances. Extensive use
of arsenic raises significant environment/health problems. Supplies of gallium
are not well known, but are certainly relatively small.
Elaborations of these film techniques are being tried to develop stacked
multilayer, multigap cells that convert a larger fraction of the solar energy
to electricity. (Largest-gap junction nearest the front surface captures high
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energy photons photons, but is virtually transparent to lower energy ones,
which penetrate to the next lower-gap junction, etc.). Work is still in an
early stage, and the possibility of 30% conversion efficiency exists (Fan 1982b).
(c) Concentrators versus flat plates. It is still a horse race,
with possibly a decade to go before we see if there is even a clear winner. New
technology for concentrators (e.g., new plastic Fresnel lenses) will bring the
cost down, but the solar cells live in a very severe and changing envivonment.
The choice between flat plates and concentrators depends on:
* cost of concentrators vs. cost of flat cells.
" cost of flat one-sun cells vs. cost of highly sophisticated
cooled cells with maximum efficiency.
* costs of reliable trackers.
* cost and availability of PV material -- silicon is (or can be made)
plentiful, but GaAs, CuInSe, etc., cannot be so plentiful.
* the environment -- for example, flat plates still give about 40%
reception on hazy or overcast days, but the efficiency of concen-
trators drops drastically under such conditions. For example, at
Barstow, California, 100 miles ENE of California (just beyond
Hesperia), LA smog decreases total reception by 15% (Mackin 1982).
(d) Aggressive and competent development. There is some worry that the
U.S. solar PV industry is less than optimally structured. One worry is whether
companies with the ability to produce the cells have the ability to sell them.
Vice versa, do small companies with aggressive sales policies have the competence
to produce them? Some other countries, expecially Japan and now Taiwan, are
working very hard; according to some observers Japan is in the lead in much
solar cell R&D, for example a-Si (Maycock 1982). Any large solar PV future is
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bound to take a long time to develop. It would be too massive for rapid movement.
However, the entire solar and energy program in the U.S. has too-short time
perspectives and there are few incentives to do any different. For example,
there are few incentives at the moment to spend something like $30 to $50 million
of capital expense to turn out about 50 MW/year of PV output (this is a present
estimate of the cost of factories). Nevertheless, PV is much easier than nuclear
reactors in many ways, because there is only about a two-year lag in the factory
investment before obtaining a return on capital, instead of a decade or more.
The initial markets will not be major U.S. grid-connected systems and the
question arises whether the U.S. companies will be smart enough to beat out
the Europeans, or (more important) the Japanese.
4.2.4 Brief Annotated Bibliography
Electricity from Sunlight: The Future of Photovoltaics, by Christopher
Flavin. Worldwatch Paper No. 52, December 1982. A very readable 63-page
summary of large and small projects, cost reduction trends, national programs.
Also 82 references. Points out that this renewable technology did not develop
so much with the "environmentalists" (as did wind, OTEC, biomass, etc.) but as
part of science, technology and industry. This can be some advantage, and Flavin
favors the technology.
Basic Photovoltaic Principles and Methods, Report SERI/SP-290-1448,
February 1982, published by Technical Information Office, Solar Energy Research
Institute, 1617 Cole Blvd., Golden, CO 80401. A nice semi-technical overview.
Solar Photovoltaic Energy Conversion (Principal Conclusions of the American
Physical Society Study Group, H. Ehrenreich, Chairman), published by American
Physical Society, 335 East 45th Street, New York, NY 10017. An excellent
review of the basic science and progress up to late 1978.
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Photovoltaics as a Terrestrial Energy Source: Vol. I, Introduction; Vol. II,
System Value; Vol. III, An Overview; by Jeffrey L. Smith, Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, October 1980. An
excellent review, especially with respect to the problems of systems integration,
incentives, cost projections, etc. A summary of this is "Photovoltaics," by
the same author, Science 212 1472-1478 (1981).
Preliminary Analyses of Industrial Growth, and the Factors that Affect Growth
Rate, Edward Edelson and Tom K. Lee, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California
Institute of Technology, Paper 5101-4, January 1977. Old, but important concepts.
Study of growth rate of several rapidly growing industries, showing how the
projected PV growth rates tend to surpass practical experience. Has statistics
and some simple modeling.
Decentralized Energy Technology Integration Assessment Study, Systems
Control, Inc. Report, SCI Project 5278, December 1980 (1801 Page Mill Rd.,
Palo Alto, CA 94304). This report is more extensively used in our section on
integration of PV, etc., systems, but some calculations are very applicable here.
"Solar Cells: Plugging into the Sun," J.C.C. Fan, Technology Review, vol. 80,
No. 8, August/September 1978. Good description of principles and techniques as
of that date; still good reading. 18 pages.
Photovoltaic Systems Program Summary, Department of Energy Report DOE/CE 0033,
January 1982. A description of all their funded projects, with funding level, but
not much useful overall assessment.
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Table 4.1
MAJOR CALIFORNIA PHOTOVOLTAIC INSTALLATIONS
Site Owner PV Size Power Year of Cost Note
Supplier MW Sold To Operation $million
Hesperia, ARCO- ARCO- 1 Southern 1982 Propri- a
60 mi. NE of Solar Solar California etary
Los Angeles Edison
Carissa ARCO- ARCO- 6 Pacific 1984 Propri- b
Plains I, Solar Solar Gas & etary
between Electric
Bakersfield
and San Luis
Obispo
Carissa ARCO- ARCO- 16 Pacific ? Propri- c
Plains II Solar Solar total Gas & etary
Electric
SMUD I SMUD ARCO- 1 ac SMUD April 11.4 d
Solar (1.2 dc) 1984
SMUD II SMUD Several 1 ac' SMUD 1986? 10.4 e
(?) (1.2 dc)
SMUD III SMUD ? 5 ac SMUD ? 40 f
NOTES
(a) 1' x 4' panels assembled to 30' x 30' single-axis tracking units.
(b) Robert E. Robertson, Manager of Engineering, ARCO-Solar Industries, Inc.,
private communication. Has side-mirrors in panels for non-focused concentration.
(c) Entire plant (640 acres) to operate unmanned, by remote control.
(d) Sacramento Municipal Utility District. $7 for modules ($5.80/Wp dc);
50c/Wp for support; power conditioning, $400,000; site construction
$1.46 million; field engineering $1 million. Mostly Federal money. These
data from E.S. "Ab" Davis, "Assessment of the Single-Axis Tracking Flat
Plate Concept for SMUD PV PHase I," Jet Propulsion Laboratory Report
5250-15, August 9, 1982, also private communications. Mark Anderson,
Project Manager, SMUD, private communications.
(e) Specifies only 8' x 16' arrays to match mechanical and electric interfaces.
Bids asked mid-October 1983 for 900 kw dc from one supplier, 3 x 100 kw dc
from others. SMUD offers to pay $3.6 million. Deflated to 1980 dollars
(basis for original plan), this comes to $7.67 million total, with $2980/kw
contributed by SMUD.
(f) Up from original 2 MW ac. Expect complete solar panels at $4.00/Wp dc,
SMUD pays 50% of costs.
'3
4.3 Wind
Despite some 1200 TW of solar power that goes into driving global winds,
the scarcity of good wind-power sites limits the development possibility to very
much less. Even 0.1% of this, or 1.2 TW, is probably optimistic, implying the
presence of large high-performance windmills on windfarms that would occupy more
than one percent of the world's land surface. Nevertheless, it is regionally
important, and discussion of it brings out clearly some problems and critical
issues related to non- or semi-dispatchable power.
Because good wind-sites are scarce, hence unlikely to be where their power
output is needed, their output will be almost entirely electric, bringing them
into competition with PV and nuclear power, amongst the various nonfossil options.
The wind blows somewhat unpredictably even at the best of sites; therefore wind
power has a limited capability of displacing more conventional (and dispatchable)
installations that must respond reliably to demand. That is, the capacity credit
is likely to be modest, less than the fuel credit.
A simple calculation establishes some of these points, particularly the
fuel credit. Suppose the electric power demand is P (kilowatts) for 0.7
of every day, and P2 (>P1) during the remaining 0.3; this corresponds roughly
to daily periods of normal and peak loads. Suppose also that the wind blows at
optimally usable speed a fraction f of the time, and not at all during the
remainder (1-f); the times are unpredictable. This two-level windspeed is not
a bad approximation for our purpose, because the v3 dependence of wind-power on
speed makes slow winds almost valueless; at speeds greater than the optimal one,
most machines limit the output, in order to avoid failure. Suppose also that
oil-burning power stations are available at $500/kwe capital cost, oil costs
$5/GJ ($30.50/bbl), the oil plant has 40% thermal efficiency, the annual cost of
capital is 10%, and all systems have 90% technical availability.
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What can we afford to pay for the wind-farm assuming that transmission
costs of the two systems are the same?
First, consider no energy storage (e.g. pumped hydro), and (for the
moment) no capacity credit. Then we require that the entire demand be met
by oil if necessary. The fuel cost of electricity is $5/0.4 = $12.50/GJ, and
the wind cost must be less than this. To replace continuous power P1, we have
a wind capacity factor of 0.9f, and it can be easily checked that the annual
output of the wind-farm is 28.4f GJ/year per kwe of name-plate capacity. The
saving is therefore $355f/year-kwe, and with money at 10%, we can afford to
spend $3350f/kwe for the complete windfarm.
If f = 0.5, corresponding to the best sites, the break-even comes at
$1775/kwe; if wind farms are available for less than this, we should buy them
up to the capacity P1 , unless other circumstances intervene, based on a fuel
calculation alone.
What about building beyond P1 , to replace some peaking power as well? Now
the additional windmills operate only 0.3 as often as the others, so their cost
must not exceed $1183f/kwe or only $591 if f = 0.5.
Several important considerations have been omitted in this simple example.
1. Capacity Credit. The combined system is less likely to be inadequate
to supply any given load than was the oil-only one. Therefore on a reliability
(i.e. loss-of-load-probability) basis, some fraction of the installed wind
capacity can be applied to reducing the base-load plants. Just how much
depends on detailed calculations of the joint probability of the demand
exceeding any given amount, and the wind not blowing optimally. This topic
will be examined in Chapter 5, on system integration.
2. Spinning Reserve. Here, especially if the system penetration of the
windmills is greater than a few percent, a negative credit may apply. The
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reason is that the wind may not blow, in an unpredictable way, and the load may
have to be picked up rapidly. Again, the detailed nature of wind fluctuations
and calm periods will determine the outcome, to be discussed in Chapter 5.
3. Operation and Maintenance. It is liable to be high for small isolated
windmills, giving the advantage to substantial windfarms.
Now suppose that the wind-energy system of this example had retrievable-
on-demand storage for more than one day, but for a shorter time than the maximum
windless periods. In that case, we replace fuel at all times and can afford
$3350f/kwe up to maximum power P2* If storage time exceeds the maximum windless
time, then the whole oil system could profitably be replaced, if it cost less than
$3350f + 500 per kwe, or $2275/kwe in our example with f = 0.5. But note the
continuing caveats about spinning reserve (if the storage will not deliver in
time), and O&M.
The wind parameters and postulated system in this example were close to the
best available. First, the wind profile was good. Figure 4.3.1 shows the wind
duration and derived available power for Kahuku, Hawaii, one of the world's best
wind sites, where indeed f f 0.5 (full power equivalent for 4300 hours/year).
Second, the competition was high-cost fuel. If the alternatives had been nuclear
or solar PV with either low (or zero) fuel cost, the wind sytem could not have
fared well, both because of its unreliability and the competition with cheap
(or free) fuel. Energy storage overcomes that drawback, one might claim. That
is so, but the same energy storage systems would turn daytime solar PV into
night-time lights, and cheap off-peak (night-time) nuclear power into peaking
power, as discussed at greater length in section 4.8 on energy storage.
06
From this simple example, one can see why windpower is attractive in:
. Scandinavia, where:
the winds are good, especially in Denmark and Southern Sweden;
hydropower is available, especially in Norway; the two systems are
complementary as detailed calculations have shown. See the section
on energy storage for more details.
the skies are often cloudy;
traditional dependence on oil is high;
there is no cheap coal.
. California (and some other U.S. sites), where:
tax incentives and other subsidies, plus PURPA, make it attractive;
there is high dependence on oil;
there are good winds in selected locations;
there are impediments to use of nuclear or coal.
. Hawaii, where:
almost all the California advantages apply;
trade winds are exceptionally reliable 9 to 10 months of the year.
Table 4.3.1 shows the results of a July 1983 poll we conducted of major U.S.
manufacturers. It is not complete, but we think that most major installations
have been included. According to these entries alone, about 107 MWe are presently
installed, chiefly in California. This total has more than doubled each recent
year. Prices range from $1200/kwe at the factory to about $2000/kwe for a
complete installation. The Pacific Gas and Electric Company and Southern
California Edison Company programs are largest. Compare these costs with
those derived in the initial example. With present tax incentives, an effective
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capacity factor as low as f = 0.25 would still represent an attractive investment.
Material requirements are principally 20 to 30 kg metal per kilowatt for 50 kw
size machines, and less for larger ones. Thus both material and land demands of
wind-power seem not to be severe.
As stated earlier, good wind sites are scarce, and they have not been
catalogued in detail in enough potentially useful sites. High but intermittent
wind speed is actually a disadvantage. A steady wind of 8-15 m/sec (18-35 mph)
can be ideally designed for, which suggests the tropical trade winds, some
temperate westerlies, island or mountain pass locations, etc. Furthermore,
wind speed and steadiness both tend to improve markedly some tens of meters
above ground level. This favors large windmills (>100 kwe, say).
As with other systems, a tradeoff exists between economies of scale arising
from larger size (e.g. transmission lines, central systems) and economies arising
from mass production of many small units. In our opinion, if wind-power is to
play any substantial role in our electric future, it will be with windmills in
the megawatt range: at 0.5 capacity factor, 2000 one-megawatt machines are
required per GWe, surely enough to capture the principal economies of mass
production.
The present price of about $2000/kwe installed will drop with time, advances
coming in engineering and manufacturing, not in applied science. Therefore,
prospects for cost reduction by a factor 2-3 seem bright, but beyond that.not
good (unlike hopes for solar PV). At about $1800/kwe it will and does replace
oil marginally in good locations. At about $700/kwe it would replace coal
similarly, and we are optimistic enough to think this could happen in selected
sites.
Manufacturer
Fayette Mfg.
PO Box 1149
Tracy,CA 95376
(415)443-2936
Rated Unit
Size KW
85kw
Table 4.3.1 Major wind installations, July 1983.
Factory delivered/
In- talled/Location
>240/Altamont Pass,CA
Ntmber
Ordered
$/Unit. installed
Prices (1983 $/kw)
0 $118,000 installed ($1.388/kw)
Page (1)
Comments
Has produced
over 1.06 kwh
PM Wind Power 25kw 3/Ohio 0 $35,000 delivered ($1400/kw)
1/Texas
Boeing 2500kw 3/Coodnoe Hlllls,WA The unit in CA - PG&E The one ordered
1/Solano,CA 1 $6.3 million installed(1980$) is R&D for NASA
1/Wyoming $7.5 million (1983$) 3 Mw
($3000/ku)
Hamil tor. S td. 4 MW 1/Wyoming 0 Prototypes
3MW 1/Sweden
Tahachapi, CA 0 $60,000-$80,000 installed to 2 itoer sie
Wind Power Systems 40kw 222 Aitamont, CA ($1500-2000/kw) to 2 tower sizes
that are offered
American Wind 50kw 150/Tehachapi, CA * $65,000/unit factory *HallMath,Inc.
Energy Systems 20/Pacheco PathCA ($1300/kw) manufactures
(designers)* Y'>kw the WI C. They
100kw have "thousands"
of orders.
Carter Wind 25kw 10/Texas - $30,000 - everything except
Systems 4/Montana foudatfion & deliver
1.(0/ Cali f orn -ia ($1200/kw)
delivery & ins talla tion =$5/mile
Manufacturer
Energy Science
Rated Unit
Size K11
50kw*
60kw
#Installed/Location
have installed 50kw
20/Calif.
8/Hawaii
Number
Ordered
Factory delivered/
$/Unit installed
Prices (1983 $/kw)
$70,000 factory
(2)
Comments
*They no longer
manufacture 50kw
U.S. Wind Power 50kw 600 Altamont, CA 500-600 entire windfarm Included
for PG&E station
100kw Prototype 0 $2000/kw installed foundation
... everything
Westinghouse 7.3 Mw - 1/Hawaii $14.2 million Prototype
installed
($1945/kw)
Windtech, Intl. 25kw 3/Calif. %$28,000 delivered
($1120/kw)
50kw 1/Tehachapi %S45,000 delivered
($900/kw)
75kw 1/Tehachapi 25/Tehachapi %$55,000 delivered
($733/kw)
DAF Indal 50kw 1/TX, US %$130,000 factory
7/Canada ($2600/kw)
1/Ireland
1/Australia
2/California,US
230kw 1/California Discontinued
1/Prince Edward Island
500kw 1/Gulf of St.Lawrence,CANADA $500,000 factory
($1000/kw)
Manufacturer
Turbowind
Rate Unit
Size KW
300kw
Installed/Location
30/Altamont Pass
Number
Ordered
60
Factory
$/Unit Delivered ($/kw)
Prices Installed
$700,000 factory
($2333/kw)
Windmaster 200kw 5/USA 50 $160,000 factory
4/Europe ($800/kw)
65kw
Zond 100kw >100/California $150,000 ($2308/kw)
107990 kw installed
I'
(3)
Comments
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4.4 Nuclear Fission
Nuclear fission stimulates many conflicting views, much social debate and
political and economic controversy. In the U.S. it is widely regarded as a
loser, an attitutde also found in some sections of West Germany, Sweden and a
number of smaller European countries. In many others -- Korea, Taiwan, Japan,
France, for example, it is seen as a winner. In the U.S.S.R., China and some
other countries it is seen as an important energy option to be developed with
tight controls that are consonant with central planning.
We believe that nuclear power will play an important role in electric power
provision globally, and quite possibly also in providing heat in the temperature
range up to 800*C for large industrial applications. This opinion arises not
from study of the present state of the U.S. industry, but from what we see
to be future prospects and trends elsewhere. The initiative will pass from the
U.S., if present trenids continue.
Support for this conclusion comes from many sources, but three deserve
particular mention. One is the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
study of The Future of Conventional Nuclear Power (in the U.S.), just being
completed (fall 1983). . Second is an insightful analysis by William Walker
and Mgns Lnnroth, Nuclear Power Struggles, Allen and Unwin, London (1983).
Third are the conference papers from a workshop, "Nuclear Power in the Asia-Pacific
Region," at the East-West Center, Honolulu (January 1983), the proceedings of
which will appear in 1984 in the journal Energy.
We will focus principally on electric power generation, believing that the
future of nuclear power depends on general acceptance of it for that purpose;
other applications would then follow. Also we start with a discussion of the U.S.
nuclear sector, not only because we are interested in possible U.S. actions,
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but also because it makes a good point of departure for reviewing the state
of affairs elsewhere.
Are the present difficulties afflicting nuclear power only growing pains,
or symptoms of a terminal disease? We suggest that most of them are the former
(at least outside the U.S.), and that reasonable treatment can cure them. But
some are potentially fatal.
4.4.1 Issues with Large U.S. Domestic Content
1. Present U.S. light water reactors (LWRs) are not well matched to
future needs. Several sub-issues exist here:
(a) At times of low growth of electricity demand, and also to match smaller
electric utility grids around the world, interest turns to smaller reactors,
both light water and gas cooled. Such units could capture the effective and
improved quality control of factory production, and the economies of construction
arising from serial production of identical (or near-identical) units. Moreover,
there is a smaller likelihood of large accidents. It was claimed that economies
of scale would favor the 1300 MWe reactors now being built, but this has not
turned out to be so.
(b) Few U.S. vendors seem interested in building anything but the present
line of large LWRs. MIT's Nuclear Engineering Department has held a series of
seminars involving the vendors, electric utility companies, and regulatory per-
sonnel, which have confirmed this view. Almost without exception, the U.S.
vendors see insuperable difficulties in developing anything else: R&D funding,
public acceptance, NRC licensing, no markets, etc. Westinghouse and General
Electric have joint development programs with Japan, but the initiative seems
to rest with Japan.
(c) The U.S. nuclear industry has lost international momentum. The U.S.
fraction of the diminishing number of world orders has dropped sharply. See
Table 4.4.1 attached (from L~nnroth).
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All these look more like growing pains than terminal illnesses, except
perhaps for the U.S. sector.
2. Unresponsiveness of the nuclear sector to fears of accidents, conse-
quences, etc. This applies especially to the Atomic Energy Commission and the
nuclear industry in years past, but some vestiges continue. This created a
climate of suspicion that was justified only in part, but was capitalized upon
by critics. The nuclear sector lost its claim to authority, so to speak. To
paraphrase the words of Michael Polanyi (Polanyi 1967), the public normally accepts
technology not because of a shared sense of the detailed concepts, but by sub-
mission to the demonstrated authority and success of technology. Hence, if
people ever venture seriously to dissent from technological opinion, a regular
argument may not prove feasible. It will almost certainly prove impracticable
when the question at issue is whether a certain set of evidence is to be taken
seriously or not. Such conflicts between technology and the general public may
imperil technology.
The U.S. nuclear sector seems disinclined to pay attention to issues of
this sort. This is a potentially fatal disease wherever it occurs. A cure
exists: Safe operation for enough years so that the public is reassured.
3. Misjudging the nuclear waste problem. The tale is well known, but seems
on the way to a cure in the U.S. via passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982. Again, this looks more like a growing pain, although it has often been
presented as a terminal illness.
4. The slower growth of electric energy use. The effectiveness of energy-
efficient programs in the post-1973 period, plus shifts in product mix, have
reduced electric power growth from its 1900-1970 rate of 7% per year to about
2% per year in 1980 (and even a decline in use in 1982 because of the recession).
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Thus the U.S. had an excess operating capacity exceeding 30% in 1982. With
presently expected electric power growth rates of even one to two percent per
year, this excess will be gone by the mid-1990's, but the nuclear vendors may
not stick it out that long, and besides, the technological initiative may have
passed to Japan and/or Germany by then. In any event, the present LWRs seem
to us not ideal for the period of the 1990's and beyond.
This issue relates to the electric utility sector as a whole, and not the
nuclear sector in particular.
5. The over-ordering of nuclear plants in the early to mid 1970's, followed
by massive cancellations. This is related to Item 4 above. This ordering of
nuclear plants came about not only in response to oil price rises, but also
coal price rises (not much publicized) from $0.38/GJ in 1970 to $1.50/GJ in
1.980 (average to industrial users). This misassessment was duplicated in other
countries that now face a surplus of ordered plants: France, Korea, Taiwan,
for example. But it appears to be an intermediate-term problem, not a long-term
one.
6. The high cost of money. This high cost, especially in 1978-1983,
drained financial resources of electric utility companies (and other sectors)
that contracted for capital-intensive plants that would take too long to build
and/or to recover their cost via operating expenses. The present twelve-year
period between first plans and final operations of a nuclear plant does not mean
that 12 years interest on the whole cost must be paid. Far from it; judicious
ordering of components reduces the interest and escalation charges to what is
in effect a few years only. Nevertheless, those money charges account for about
half the cost of plants presently going into operation.
If this circumstance of high money costs continues globally and for the
long term, many other sectors besides the nuclear one will be in trouble.
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7. Many electric utility companies were (and are still) unprepared for
nuclear power. The difference in costs and times to completion among nuclear
plants in the U.S. is startling, the former varying by a factor of three, and
the latter by more than a factor of two. Some electric utilities, not necessarily
the largest or best known, have had nuclear plants come in approximately on budget,
on time, and they run well. Others, not necessarily the smallest, have experienced
large overruns and delays, and operating problems. The nuclear sector is hostage
to its least competent reactor operators. The growing realization by the utilities
that efficient and safe operation is essential, and that owning and operating
nuclear plants is much more complicated than owning and operating coal-fired
plants, presses electric utilities in the U.S. to improve their performance.
The Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) was established to deal with
these problems, and most of the nuclear electric utilities (both public and
private) in countries outside the CPEs are members. However, it remains to be
seen how effective INPO will be.
This set of problems is even more difficult for developing countries
where the shortage of highly skilled craft personnel, engineers, technicians,
engineering and technical services, etc., can lead to serious problems in
construction, operation and maintenance. The supply of skilled manpower per nuclear
megawatt in Taiwan and Korea is projected to be only about half that in
Japan in the 1990's, given present training programs.
In our opinion this lack of in-depth skill in the nuclear-electric sectors
of developing countries will be one of the greatest impediments to the growth
of nuclear power.
8. The U.S. legal and regulatory morass. This problem is not peculiar
to the nuclear sector. Issues are often recycled round and round between the
97
Federal and State governments, the Congress, and the courts. The U.S. form of
government is effective for implementing a consensus already reached, but not so
good for reaching consensus quickly. The problem is aggravated by the fact that
the U.S. is a very litigious society to the benefit of the legal profession but
few others.
These attitudes and difficulties are found also in West Germany, but only
to a much smaller extent elsewhere.
9. There is no obvious solution to the potential misuse of the technologies,
facilities, and materials associated with civilian nuclear programs for the
construction of nuclear weapons. International Safeguards and export controls
on sensitive technologies can help, but the ultimate fix is not technical:
It lies in reducing the incentives for nations to acquire weapons, not in
banning civilian nuclear power. Georgius Agricola wrote in 1556 about whether
it is proper to mine the earth for metals because they could be used in weapons:
The curses which are uttered against iron, copper, and lead have no
weight with prudent and sensible men, because if these metals were done
away with, men, as their anger swelled and their fury became unbridled,
would assuredly fight like wild beasts with fists, heels, nails, and teeth.
They would strike each other with sticks, hit one another with stones, or
dash their foes to the ground. Moreover, a man does not kill another
with iron alone, but slays by means of poison, starvation, or thirst.
He may seize him by the throat and strangle him; he may bury him alive in
the ground; he may immerse him in water and suffocate him; he may burn or
hang him; so that he can make every element a participant in the death of
men. Or, finally, a man may be thrown to the wild beasts. Another may be
sewn up wholly except his head in a sack, and thus be left to be devoured
by worms; or he may be immersed in water until he is torn to pieces by
sea-serpents. A man may be boiled in oil; he may be greased, tied with
ropes, and left exposed to be stung by flies and hornets; he may be put to
death by scourging with rods or beating with cudgels, or struck down by
stoning, or flung from a high place. Furthermore, a man may be tortured
in more ways than one without the use of metals; as when the executioner
burns the groins and armpits of his victim with hot wax; or places a cloth
in his mouth gradually, so that when in breathing he draws it slowly into
his gullet, the executioner draws it back suddenly and violently; or
the victim's hands are fastened behind his back, and he is drawn up
little by little with a rope and then let down suddenly. Or similarly,
he may be tied to a beam and a heavy stone fastened by a cord to his
feet, or finally his limbs may be torn asunder. From these examples we
see that it is not metals that are to be condemned, but our vices, such
as anger, cruelty, discord, passion for power, avarice, and lust.
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We do not pretend that uranium and plutonium are iron or copper, but
quote Agricola to show how similar debates have occupied the attention of people
for millenia. Applied to nuclear power and nuclear weapons, we see both promise
and peril, and the dangerous imperfection of man, susceptible to the sins of
avarice, overambition, and hubris. Despite these weaknesses, or perhaps because
of them, we believe that resolution lies in seeking states of increasing grace
and caritas, and accepting what is in Creation with an attiude of thanksgiving,
dedicating the use of these things to the good of all and not for selfish gain.
In a sense we are junior partners in Creation and should be careful stewards
over that part of it entrusted to us.
4.4.2 Issues that are more International
Let us turn now to some important international trends. U.S. actions in
the mid-to-late 1970's to restrict reprocessing of nuclear fuel and other
aspects of international nuclear trade had two main effects: (a) it made
the U.S. appear as an unreliable (and sometimes incompetent) partner; (b) it
stimulated European and Japanese efforts to set up their own enrichment and
reprocessing facilities, and to become much less dependent on U.S. nuclear-
related technology. The Japanese effort is remarkable; it is now virtually
independent of the U.S. technologically. In joint ventures with the U.S. to
develop A-PWRs and A-BWRs (see topic No. 1 above), Japan has taken the lead.
Several foreign suppliers seem much more capable of providing complete
integrated nuclear facilities than do their U.S. counterparts. Consider the
Japanese and German companies. Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Toshiba and Kraftwerkeunion
(KWU) have broad experience in building whole plants, in collaborating directly
with electric utility and other customers, and providing sophisticated architect/
engineering services. They have contacts and contracts worldwide. On the other
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hand, the U.S. vendors have little equivalent expertise, while the Canadians
have demonstrated competence in this area but lack the international connections.
Table 4.4.2 (from LUnnroth) shows dramatically the shift in supplying heavy electric
power equipment. The Japanese electrotechnical industry has expanded rapidly
in the heavy electrical export market, and is by now the single most important
exporter. The prospect of the Japanese industry entering the nuclear export
market is thus not taken lightly by the competitors.
Where are we left, when all this is said? Nuclear power is the only long-
term non-fossil option that utilizes modern technology and that has reached a
stage of mid-maturity and substantial impact on the world's energy supply.
Its technical troubles appear resolvable, even including those related to nuclear
wastes. Its connection with nuclear weapons will remain, to the degree that
governments want it to remain so. Training for a nuclear age is insufficient,
as it is for wide adoption of any of the other renewable technologies discussed
here. The differences in present and future needs, and present and future
competence around the world are large. We think that some countries will see
nonnuclear options as too insecure, too expensive, or too remote in time to
trust completely, and hence will preserve a lively nuclear option, especially
on the 50-year timescale of interest in this study.
DESTINATION
Table 4.4.1
OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS IN THE WESTERN WORLD (from L~nnroth)
Supplier 1960-65 Units 1966-70 Nt 1971-75 U it 1976-81 Nt
Canada OECD - - - - - -
Non-OECD - - India 1 Argentina 1 Rumaniaa 2
- Pakistan 1 Korea 1 -
France OECD - - - - Belgium 2 --
Non-OECD - - - - - - South Africa 2
Korea 2
F.R. Germany OECD - - Netherlands 1 Austria 1 Spain 1
- - - Spain 1 -
- - - Switzerland 1 -
Non-OECD - - - - Brazil 1 Argentina 1
- - - Iranb 2 Brazil 1
Sweden OECD - - - - Finlandc 2 --
Non-OECD - - - - - - -
U.S. OECD Belgium 1 Belgium 3 Belgium 2 Spain 1
Germany 1 Italy 1 Japan 3 --
Japan 1 Japan 6 Sweden 2 --
Netherlands 1 Sweden 1 Switzerlandd 1 -
Spain 2 Switzerland 3 Spain 10 --
Switzerland 1 - - Yugoslavia 1 --
Non-OECD India 2 Korea 1 Brazil 1 Korea 4
- Taiwan 2 Korea 1 Philippines 1
- - - Mexico 2 -
- - - Taiwan 4 --
Total OECD 7 15 26 2
Non-OECD 2 5 13 13
Total U.S. Exports 9 17 27 6
Non-U.S. Exports 0 3 12 9
Notes: a.
b.
c.
d.
It is now doubtful that the Rumanian plant will be completed.
Cancelled at an advanced stage of construction.
Finland has also imported two units from the U.S.S.R.
Kaiseraugst has yet to receive its construction license.
0
0
DESTINATION
Table 4.4.2
HEAVY ELECTRICAL EXPORT SHARES (PERCENT)'
All Electric Power
Eqipena Turbine generatorEquipmenta deliveries (hydro and
1955 1964 1972 1978 steam), 19 75-87b
France 6.0 9.1 10.3 10.2 8.0
Germany 18.5 22.6 21.9 22.7 17.2
Italy 1.9 4.6 4.9 4.6 3.0
Japan 1.3 3.8 10.2 15.1 24.9
Sweden 2.5 4.7 3.3 2.4 c
Switzerland n.a. 5.1 4.8 5.9 13.2
U.K. 22.2 13.2 8.9 8.7 13.2
U.S. 31.9 22.8 17.2 14.2 7.9
Other 15.7 14.1 18.5 16.3 12.5
Source: Surrey and Walker, 1981 .
a. U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics, SITC 722.
b. This refers to turbine generators installed in, and due for delivery to,
the export market between 1975 and 1987. It is a more up-do-date,
but narrower, indicator than that contained in the most recent U.N.
trade data in electric power equipment. The figures have been derived
from the Science Policy Research Unit's data bank on the Western World's
power plant.
c. Included in 'Other'.
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4.5 Controlled Nuclear Fusion
Our basic conclusion is that controlled nuclear fusion will not make an
appreciable contribution to global energy in the next half-century. That said,
we hasten to add that the fusion research program has not been wasted because
(a) the work is very difficult, so that only recently has it been possible to
make assessments which are more than hopes or guesses; (b) most of the field of
plasma physics and its many applications (gas lasers, plasma treatment of sur-
faces, ultra-high temperature chemistry, astrophysics) plus substantial nonplasma
developments (large superconducting magnets, for example) came about because of
fusion research, and are supported by fusion research funds; (c) we may be
wrong.
About $2 billion/year is spent globally on fusion, about one-third spent
by the U.S., one-third by the U.S.S.R., 15% by Europe, 15% by Japan, and the
remainder by China, Canada, Australia, Poland, and more than a dozen other
countries.
The reasons for our pessimism have been presented by one of us (Rose) in
a paper prepared for the NSF in 1981, and there is no reason to change its
major conclusions in this regard:
1. The plasma physics of confinement is still imperfect; disruptions of
ostensibly stable plasmas in large tokamaks do occur, and in a real fusion
reactor could be very damaging.
2. The problem of a "divertor" or plasma pump is still unresolved, to
keep plasma off the vacuum walls, except where it is designed to be drained off.
3. Substantial improvement has been made in superconducting magnet
development (for example 10 tesla -- 105 gauss -- in meter-size components),
but these will require about 1 meter of shielding from energetic neutrons --
a circumstance well recognized but one that complicates the design enormously.
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4. Substantial progress has been made in turning what was a pulsed tokamak
design into a steady-state torus via radio-frequency drive of dc plasma currents,
but the experiments are still small-scale.
5. The neutron damage problems per unit of energy are a factor of about
100 more severe than they are in fission reactor components.
6. Because of induced radioactivity, repair and maintenance will be more
difficult than with fission reactors.
7. This complexity suggests that the price will be high.
8. If these problems are resolved, say in the year 2000, fusion may not
be wanted, because
(a) If nuclear fission proves to be socially unacceptable because of
proliferation hazards, too-high technology, or high cost, controlled
fusion will be similarly susceptible.
(b) If nuclear fission is acceptable, fusion will have a few advantages:
little nuclear waste, easier siting, no accidents with large public
hazards (but perhaps with large costs to the operating electric
utility company). These possible advantages seem insufficient to
displace an accepted fission-based economy.
Elaborations of this theme are given by (Rose 1982). Large design studies
have been carried out (FED-INTOR 1982); an isometric view of the STARFIRE reference
design is attached. These are magnificent reference designs, but they are far
from being practical power plants.
A more detailed critique of controlled fusion prospects is given by (Lidsky
1983). His conclusions are similar to ours.
WATER COOLANT
INLET & OUTLET,
SEGMENTED
COPPER EF COILS
Fig. 4.5.1. STARFIRE reference design - isometric view
0
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4.6 GLOBAL BIOMASS POTENTIAL
4.6.1 Introduction
Biomass is an important energy source throughout the world. Vegetation,
together with the winds and oceans, plays a major role in capturing incoming
solar energy, storing it, and providing the ecosystem a principal energy
source.
Of the 4 x 10 24j of solar radiation absorbed at the earth's surface
per year, plant biomass captures about 4 x 10 21j, or 0.1% of this, and about
half of that is estimated to appear in plant material of the kind that
people might use to greater or less extent as an energy source (Sdrensen 1979).
This stored energy, were it all to be available, would be roughly equivalent
to 320 billion barrels of oil per year, about seven times mankind's total
rate of energy use. But the practical upper limits on energy from biomass
are much lower.
In the United States, biomass currently provides nearly 2% of annual
energy, mostly in the form of wood wastes used by the paper and pulp industry.
The Office of Technology Assessment has estimated (OTA 1980) that the share
could be increased to about 5% in the year 2000; but in a more recent report,
the same OTA points out (OTA 1983) that: (1) the value of wood for construction
and as new material for paper and other products far surpasses the value of
wood as fuel; (2) extended research and development on using wood and wood
waste would make it even more valuable; (3) the long-term environmental impacts
of intensive silviculture and other business production can be severe and are
not well understood. Thus the conditions that could lead to substantially
increased use of biomass in the United States for energy seem unlikely to be
realized.
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The comparison is sometimes made between energy from biomass in the
United States and energy from nuclear-generated electricity, to the effect
that they are about the same magnitude (hence that nuclear is and should
remain negligibly small or, conversely, that biomass can satisfy the energy
demand). Such a comparison is misleading; the biomass estimates are for
total heat and, as we see, are unlikely to increase substantially, whereas
the nuclear numbers are for net electricity and could be expandable.
Historically in the United States, biomass was even more significant.
In 1850, more than 90% of the 1.7EJ gross energy consumption came from wood
(Pimentel et al. 1982). As happened in the United States a century ago, a
shift to fossil fuels has occurred or is occurring, worldwide today. Even so,
it is estimated that over half of mankind still depends on biomass energy,
particularly wood, for a significant fraction of total energy use (BNL 1977).
Population pressures and competing land-use demands stress forests and
agricultural land worldwide. For hundreds of millions of poor people relying
on decreasing wood supply, substituting expensive fossil fuels remains beyond
their means. As governments around the world try to ease rural energy problems
and reduce dependency on imported oil, ambitious tree farm projects and fuel
alcohol programs begin, e.g., in Brazil. These have desirable aspects but
associated environmental harm and net energy potential should be carefully
assessed when planning such projects (Goldemberg 1982).
In this paper, these problems are reviewed and calculations of the
global biomass energy potential are presented.
4.6.2 Biomass Resources and Productivities
Biomass energy can contribute importantly to many nations? energy
supply although it is limited by the biological productivity of the plants
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themselves. It has been suggested that most of the United States energy could
be obtained from plants on only 10% of the land area; certainly, if 100 million
-1 -l
hectares are planted with a crop yielding at least 25 dry T ha yr , then
about 35 EJ gross per year would be supplied. However, it is the purpose of
this section to indicate that the sustainable biomass yields that are relevant
for energy planning are much lower.
The bulk of biomass energy potential is from forests and crops rather than
from, say, manure or algal ponds (see Figure 4.6.1). Hence, forest and crop
productivities deserve attention.
The photosynthetic reaction by which plants grow and solar energy is
converted to chemical energy:
6C02 + 6H2 0-----CH12 6 + 602
requires 8 quanta of 400-700nm light to reduce each CO2 molecule to carbohydrate.
The energy retained by the carbohydrate, about 480 kJ per mole of
carbohydrate, is approximately 28% of the light energy required for photosyn-
thesis. Since this photosynthetically active radiation (PAR) represents
43% of the total solar energy at the earth's surface, the efficiency of the
energy retained relative to the radiation reaching the ground would be about 12%--
and this would be for perfectly absorbing plants. Accounting for the radiation
not absorbed brings the maximum theoretical efficiency to about 10%.
Measured peak values are 1% - 3%. Contrast this with actual efficiencies of
solar photovoltaics of about 10% and theoretical efficiencies of 26%.
The next question to ask is how much of the photosynthetically acquired
energy becomes stored as a harvestable biomass yield. The plants' own
respiration reduces the gross primary productivity (GPP, total newly
photosynthesized matter) by 20% to 80%. This amount is the net primary
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productivity (NPP) and is reported in recent global biomass productivity surveys
(FAO 1982a, b). Highly stressed plants in deserts may have NPP close to zero,
-1 -l
while algae may produce 60 T ha yr
However informative NPP may be, it does not account for biomass
consumption by the ecosystem itself. The net ecosystem productivity (NEP),
accounting for termites (Zimmerman 1982) etc., indicates more realistically the
harvestable biomass yield. A mature tropical rain forest will have a
negligible NEP, while a sprouting man-made ecosystem such as a young pine
plantation may yield one-quarter of the GPP.
-1 -1Maximum reported growth rates of 100 dry T ha yr for a Puerto Rican
-1 -1
sugar cane and 25 T ha yr for Euphorbia lathyris (Calvin 1982) correspond
to peak seasonal efficiencies of 1.5% to 3% of received radiation (OTA, Smil
1983), which is equivalent to the record yields of corn (OTA). The average
yields are much lower, reflecting varied climate and soil conditions and
management practices.
Using a large-scale average productivity value, maximum biomass resource
limits can be calculated that compare well with more detailed assessments.
Since a detailed assessment of the global biomass resource has not yet been
done, such a calculated resource limit must suffice. V. Smil's (1983)
calculation of the United States' maximum harvestable biomass for fuel is
about 15 EJ/yr, similar to detailed studies by OTA and ERAB that determined a
potential of about 10 EJ/yr around the year 2000. Essentially, this represents
a yield of 1-1.5 EJ per 100 million hectares of land in the U.S.A.
Studies of Canada's forest biomass potential yield similar results. A
supply potential of 120 million dry tons per year about the year 2000,
three-fourths of which would be available at 1980 at $2.6 per GJ, could be
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obtained from 220 million hectares of productive forest land. (Canadian
Forestry Service 1981, 1982a,b.) This represents a large area, but 30%
of this land is yet to be opened up to commercial forestry. Much of the
tropical forest is similarly inaccessible; assuming similar productivities,
similar limits of one EJ per hundred million hectares can be expected.
Depending on the forest region, Canadian forests have mean annual increments
3 -1 -1(round wood growth) of 0.3 to 7 m ha yr , depending on the region.
3 -1 -1 3 -1 -1
Yields are 1 to 2 m ha yr in tropical Africa and 2 to 4 m ha yr
in the Asia Pacific region (Sommer 1976).
Before concluding this estimate of global biomass supply, potential
agricultural productivities should be briefly addressed. The net primary
productivity of cultivated land is about 6.5 T ha~, lower than that of forest
and shrub land, 14 T ha~l (Lieth and Whittakker in FAO 1980). This compares
with corn, rice, and wheat yields for the total plant of 7.4, 5.4 and 4.8 T ha~1
respectively (Smil 1983); however sugar cane yields much more, averaging
15 to 27 T ha 1. Since forest productivities are generally
higher than agricultural ones, it seems reasonable to assess global biomass
resource limits in terms of the 1 EJ per hundred million hectares
(1 EJ/106 km 2) determined above. Table 4.6.1 indicates the planet's land
area and limits on potential biomass supply.
Perhaps the world could obtain 130 EJ yr~1 (4.6 TW) from well-
developed biomass energy supply projects. However, only local assessments will
indicate whether this potential will be achievable. Further subsections of this
report will indicate some of the competing demands for biomass, the environmental
concerns associated with biomass harvest, and related constraints.
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4.6.3 Forests
Further support for the forest as the principal source of biomass
energy is evident from the UN FAO estimates of agricultural expansion to
the year 2000 in Table 4.6.2.
If all of this new land is intensively managed for biomass energy,
only a few exajoules would be generated. However, even this is unlikely,
given the serious global food problem. So we turn our focus to forestry.
What are some of the trends in deforestation and replanting and demands
for other materials from the forests?
In 1975, the world consumption of wood and wood products was roughly
25 EJ equivalent (i.e., 2.5 billion m 3). Fuelwood accounted for less than
40% of this. In the 13-year period from 1961 to 1974, world trade in all
forest products grew 17% yearly, "far exceeding the growth of total world
trade in all commodities, including manufacturers" (FAQ 1976). Due to
the commercial importance of wood as fiber, tree farms and fuelwood will remain
of secondary importance when timber markets are strong. However, the increased
demands for timber and fiber will open new previously inaccessible forests and
thereby increase access to marginal wood and residues for fuelwood needs.
Alone, the commercial value of fuelwood does not warrant the heavy investment
in roadbuilding needed to develop a sustainable and well-managed forest project
(Hewett 1981).
Moreover, the demands for firewood place severe stress on forests,
particularly their perimeters. As the edges of the forests are nibbled away,
families spend more and more of their time collecting firewood from greater
distances. In the Himalayan foothills of India, firewood collection has grown
from a task requiring one hour to one needing a day (Fritz 1981). As this
happens, the denuded areas suffer more severe weathering and erosion problems,
111
which may, as in the Sahel, increase desertification.
The extent of the .fuelwood shortage is so chronic it is almost beyond
the label "crisis." Hundreds of millions of people are affected (see
Table 4.6.3) who overcut the woodlands as they attempt to meet their needs
and thereby diminish their resources--a certain tragedy of the commons.
4.6.4 Deforestation and Plantation
Concern about deforestation of the tropical forest has received
much international public attention. Shifting agriculture poses the greatest
concern since more land is cleared than ever restored by plantations or
reforestations. The clearing operation can.be more serious than logging,
which latter can select saw logs and veneer logs, allowing forest cover
to remain. Figure 4.6.2 depicts data from the most recent FAO survey of
tropical forest resources. For every 10 hectares of forest cleared, only about
1 hectare of plantation will be created. This 10% replacement rate is a
global average for the tropical forest and masks the great variation from
one region to another. For example, in tropical Asia, the replacement rate
is about 25%, but in Africa it is less than 3%. Moreover, often reforestation
is distant from the clearing areas. For example, in Brazil tree clearing
occurs in the north, but the plantations are in the south. It is a good
sign that plantations are being encouraged in many nations. Notably, 40%
of the total tropical forest plantations were planted in the 5 years from 1976-
1980 (FAO 1982b).
Yet even with ambitious plantation plans, large national programs
may not effectively relieve anticipated deficits. India's plantation program
of 650,000 ha/yr could result after 20 years in a yield of 30 million m3
woodfuel/yr, which could provide about 0.5 EJ/yr. Much of this plantation
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effort is planned for industrial wood. As the share of industrial wood
consumption relative to total consumption increases (see Table 4.6.4 and
note the reversed consumption situations in developed and developing
economies), the fuelwood supply will be further stressed.
As petroleum resources diminish, coal and biomass will be turned to for
hydrocarbon feedstocks. Catalytic dehydration of ethanol to ethylene,
microbial transformation of lignin and cellulose, and plant breeding techniques
to develop plants which will produce specific hydrocarbons are among
a number of industrial processes receiving attention for their potential to
use biomass feedstocks (Bungay 1981, Calvin 1982, Hydrocarbon Processing 1981).
Biomass as a materials supply will introduce further land use competition
together with agricultural, forestry, and energy demands. The issue of using
land for food or fuel has been well discussed recently (Brown 1980, FAO 1980,
Pimentel et al. 1982). A good initial indicator of whether energy crops might
hinder food supply is shown in Figure 4.6.3. Where nations experience
deficits in both energy and agriculture, using land for extensive energy
projects may aggravate present difficulties.
China serves as a good example where biomass energy will be inadequate.
Pressures on fuelwood supply are dramatically evident in China. The forest
area per capita in China is 0.12 ha per person, much lower than that of
Europe (0.3 ha/person) or North America (2.8 ha/person) (FAO 1978, FAO 1982c).
The actual forest land area, 122 million ha, covers about 13% of China and
80% of the forests' production provides timber. Less than 4% of the forest
land supplies fuelwood; other small wood lots supply roughly an equal amount of
fuelwood (FAO 1982c).
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Although China has ambitious plans to increase plantations, their planned
production 10 years from now will not be sufficient to meet their current or
future demand. Current fuelwood demand is estimated at 400 million T (about
4 EJ equivalent), but the supply is less than one-third of this. Twice the
current total forest area could be planted and devoted solely to fuelwood,
and China still would experience shortage. In conditions of such scarcity,
it is not surprising to hear reports of overcutting. In many places, tree
plantations are damaged so trees will die early and can be culled for fuel.
Moreover, the reported 70 million m3 of fuelwood which is obtained from 4%
of China's forests indicates a harvesting rate of 13 m3 /ha yr, clearly exceeding
an average sustainable yield.
4.6.5 Environmental Constraints
Although biomass resources can be renewable and have a lower sulfur
content than oil or coal, biomass energy conversion and use have associated
environmental and public health problems. Detailed descriptions of these
concerns are given in (Pimentel et al. 1982) and (Pimentel et al. February 1983).
Of particular concern is the soil erosion and water run-off problems associated
with removing forest and crop residues. The economic externalities of such
removal can be sufficiently high to negate any benefits of the energy harvest.
Calculations presented in Table 4.6.5 based on World Bank watershed rehabilitation
projects indicate that the economic cost of watershed damage can be from about
$2/GH to $8 +/GJ of energy obtained from forest cutting.
4.6.6 Conclusions
Biomass energy potential is estimated to be 1 EJ per hundred million
hectares, or perhaps 4.6 TW for the world as a whole. We consider this to be
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a high estimate, although some researchers who count on the widespread
use of very high yielding plants may consider it low. Biomass energy
potential must be viewed together with competing land use demands for wood,
chemicals, and food, and associated environmental problems should be clearly
understood before regions embark on large biomass energy programs.
115
Table 4.6.1
Land Areas
Million km2
Africa 30.6
Asia
USSR
China
the rest
Near East
Europe (east and
west, excluding
USSR)
N. America
Canada
USA
Central and S. America
Oceania
Total
(Antarctica and
Greenland)
22.4
11.4
9.6
5.9
10.5
Biomass Energy Potential (EJ)
(gross energy per year)
31
42
6
10
10
9.4
19.9
19
20
8
137
8.5
138.2
15.4
Sunnary and Comparisons:
140 EJ/yr is roughly equivalent to 4.6 TW
Comparing this with predicted energy
consumption level s:
year 2030
year 2030
year 2030
Lovins scenario
IIASA high scenario
Hudson Institute scenario
40% of a
15% of a
10% of a
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Table 4.6.2
AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION
World's land area:
World's potentially arable land:
Mid-1970 agricultural land:
Expansion by A.D. 2000:
147 million km2
30-40 million km2
15 million km2
2.4 million km2
Source: FAO 1980
TAble 4.6.3
The Fuelwood shortage
(millions of people affected)
1980 2000
Acute Deficit | Acute scarcity orI scarcity | deficit
I Total Rural Total Rural I Total RuralI population population population population I population population
55
31
26
112
49
29
18
96
146
832
201
1179
131
710
143
984
535
1671
512
2718
-I
-I
-I
464
1434
342
2240
Definitions of categories:
- acute scarcity: sufficient fuelwood cannot
is below minimum needs;
be obtained even by overcutting; consumption
- deficit: minimum fuel needs are met, but only by overcutting existing resources.
Source: FAO 1982b.
I-h
-4
I I
Region
Africa
Asia and
Pacif ic
Latin
America
Total
|
Table 4.6.4
Use of World Forest Resources
Region
I |
| World |
|Developed |
|market |
|economies|
| I
|Centrally |
|planned ||economies|
I |
Forest area
1975
million ha
Closed
forest
Open
forest
Removal 1974-1976 3Annual average in million m
Total Fuelwood Industrial wood
(including that for
pulp and paper)
I I
2,860 1,070
693 243
945 185
2,799
761
733
1,473
57
304
1,326
704
429
N.B. Clearly fuelwood supplies would be further stressed as the share of industrial wood supplies inless industrialized countries increase unless industrial wood is obtained from plantations not
competing with fuelwood.
Source: FAO 1982a.
C3
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Table 4.6.5
Cost of watershed damage due to
improperly managed forest removal
Cost of rehabilitation of watershed: $500/ha - $1000/ha (1982 $)
(Data from World Bank projects, ref. John Spears, 1982)
Level of forest removal leading to watershed problems:
13 - 31 m3 ha -1 yr -1
(120 - 290 GJ eq ha- 1 yr-I
(Data from FAO 1982b).
Energy content of wood: 9.4 GJ/m 3
Economic cost of Watershed Damage (1982 $/GJ) |
Annual
Rehabilitation | Forest Cutting
Cost
Low yield -l 1 High yield _
13 m ha- 1 yr | 31 ha- 1 yr
$500/ha $4.1/GJ $1.7/GI
$1000/ha $8.2/GJ $3.4/GJ
This table indicates a range of costs, noteworthy because they indicate
the environmental costs can be large. Proper management practices
in advance could prevent the need for corrective rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation costs may even be higher than $2 - 8/GJ depending on
terrain, soil type, climate, and the need for dams, etc. to prevent flood
damage.
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Figure 4.6.1
Estimates of biomass sources available per year
in the USA about the year 2000. (ERAB)
Relative Potential Gross Energy
(dry 1018 j)
Aquatic Plants
Grains
I __________ -____
I I
I _ _ I
I _ _ _
Animal Wastes
Food-processing
Industrial, and
Urban Wastes
Crop Residues
Wood
I _______ I
I I
I I
I ________________ I
1 2 3 4 5 (x101 8J)
I I
Figure 4.6.2
Tropical Forest Use
World Forest Resource Base
(x 106 ha)
4000
3000
2000
1000
4000
mi
I I
n LDCs
7 50
Global
Total
of which
about 3000
is closed forest
Closed
Forest
Open
Forest
(much of the
current fuelwood
supply comes from
the open forests)
Estimates of tropical forest areas disturbed annually (x 100 hectares)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Clearing of closed forests
(mostly by shifting cultivation) 7.5
Closed forest: logged
but not cleared N.B. Sustainable energy
potential foregone
from the 150 million
ha that will be cleared
through the year 2000
= 1-2 EJ/yr.
3.8
1.1 Plantations
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Open forest:
cleared
I
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Figure 4.6.3. Energy and Agricultural Self-Sufficiency
Iatrix for Selected Countries. Large
dots, indicate countries already engaged in
or seriously considering programs for
converting food commodities to alcohol.
Source: FAO 1980.
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4.7 Reducing Energy Consumption by Rational and Effective Use
One of our principal conclusions is that rational and effective use of
energy not only can but also most likely will reduce the global demand of energy
well below the levels postulated by (say) the IIASA scenarios. This section
provides our support for this view.
Speaking of "rational and effective use" in preference to "conservation"
is more than mere semantic detail; to many financially constrained groups,
"conservation" sometimes sounds like curtailment imposed by the rich upon the
poor, whereas the more correct phase makes clear that the activity is applicable
to rich and poor societies alike. Extracting the maximum utility from each
unit of available energy is a task of global importance.
4.7.1 The Relation between Energy Use and GDP (or GNP)
Energy projections for developing countries generally show the ratio
Energy/GDP rising during early stages, then passing through a broad maximum
before declining, as sophisticated, highly technological service enterprises
replace more energy-intensive production-oriented ones. For example, the IIASA
scenarios (Hafele 1981) and a 16 TU low-energy case proposed by Colombo and
Bernardini are characterized by the following primary energy-GDP coefficients
E,* for Latin America (LA), Africa/Southeast Asia (AF/SEA), and Western Europe/
Japan/Australia/New Zealand (WE/JANZ).
Some Energy-GDP Elasticities
High Scenario Low Scenario
(36.7 TW) (22.4 TW) 16 TW Case
1975- 2000- 1975- 2000- 1975- 2000-
2000 2030 2000 2030 2000 2030
LA 1.04 .98 1.06 .97 .96 .82
AF/SEA 1.15 1.11 1.18 1.19 1.38 .90
WE/JANZ .70 .77 .65 .73 .04 .10
*The elasticity coefficient c is defined as
E(t2) GDP(t2)
E(t ) GDP(t )
where t1 and t2 are two given times, E is measured in physical units and GDP
is measured in real non-inflated monetary units.
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Elasticities E > 1.0 imply that energe use is rising faster than GDP; the 16 TW
case assumes such sharply rising energy prices that energy use is severely
constrained everywhere, and that developed countries experience decreased per
capita energy consumption due mainly to higher efficiencies of end-use.
The energy being discussed in these cases is energy that reaches the commercial
sector; in fact, the ratio E/GDP may not be rising at all, when noncommercial
energy, which is largest at early development stages, is included. Thus the
rising-falling curve may give the wrong impression, that energy-efficiency
techniques are more or less irrelevant at early development stages. The case
of the U.S. shows these effects very well. Figure 4.7.1 shows the E/GNP in the
U.S. from 1880 (when the U.S. was in a sense like some LDC's today) up to 1980.
The data before about 1910 are misleading because wood, a major fuel then, was
not included in the accounts, just as many traditional fuels like sticks, dung,
grass, etc. are inadequately counted today in LDC's. The three single-year
points include the effect of fuel wood, according to the authors of the quoted
report. Overall, the ratio E/GNP fell or at worst stayed approximately constant,
during the entire 100-year span, and it seems reasonble that most presently
developing countries will have a similar experience, especially as energy prices
are expected to rise more rapidly in real terms than they did decades or a
century ago. The present LDC's will become increasingly important energy users
in coming decades, so the likelihood of successful fuel efficiency strategies
will be important, as in the developed countries.
The CO2 problem is generally a consequence of high energy use; there is a
high payoff for effective use, so it is worthwhile to study E/GNP and its changes
with time, as follows.
*Strictly speaking, it is a consequence of high fossil fuel use; here we assume
that improving energy productivity reduces demand of all supply sectors.
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Figure 4.7.2 shows the growth and occasional decline in both constant-dollar
GNP and energy use in the U.S., between 1950 and 1978. Some advocates of rapidly
increasing energy supply have used this correlation to support the egregious
misconception that "energy conservation" is inherently undesirable because it
leads to lowered GNP and other miseries. In that view energy drives both society
and GNP.
The system does not work so simply. That is fortunate, because Figure 4.7.2,
taken literally, predicts that as energy costs rise and its use inevitably
declines, the GNP will surely drop. What the figure really shows is that the
short-run correlation is strong; for example, the dip in both arising from the
late-1973 through 1974 oil price increases.
Now refer back to Figure 4.7.1. We see that E/GNP was indeed approximately
constant from 1950 to 1974, but during that time energy prices declined in
constant dollars, implying that if real energy prices had remained stable, E/GNP
would have declined with time. The period 1920-45 was such a time, and
Figure 4.7.1 shows a decline of about 1% per year. The 1979 oil price rises
and the gradual maturation of energy conservation technologies (coupled with an
economic recession) brought U.S. energy use in 1982 back to its 1972 level --
72 quads.
Supporting evidence for this trend comes from elsewhere; e.g. in Japan,
the GDP per unit of energy increased by about 30% between 1973 and 1980, after
correcting for inflation (EWC 1983). Total energy use stayed about the same, but
(significantly) the electric fraction grew substantially, just as it had done
in the U.S. and almost everywhere else.
These ideas find confirmation in the sophisticated energy modeling studies
initiated for the CONAES studies. Figure 4.7.3 from one of those reports shows
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the results of several modeling attempts to answer the question: if the E/GNP
ratio were forced to decline from its 1975 value to a fraction of that value
by the year 2010, by what fraction would the GNP decline from the value it would
have had if E/GNP had remained constant? This question, awkward to state, asks
in effect about the medium and long-term elasticities, and at what rate energy
and GNP can be decoupled. The curve shows, for example, that E/GNP can decline
to 0.6 of its 1975 value in 35 years while GNP decreases by only 1.3%, a number
surely within the uncertainty of the calculations. This reduction corresponds
to a decline of about 1.4% per year in the ratio E/GNP.
4.7.2 Recent Progress in the U.S.
The actual improvements in energy efficiency throughout the past decade
have been noted throughout the literature. A summary of the situation as of
1980 is given by (Hirst et al. 1981), and it is worth showing a few of their
results. Figure 4.7.4 shows residential energy use 1970-1980. The ORNL energy
models were used to project the reduction in residential energy intensity due to
price increases. Figure 4.7.4 shows both the projection and the actual energy
data. A savings of 12% came about in seven years (1.7% per year) because of
price increases. It should be emphasized that the stock of residential structures
had not changed very much during this period. Regarding the possibility of
further improvements, Figure 4.7.5 shows data from another report, describing
specific savings achieved in retrofit studies. The cost-benefit ratio indicated
in that figure strongly favors more effective use.
In Figure 4.7.6, Hirst et al. show the improvement in automobile fuel
economy from 1975 through 1980. Many small cars now (1983) comfortably exceed
the 1985 standards.
It might be argued that this is only a temporary phenomenon, due to end
when energy costs stabilize, and the cost of efficiency improvements starts to
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catch up with energy savings. To be sure, the rate of improvement will slow,
but: (a) data show that most capital improvements that have been made to increase
energy efficiency have paid back their investment in less than 5 years, sometimes
as soon as 1 to 2 years; (b) the thermodynamic second law efficiency postulated
by availability analysis is still very low even in the U.S. -- perhaps 10% for
the automobile industry, for example (Bazerghi 1982); (c) the technology of rational
and effective energy use is much less developed than the technology of provision.
Much room exists for continued improvement in the U.S., and in other developing
countries as well as the LDCs- (Dunkerly 1981).
The most authoritative study of the magnitude and origin of changes in
energy productivity known to us is Marlay's study of industrial energy productivity
in the U.S. (Marlay 1983). By analyzing the actual material output and energy use
in 472 mining and manufacturing industries between 1945 and 1980, he has
separated the effects-of-shifts in product mix, technological improvement, and
changes in economic growth, especially in the period 1972-1980. Figure 4.7.7
summarizes some of his findings. During the period 1950-1972, the output per
unit of fossil energy input increased by about 0.9% per year, even though most
fossil energy prices declined in constant dollars. This improvement was partly
offset by an increase in electricity use, leaving a small net improvement overall,
consistent with the findings stated earlier.
The period 1972-1980 showed a dramatic improvement, a reduction in fossil
fuel use per unit of output of 2.3% per year, not compensated by any increased
electric intensity. Much of this improvement featured reduced use of natural
gas, as a result of restrictions placed on its use, and reduced use of coal,
as industry backed out of coal technologies because of environmental and other
considerations. Figure 4.7.8 shows Marlay's summary of the 1972-80 situation,
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a reduction in energy use by industry of some 22% from what had been projected in
1972 from historic trends, and all this in the presence of substantial growth
in output.
One must be careful in analyzing data like these. Many were supplied to
U.S. Government agencies (for example, the Federal Reserve Board) only sporadically,
and sometimes on a voluntary basis by selected industries (a circumstance now
being corrected in part). Figure 4.7.9 shows Marlay's comparison of 1972
Federal Reserve Board data compared with Census index data, for 134 industries
from which the FRB collected data. It is easily seen that errors of 5 to 10%
can be made, and wrong implications drawn, especially when one is looking for
changes amounting to something like 1% per year.
All these studies suggest that energy productivity can be improved at the
rate of about 1% per year, with moderate stimuli, and with good information
available about how to do it. Thus we have included in our MIT/IEA energy
scenarios several with such a rate of improvement worldwide.
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Figure 4.7.1. An index (1900 = 100) of energy consumed per dollar of real gross national
product for the United States from 1880 to 1980 shows successive trends of rise, decline, and
stability. This plot excludes fuel wood, whose consumption exceeded that of coal into the
1880s. Single-year points that do include fuel wood are indicated for 1880, 1920, and 1950.
Source: Adapted from Sam H. Schurr, Joel Darmstadter, Harry Perry, William Ramsay, and
Milton Russell, Energy in America's Future: The Choices Before Us, Resources for the Future
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). Copyright 1979 by Resources for
the Future, Inc.; all rights reserved. Data for 1975-81 from other sources.
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Figure 4.7.2. Annual percentage changes in primary energy and
GNP, 1950 - 1978. Data for GNP changes are from the Economic Report
of the President (Washington D.C.; Government Printing Office, January
1979). Energy data are from the Bureau of Mines for 1950 - 1974 and
from the Department of Energy for 1974 - 1978,
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U.S. From Fig. 2.12 of Report on Building a Sustainable Future, Committee
on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress
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Figure 4.7.7. Fossil Fuel Veighted Measure of Output Divided by Fossil Fuel Input, 1951-1980
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Figure 4.7.8.
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Figure 4.7.9. Comparison of 1972 FRB and Census Indexes of
Industrial Production for Mining and Manufacturing
For 134 FRB Industries
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Histogram shows percent differences between the Fed-
eral Reserve Board's Indexes of Industrial Production for 134 min-
ing and manufacturing industries and 134 equivalently constructed
Production Indexes from the 1972 Census of Manufacturing and Min-
eral Industries, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Com-
merce. The FRB indexes exceed those of Census by an average of 1.8
percent, relative to a set of common references in 1967.
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4.8 Energy Storage
4.8.1 Introduction
Solar energy without storage is to a first approximation a capital-intensive
method of saving on fuel costs at uncertain times;.hence storage is critical
to making solar power economic on a large scale. However, it is important to
note that storage per se does not guarantee that solar will be more economic
than conventional supply alternatives. For example, if cheap storage of bulk
electric energy became available, it could be used to store solar power for
the night, or off-peak night-time nuclear power for the day and early evening.
This indicates that storage can be a benefit to conventional as well as to non-
dispatchable sources and that a judicious combination of sources could reduce
the need for energy storage, hence total cost.
This section concentrates mainly on storing the excess energy output of
electric generators and redelivering it on demand. Electric power systems are
often characterized as "having no storage," reflecting the view that electric
energy is produced in the amount required to be used at a given time. But this
is not true in a deeper sense, and incorporating energy storage into the electric
supply system can affect its cost, operation, choice of major components and
configuration profoundly. Short-term storage affects the need for prompt reserve
capacity; longer-term storage provides flexibility in meeting peak demand.
Some interruptible consumer use can be looked upon as storage provided by the
user (literally true for water heaters timed to operate only off-peak). Storage
can sometimes permit using cheap fuel instead of expensive fuel, and can sometimes
replace generating capacity. The presence or absence-of storage greatly affects
the value of renewable, nondispatchable* and/or decentralized energy systems,
Sources such as wind and PV whose output at any time is much less predictable
than conventional power plants, and hence cannot be dispatched by the electrical
systems controller in the same manner.
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hence the composition of an optimal electric power system.
This section deals principally with the storage technologies themselves,
leaving the issue of integration with other elements of the grid mostly for
the next chapter. However, some simple systems concepts will be introduced
here, to help show how much of what kind of storage can be useful and have a
major impact.
In the context of this study, we are considering the potential for large
amounts of storage. Biomass is usually storable, a global resource we estimate
to be on the order of some 4 TW (See section 4.6) at most. However, much of its
use is liable to be restricted to locations and times that do not match the needs
for power on demand in industrialized societies; so to a first approximation,
we should look to storage.elsewhere. The energy to be stored, in our mainly
nonfossil future, is of two principal kinds: electric energy (the natural outputs
of nuclear, wind, photovoltaic and most other nonbiomass energy systems), and
low temperature heat (for example, in passive solar houses).
Several time scales characterize the operation of an electric power system;
Table 4.8.1 shows these time scales, tasks to be accomplished, and how they are
met with present facilities.
The principal future storage modes are (in our opinion) electrochemical,
hydropower, and compressed air, in decreasing order of importance. Some others,
for example flywheels, may find useful applications, but we think that their
global effect will be very small. From time to time, the idea of a hydrogen
economy has attracted attention, for example in the IIASA studies. That may
come about one day, but the only efficient methods of making hydrogen at present
(from water, not from fossil fuels) depend on large amounts of very cheap elec-
tricity and/or high temperature heat, which in our view puts a hydrogen economy
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as perhaps a successor to a mainly-electric economy, that would develop with
less exotic storage forms. Thus our main priorities are the three mentioned
above.
4.8.2 Hydropower as Storage
Compared with future global energy demands, it is a moderate potential
resource. Our own estimate of utlimate availability is about 4 TW (120 EJ/year)
maximum. Much of the cost of a large hydropower system is in foregone land
use, the dam itself (or reservoir, for pumped storage) and other items whose
cost does not depend very much on the rate of filling or emptying of the system
(e.g. locks in a navigable river). Thus, hydropower systems, just like other
energy storage schemes, work most cheaply if the filling and emptying cycle is
short: non-flowing stored water increases capital cost, but not revenue.
Pumped storage systems are then designed for daily (sometimes weekly) charge and
discharge cycles. Natural rivers flow seasonally, so weeks, even months, of
storage must be provided; thus the ratio (capital in the storage system)/
capital in the generating system) is higher for natural systems than for pumped
storage ones, unless the pumped reservoir is exceptionally expensive, say as
excavated caves.
These features of hydropower make it an attractive complement both to
nondispatchable sources, and to full-time baseload plants, although the schedule
of demand will differ in the various cases. Whether it is natural hydropower
or pumped storage is mainly a matter of geography, economics and environmental
impact: if generators at a natural dam run only during periods of peak demand,
their amortized cost is higher, a situation that applies to pumped hydro systems
just as well. About the year 1940, Grand Coulee development in Washington State
received its name and location because it was envisaged in part as a large
seasonal pumped storage scheme.
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At present about 1.4 EJ/year (-45 GWe) comes from hydropower in the U.S.*
To put this number in context, we note that about 70% of the rainfall evaporates
or is transpired by vegetation before it gets into any river. If every drop
that naturally flows downhill in every stream delivered all its potential energy
the answer would be about 2000 GWe. The amount present in accessible streams
and rivers might be 1000 GWe, but of this only a small fraction is really
available, because of many limitations. The CONAES report suggests 100 GWe
maximum.
The U.S. has about 5% of the world's land surface, and collects about that
fraction of rain on the land; its topography is slightly more mountainous than
the average, but not much more. Thus the 100 GWe ficgure for the U.S. and 2TW
globally are in proportion. However, the U.S. generates about 20% of the
world's hydropower; the regions of principal promise are Asia (particularly
China), South America and Africa.
We believe that natural dams are liable to be much more important than pumped
hydro, as a global average. The sites for pumped hydro, while regionally
important, seem too few to dominate, and such installations generally cannot
serve any other purpose, such as irrigation on demand, recreation or fish
production.
Because of its availability on a multiplicity of time scales and because
it can fulfill the role of spinning reserve, hydropower can be an excellent
complement to non-dispatchable renewable sources. Consider for example wind/hydro
systems; Sdrenson(1981) outlines the possibilities well. He describes the results
of a study made of the feasibility of combining Danish windpower. and Norwegian
*Note that this is electrical energy; in some accounting schemes, this number
is divided by the thermal efficiency of a fossil fuel plant to give the equivalent
hydro contribution to primary fossil energy use.
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hydropower. Data from three Danish wind years (good 1967 , bad 1963 and
typical 1961) with an average Norwegian hydro year -.ere used to show that the
maximum annual deviations inwater level caused by the power exchange with the
wind system were +11% and -5%. Those deviations are small compared with the
natural variations caused by differences in annual precipitation.
Regarding this complementarity, we quote from Sdrensen's excellent article
directly.
More ambitious wind-hydro systems have been proposed in California and
and in Scandinavia. The appealing feature of such schemes is that wind-
energy converters embedded in a hydro system of sufficient size may
effectively obtain full capacity credit at a very low expense. This
hinges on a crucial feature of the regions under consideration for such
installations: the average seasonal variation in wind energy is to a
considerable extent positively correlated with variations in load and
negatively correlated with variations in the water level of the hydro
reservoirs. For this reason the impact on the water level in the reservoirs
is on average very modest. If anything, the rise in water level tends to
occur during the winter, when the wind power is highest and the water
reservoirs are being emptied, whereas deficits in wind power leading to
withdrawal of water from the reservoirs usually occur in summer, after the
reservoirs have been filled by the melting of snow during the spring.
Superimposed on these trends is a large amount of borrowing and repaying
between the wind and hydro systems on a shorter time scale, ranging from
a few hours to a few weeks.
The addition of wind-energy converters to a hydro system with sufficient
reservoir capacity may require reinforcement of transmission lines and
increased hydro-turbine capacity, but does not require any enlargement
of the two main components of the hydro installations: dams and
reservoirs. In this sense the wind-energy converters may be given full
capacity credit, although strictly speaking the increase in turbine
capacity at the hydro installations carries a penalty in power rating.
The point is that the power rating is not an adequate measure of capacity
either for wind or for hydro installations. For wind turbines the proper
measure of capacity may be the average power output at a given site, while
for hydro installations it may be the average power of water flow over
the year -- neither of which is strongly correlated with the power rating
of the generators.
Obtaining capacity credit for non-dispatchable systems increases their value
very substantially, because it converts them from being mainly fuel savers to
fuel-plus-plant savers. This topic will recur not only elsewhere in this
section, but also importantly in Chapter 5 on system operation and
integration.
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4.8.3 Compressed Air
If pumped hydro with (usually expensive) underground reservoirs are
contemplated, the terrain and the electric power system should also be studied
to see if compressed air is feasible. The density of overburden rock is about
2.5 that of water, so a gas pressure equal to 40% of the overburden pressure
at any particular depth corresponds to a static hydraulic head that high. A
well-publicized and successful 290 MWe system operates at Huntdorf, West Germany,
utilizing a cavity leached in an underground salt dome. A principal disadvantage
is the loss of adiabatic heat in intercoolers during expansion (made up in the
Huntdorf system by burning fuel in the expanding air to operate gas turbines).
Circumstances favorable to compressed air storage seem less common than for hydro
systems.
4.8.4 Electrochemical
The electric energy stored in all the car and truck batteries in the U.S.
is about 3 x 10 14J; if this were fully discharged during 4 hours each day to
contribute to peak electric power demand, the contribution would be about
18 GWe. Such an application is of course impossible; the simple calculation
was done to show that much larger storage systems would be needed to satisfy
peak demand, and that lead-acid batteries, which even now strain the availability
of lead, are not properly suited to the task (beside the fact that these
batteries have low energy/kg and power/kg ratios, and the chemical cycles tend
to degrade the electrodes physically).
Let us look at the cost. Let the storage system cost = $E 1 /kwh, the number
of useful cycles = N, the interest rate on money = i, the cycle period = T
(measured in the same time units as i), and cost of imput/output power equipment
be $K/kw. Also let a fraction f of the stored energy be drawn out each period,
and the cycle efficiency be n. It is then easy to show that the incremental
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cost $/kwh of storing the electricity is, very closely
$ _E 1 iT (1+i)NT
kwh + K i
rif[(1+i) -1]
The first term represents both the initial cost (E1 ) and the investment
required to replace it at its end of life, NT, on a continuing basis.
Note that this cost is in addition to the initial generation cost of the
electricity.
A report prepared by the Electric Power Research Institute's UBOAT
group (EPRI 1983) gives the following specification for substantial utility
application (in a 20 MW, 100 MWhr capacity system):
E = $80/kwh
N = 7500 cycles
T = 1 day cycle time
K = $115/kw
f ~ 0.8
a = 0.65
Suppose i = 15%/yr. Then the incremental energy cost is 7c/kwh, of which
almost all comes from the battery cost, in the first term. If the
batteries had only 2500 useful cycles, the cost would rise to about 100/kwh.
Such a storage system also provides the equivalent of spinning reserve
(but more expensively than pumped hydro if it is available).
Another report of EPRI (EPRI 1982) dealing with customer-side industrial applica-
tion adopts a baseline battery cost of $212/kwh dc, plus variations both up and down,
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and correspondingly higher costs for other items. That might be attractive to
some users to eliminate high peak demand charges imposed by the electric utility.
While interesting for specific industries, and possibly stimulative for yet
more economic systems, that application has little relevance to our larger
electric storage problem.
The battery cost ($80/kwh in the example above) is the most important item.
Where are we now? Automobile batteries are much cheaper ($40/kwh, more or less)
but they have limited cycle life, especially with deep discharge, and lead
supply is inadequate.
(Kalzhammer 1979) (of EPRI) gives a readable review of the status of lead-acid,
nickel-iron, nickel-zinc, zinc-chlorine, sodium sulfur and lithium-iron sulfide
battery R&D as of 1979. Of these, sodium-sulfur uses relatively abundant
materials, and progress in its development is good. Recent difficulties with
their development have been cracking of the beta-alumina ceramic electrolyte
tube and insulating seals, together with corrosion at the sulfur electrode,
leading to shortened life. The General Electric Company reports (EPRI 1982b)that
their type C-45 cells incorporating modified beta-alumina and other improvements
have largely overcome these difficulties, and would sell for $45-$60/kwh in
quantity (1981 dollars). In the referenced report, G.E. states that the new
cells were undergoing extended life test.
A $50/kwh figure applied to our example above would lead to an incremental
cost of electricity storage of about 4.60/kwh. This number compares favorably
with the fuel cost alone of oil or gas for peak generation: at $6.00/GJ in 40%
thermal efficiency plants this is 5.40/kwh; on the other hand, the cost of coal
at $2.00/GJ in the U.S. corresponds to only 1.75c0/kwh. However, if cheap baseload
power is available, the storage can replace the plant as well as the fuel. For
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example, night-time nuclear power at a marginal fuel cycle cost of 1.5c/kwh added
to the 4.6/kwh of storage wins over any present peaking system.
Storage would be necessary for large installations of solar or wind
power; the costs are higher. For example, electricity from a photovoltaic
(PV) installation at $1.00/Wp total system cost, at 15% interest rate, costs
about 80/kwh. Wind at $1000/kwe nameplate capacity and 0.4 load factor
(optimistic numbers) corresponds to 4.40/kwh. The sums of these plus our
prospective battery storage (12.60 or 9.0/kwh respectively, assuming diurnal
cycles) compete with peaking power, but are a long way from replacing coal or
nuclear baseload if the latter are permitted on the system.
How much storage might be required? A very simple calculation shows
fairly accurately what could be accomplished. See Figure 4.8.1. A typical U.S.
daily electric power demand looks approximately like a constant average,
modulated 30% above and below by a sine curve with a peak at 3 pm, plus higher
harmonics and week-end effects. These higher order and weekend effects can
be ignored if a 20% + error is allowed, good enough for this assessment.
The entire energy content lying above the mean in this case is 9.6% of the
daily total, some 5 x 1013 joules or 1.49 x 10 kwh, if the daily average
is 6.1 GWe. The storage system would have to deliver 1.8 GWe peak, rising from
and decreasing to zero over the 12-hour period.
The effects of a hypothetical but interesting solar PV system can be easily
calculated. Suppose the PV system produces power corresponding to the upper
half-sine curve of power demand, but off-set in phase by three hours. The remain-
ing misfit area must be supplied by storage (from the cheap off-peak baseload
power). This total amount of energy corresponds to only 2.2% of the daily
energy demand. In this 6.1 GWe scenario, some 3.2 x 106 kwh would need to be
generated over a 71 hour period, at a maximum rate of about 1.2 GWe.
147
This simple example is not meant to show that PV systems could in fact
take over that much of the load; such a system would rcquire enough spinning
reserve and/or rapidly accessible storage in order to handle the vagaries of
sunshine. What it does show is that the degree of penetration of storage
and nondispatchable sources such as PV or wind affects other system components,
and that where photovoltaic systems are most useful additions to utility grids,
they tend to reduce the value of additions of electrical storage systems, and
vice versa. Provided cheap night-time baseload power is available, the two are
substitutes for each other. The situation would reverse if PV capacity increased
to provide a high proportion of total grid generation. This conclusion has been
remarked upon by (Smith 1981) and complicates the development of both renewable
and storage systems, the former probably more than the latter. As utility
storage systems become available and economically attractive, an outcome we
consider likely, so do cheap baseload systems become more attractive, and the
market for all peaking and nondispatchable power systems declines.
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Table 4.8.1
TIME SCALE TYPICAL TASK HOW THE NEEDS ARE MET
0-100 sec. Frequency control Governors, steam reserve,
dynamic control.
30-500 sec. Spinning reserve Part-load pumped hydro,
(running spare) system dispatch.
3 min.-3 hrs. Peak lopping Unit commitment (gas turbines, low
merit fossil plant). Links with
other systems.
4-12 hrs. Load leveling Unit commitment (mid-merit fossil
2-7 days for various plants, spare plant) scheduled
1-3 months periods maintenance.
1 month-2 yrs. Long-term loading Scheduled maintenance.
5-20 yrs. Long-term demand Capacity expansion planning.
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Chapter 5
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM INTEGRATION
5.1 Introduction
Here we consider how both fossil and nonfossil energy sources can best
be combined in an electric utility system. This interest in electric systems
in our work arises because (a) many of the nonfossil supply options are electric;
(b) the electric energy fraction of total energy use grows steadily worldwide.
We are particularly interested in what happens with high penetration of
"nondispatchable" energy sources, such as solar photovoltaic and wind;
they pose novel problems as well as offering new opportunities. The sections
on wind, photovoltaic, and storage systems in Chapter 4 touched on them
briefly.
We cannot here review in detail the vast literature on how electric
power systems are arranged so as to call on various units at different
locations and times to match present and anticipated demand, nor do we need to.
Our interest is mainly on the effect of new options, on both supply and
demand. We will conclude that substantial amounts of wind or photovoltaic
power--perhaps 20 or 30 percent of the system capacity--can be incorporated
into the utility system, provided some other features that are desirable in
their own right are also incorporated. Chief among these are energy storage
(e.g., batteries and/or pumped hydro) and load management (e.g. short-term
microshedding of interruptible loads). These system developments--storage
and management--benefit baseload options such as nuclear power just as well
and conceivably even more, because they make off-peak baseload capacity
,ailable to meet off-base demands. Thus the very measures that permit
extensive penetration of what has customarily been called non-dispatchable
power units into the grid also appear to encourage the introduction of the
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very opposite type of power plants. This is because both non-dispatchable
and base load units are very rigid in terms of electric power system
operation. The base load units are inflexible because it is very uneconomic
to run them at any rate other than full power (and because of that some have
not been designed to shift easily from one power level to a different one).
The non-dispatchables generate power at a rate totally outside the control
of the system's dispatcher. Storage and load management are extremely
flexible options and their availability in a power system enhances the level
at which rigid options can be introduced, without hindering the system's
operational capabilities.
These apparently opposite trends can be reconciled by realizing that
both are non-dispatchable, only in different ways: the large baseload
units cannot now load-follow to any appreciable extent; storage, load
management, peaking units, intermediate-load units etc., in this sense all
serve the same purpose--to match the generation and the anticipated load.
To be sure, the output mismatches occur for different reasons, with different
patterns of fluctuations, and in different parts of the system--the wind
dropped, or everyone turned on their television sets--but the need to match
provision and use is the same in all cases.
One can then ask which direction, or combination of directions is best.
That depends on a host of other important considerations: Cost and expected
performance of each particular type of unit; perceived environmental
impact: whether small units can be economically added in order to match long-
term load growth as closely as possible; size of the grid system; social
preference for or against any particular type of unit. Some of those
advantages and disadvantages have-been discussed in Chapter 4; many of theeothers
are system-specific, hence, not within our present scope.
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Despite our intent not to revisit system analysis in general, we
offer a brief review of selected topics, in order to establish a basis for
the later discussion.
5.2. Demand and Supply Fluctuations, Characteristic Times, and Responses
A useful perspective on systems integration follows from understanding
how demand and supply vary both in time and at various levels of demand (i.e.,
local, subdivision, town, region). Figure 5.1 deals with a hypothetical
electric utility system of a few GW total size; in particular it illustrates
how the demand (solid lines) might appear, with a nondispatchable source added
(dotted lines). For convenience in discussion, let it be wind and, for the
moment, assume (unrealistically) that all the windmachines are in one location.
Consider the top diagram of Figure 5.1, where the solid lines show events
over one hour. At the 1-kw single residence level, lights get turned on and
off, the refrigerator runs, then stops, etc., and we see large fluctuations.
At the 100-kw subdivision level, many of those fluctuations are smoothed
out, but others may appear, like the peak at 45 minutes when people turned their
lights on during a solar eclipse. At the 10-MW level, the demand is further
smoothed, but the eclipse (or some other) phenomenon appears here, too.
Finally at the 1-GW regional level, the demand is almost smooth, affected
somewhat by a few regionally correlated events.
Now consider the behavior of windmachines during this hour (the dotted
lines). The figure shows them providing a relatively large fraction (~30%)
of the average demand. For convenience in the discussion, this fraction
is administratively allocated among all the users (so that the average
wind/demand remains approximately constant throughout the system). The
wind blows variably, and not at all sometimes. Most important, this
variability is not appreciably diminished as we proceed toward higher levels
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of integration, from the 1-kw to the l-GW level; recall that all the windmachines
were at the same place. Thus a "noise" appears on the whole system that did
not exist before, and the system must cope with this, if the benefits of the
wind generation are to be captured.
Next, consider the one day time scale. In the 1-kw house, people go
to bed, go out, cook supper, etc. At the subdivision level, these cancel
only partly, and the diurnal power demand starts to show through. In this
example, we see also a 24-hour power load, because this subdivision included
a small industry that operates around the clock, e.g., an electric heater
life-test laboratory. At the town level, the average daily pattern dominates,
and even more so at the l-GW regional level. Again, the wind blows, more
during that afternoon, but with some calm periods; and, again, this
behavior runs through the entire system.
The weekly variation shows daily regularity even at the 1-kw level,
but it is noisy, as someone relaxes on Friday but stays up most of the night,
cooks a banquet on Saturday, etc. At the 100-kw level and above, the
familiar weekly pattern emerges (see also Figure 4.8.1 of the energy storage
section for another example). But again, the wind fluctuations penetrate
the entire system, and we see no daily pattern, except for a tendency to blow
in the afternoons and, by chance, not on Friday.
The one-year picture cannot be so easily illustrated: 52 one-week
experiences look on this scale like average levels with noise, although the
weekly pattern of demand is there in fact. At the 1-GW level, we see the
annual variation of demand (it is a summer-peaking system), and the range of
weekly and daily fluctuations. Again, the wind fluctuations penetrate the
system from lowest to highest level of aggregation, although they cannot be
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shown here. But we see that the wind tends to blow well from March to mid-
December, and not much in the winter; that happens in Hawaii.
How the combination of the electric utility system and its customers
can respond to these and other loads and fluctuations is clear if we spectrum-
analyze these data. Figure 5.2 shows how they would appear at the four
aggregation levels, but now the entire frequency spectrum is shown (very
nonlinearly) from steady operation over the life of the society, to one-
second variations.
It is easiest to start at the 1-GW (most aggregated) level. The system
never shuts down (the infinite-time component), has a one-year component
corresponding to the summer peaking, but also small spectral content up to
several times that frequency, because the summer-winter variation is not
perfectly sinusoidal. The weekly spectrum is notable, corresponding to
reduced demand on Saturday and Sunday; it has distinct harmonics because
the fluctuation looks like 5 days on, 2 days off. The diurnal signal is
very strong, and so are its first few harmonics, corresponding to daily
peaks and valleys. But at higher frequency, there is very little from
the demand side. The whole supply side is not shown, but if one large unit
were to stop, we would have a high-frequency transient, not easily shown
in this figure; the spinning reserve, dynamic control, etc., are built into
the system to take care of such events, of which more anon.
At lower levels of aggregation, the principal changes are a broadening
of the peaks and spectral content between them; the spectrum becomes more
noisy. At the 1-kw level, it has much noise, extending into periods smaller
than one hour, a relatively high-frequency region that is almost without
contents at the 1-GW level.
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Our wind spectrum has two main frequency bands: one year, with some
harmonics and variation, corresponding to the annual changes; and diurnal
with variation. Also we have higher frequency noise, corresponding to the
wind's well-known fickleness. All this wind spectrum penetrates the entire
system.
A main goal of system integration, and our goal here, is to reduce
unwanted peaks as far as possible and either to cope with or eliminate this
spectral noise in the system. Many options available on different time
scales are placed on Figure 5.2 on approximately their appropriate ranges.
Several may be available to cover any one time period; in fact, the entries
recapitulate much of the information contained in Table 4.8.1. of the energy
storage section.
How any specific utility system should best respond to fluctuations
over different times can only be determined by specific detailed calculations.
That would involve performing joint statistical and analytic computations
of the real electric demand and wind data over time, data shown
allegorically in Figure 5.1. But even without such calculations, we can
identify many of the principal trends and possibilities from Figure 5.2.
As an example, consider these hypothetical wind data. The presence
and operation of the wind machines allows the total system to deliver any given
output more reliably than before because the wind may be blowing when some
other generator is forced to shut down. Thus for a given level of reliability,
a kilowatt of wind nameplate capacity can displace some part of the conventional
system. More precisely, not so many new conventional units need to be added to
a growing system, or provided as replacements for obsolete units. However, the
substitution is usually much less than a one-for-one tradeoff because the wind
may not be blowing when needed. Thus a so-called "capacity credit"
exists whose real value requires determining how the system load curve, as
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calculated without non-dispatchable sources, is modified by their presence,
under the assumption that the effect of these sources is to modify the output
of the rest of the generating system. That is, by treating both the
output of various conventional generators in response to demand--shown
by the load duration curve in Fig. 5-3--and their outages as independent
random variables, one can calculate the probability that demand exceeds installed
capacity minus plant outages as a function of demand.
This brings us to the threshold of several topics, particularly loss-
of-load probability (LOLP) and spinning reserve, that have many important
complications, the resolution of which depends very much on what degrees of
performance and reliability are desired.
In the usual simplified analyses recapitulated here, the data of
Figure 5.3 are recast in the form of Figure 5.4, as Curve A of that figure.
A standard measure of system reliability is now set by technical, economic
and sociopolitical considerations; that is the LOLP, to which the system
is supposed to conform. Curve B illustrates the point that by adding non-
dispatchable units (in these paragraphs we mean wind and photovoltaic units,
that have much impaired predictable availability) to the grid, one can achieve
*
the same LOLP with fewer conventional generators. The actual capacity credit
depends sensitively on the amount and type of conventional generation which is
displaced; illustrative data are presented in the next section.
*
But as explained earlier in this paragraph, the capacity credit refers to long
run imputed cost saving, because some future additions will not be required.
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From the perspective of determining whether there is a feasible
maximum penetration of non-dispatchable sources, the important point is
that the capturable capacity credit decreases as the level of penetration
of the non-dispatchable sources increases for two reasons: (1) With
increasing penetration, the output of the non-dispatchables starts
replacing that of the less costly conventional generators (e.g., baseload
nuclear); this could also be envisaged as the solar economics getting worse,
rather than a loss of capacity credit. (2) The larger resulting fluctuations
in generating capacity require the addition of more reliable back-up power
to achieve the same LOLP as previously specified for the system. That is,
the system must now be able to accommodate the loss of the largest plant,
the maximum probable increase in load, and simultaneously, the maximum
probable decrease in non-dispatchable output. More precisely, adding
non-dispatchable sources to a grid increases the requirements for both
load-following and spinning reserve capacity. These impacts have become
the subject of an increasing literature, some of which we discuss in the
next section. However, we can already gain insight into this problem and
possible remedies by reference to Figure 5.1. Thus, spinning reserve is
responsive to events on the time scale of roughly 0 - 100 seconds, and in
Figure 5.2 this corresponds to the high frequency part of the spectrum.
If the non-dispatchable sources are co-located, their intermittent output
in this part of the spectrum penetrates the system, and it is intuitively clear
that spinning reserve must be added on virtually a one-for-one basis with
non-dispatchable capacity to maintain a given level of system reliability.
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Having written this, we now insert some caveats. First, the LOLP
is a planning concept, not an operating parameter; real systems are much more
complicated. Second, the emphasis here on the importance of spinning
reserve, the implied importance of holding frequency very constant,
of exact cycle counts every few minutes, etc. is a conventional U.S. electric
system view. Such precise standards do not exist in most other places,
and good arguments have been made that they should not, perhaps not
even in the U.S. Such expensive precision is not necessary for almost
all end-uses for which electric utility systems are built; the few
exceptions can be handled in other ways. If the standards are moderately
relaxed, the spinning reserve requirements decrease.
Several other ways (besides relaxing unnecessary precision) exist
to reduce both spinning reserve and the load-following penalty. One
is to disperse the non-dispatchable sources since this tends to even
out the effects of microclimates and short-term fluctuations. In the
language of Figure 5.2, the steady outputs add directly, but to the extent
that outputs of the non-dispatchable sources are uncorrelated in Figure 5.1,
the time fluctuations add like noise power, and the effective signal/noise ratio
increases. Other means to this end include the addition of short-term storage to
the grid and various "homeostatic control" load-management options; e.g.,
microshedding and power energy rescheduling. We discuss some of the latter
techniques in Section 5.3; for a fuller treatment of homeostatic control
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and its impact on the integration of solar electric technologies see
(Tabors 1981). As to storage options, consider; e.g., batteries. At
$200/KWh for the complete installation (see Section 4.8), 300 seconds of
battery storage would cost $200/12~ $17 per installed kilowatt of wind,
a cheap and attractive fix on this time scale. * This would not be an economic
option for long outages, but for them we could utilize slower load shedding,
hydropower, including pumped storage, peaking turbines, as well as
other homeostatic control measures such as spot pricing.
We note that ability to accurately predict wind speed and solar
insolations can improve system operation in the sense that the fluctuations
in non-dispatchable source output can be handled better. For example, several
hours advance warning of a large drop in wind output provides the time required
to bring additional steam reserve units up to load, thus reducing the need
for additional spinningreserve. This effect is even more relevant in the
case of small-scale hydro, where the time lag introduced by the precipitation-
runoff process allows more time to predict generation from precipitation
data obtained, for example, via satellites using a precipitation-runoff
generation model of the hydrologic basins.
5.3 Recent Analyses of Non-Dispatchable Source Integration Issues
Here we briefly review ideas contained in studies at Systems Control,
Inc. (SCI 1980), MIT (Tabors et al 1981) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(Reddoch et al, 1982). The point of view in these studies is similar.
However, the analysis of Tabors et al does not include the effect of the
*
We do not propose that batteries could or should charge and discharge on 5-minute
time scales, but rather that the arrangements made for longer (e.g., diurnal)
storage can at small marginal cost also satisfy these short term needs.
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additional spinning reserve and load-following requirement of non-
dispatchable source integration which, as we shall see, can be
a severe penalty at high penetration levels without innovations in load
management.
(a) Capacity and Fuel Credit
Table 5.1 shows the results of adding two levels of photovoltaic
generation to a small synthesized utility system as calculated by Tabors et al.
(The system capacity for Boston, Miami, and Omaha was about 6500 MW, while
Phoenix was 7550 MW). Note the differences: Phoenix is by far the best
system match due to high insolation, summer peaking, large mid-day air
conditioning load. For small (3.1%) penetration, the capacity credit is 40%
of the solar nameplate peak rating, dropping to 34% at 15.9% penetration.
On the other hand, Omaha is winter-peaking, a poor match for photovoltaic
power.
Note in Table 5.1 that the fuel credit exceeds the capacity credit
by about a factor 3. This ratio is in accord with the results of the simple
calculation of wind systems (Sec. 4.3) that non-dispatchable units are more fuel-
saving than capacity saving, at least with present fuel prices and utility
generation mix.
The SCI results are similar in general, but different in detail.
For example, for a wind system at Clayton, New Mexico, they calculate 
the
following: 1% nameplate penetration of wind machines can displace 0.46%
of the 5000 MW prior system capacity; 10% penetration displaces 4.5%;
30% displaces only 5%.
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These results can be expressed in other ways, for example, in terms of
the breakeven capital cost of a non-dispatchable system as a function of
system penetration. Figure 5.5 shows SCI's calculations for solar PV in
Albuquerque NM. These breakeven costs at high penetrations lie near the
midrange of our estimates for eventual costs of solar PV (e.g. ~$850/kw
at 20% penetration, 0.2 effective capacity and 15%/year capital charge
rate corresponds to an energy cost of about $18/GJ.)
(b) Taking Account of Load-Following and Spinning Reserve Requirements
The SCI calculations indicate that the addition of non-dispatchable
generation to a grid causes an increase in both load-following and spinning
reserve requirements that are fairly linear with respect to penetration and
very similar for both wind and PV generation. (See Figure 5.6) This is
in line with the more qualitative discussions in section 5,2.
The impact of this on the economics of non-dispatchable generation is severe
at penetrations greater than 1%. For example, at 10% penetration of wind
systems, the breakeven capital cost drops from $993/KW to zero when load-
following and spinning reserve are considered. These impacts can be
partially ameliorated by spatial diversity; e.g., if the wind systems
are dispersed at 25 locations within a 500 kilometer range in the SCI
scenario, the spinning reserve requirement is reduced from 18% to
14.5%--the requirement without wind systems is 8%--and the allowable capital
cost is again positive at $560/KW.
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These reports, the SCI in particular, also make several other relevant
observations.
The operating and maintenance costs tend to be exhorbitantly high
for small installations, for example, about 20 mills/kwh, in the several
kilowatt range. This is due to the lack of on-site maintenance and the cost of
providing it on call from some distance away. Systems 10MWe and above are
better.
. The majority of outages are not caused by failures in generation,
but in transmission and distribution. This leads SCI to suggest locating
non-dispatchable units near the load. If improving service reliability is
the goal, it is generally cheaper per kilowatt to improve the distribution
and transmission.
It should be noted however that these and other studies suffer from several
general deficiencies:
- There is no real evaluation of the benefits possible from spatial
diversification (analyses based on single systems).
. There is no evaluation of the potential benefits from a diversified
mix of non-dispatchable technologies (photovoltaics, solar thermal, different
types of wind machines, etc.).
. There is little consideration of the benefits from storage, not
only in terms of added capability to support more stochastic generation, but
also on the re-optimized dispatch of the rest of the system and in the case
of hydro storage, from enhanced regulation of the hydroelectric system.
To phrase the matter slightly differently, the studies usually freeze the generation
mix and style of operation in a pattern more suited to the present techno-economic
features, then add the non-dispatchable generators without re-optimizing the system
as a whole. The general cause for these deficiencies is the fact that including
optimization loops for all these issues into the capacity expansion and/or
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economic dispatch models used in the studies is a very complex task. The
treatment of storage in these models, for instance, has been a hot issue long
before non-dispatchable generation came into the picture (Castillo Bonet 1983).
Not unrelated to this discussion is the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) and the various incentives for renewable energy,
that favor small decentralized systems. It can be reasonably argued that the
purpose of it all is to stimulate development of economical energy from
renewable sources. But it should also be realized that these incentives
can also act to stimulate installation of systems whose main purpose
is to take advantage of these incentives. Tabors et al point out how under
some interpretations of PURPA, a larcenous supposed small producer could make
money by doing essentially nothing: if the small producer is paid the
utilities "full avoided cost," this could mean a marginal cost tha-t is
considerably higher than the average: but if the utility has only a single
rate for selling, based on the average cost, the small producer could in
principle get both money and free electricity from the utility company.
However, a comprehensive analysis of practice in the New England region shows
that the electric utility companies and small producers manage their mutual
affairs quite well, to their mutual (and the public) benefit (Davidson 1982).
5.4 A More Holistic View of the Problem
It appears to us that a somewhat different approach to system integration
*
is needed and indeed is developing. Consider Figure 5.2 once more. Operations
*1
Confirmed in discussions with colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, summer-fall 1983.
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per unit of energy are usually most expensive in the near right corner of the
isometric graph, and cheapest in the vicinity of the far left corner--
that is, large base-load plants. One can move in the favorable
direction via larger units (keeping in mind the diseconomy of scale that can
arise if the units become so few that economic advantages of serial
production disappear), or via smoothing the system.
Combined utility-customer load management can do much to smooth the
short-term fluctuations shown schematically in Figure 5.2, hence reduce
the penalty associated with non-dispatchable components. Here are some
relevant data, concerning electric energy use in the U.S. residential and
commercial (R & C) sectors. In 1977 and 1980 R & C accounted for 57.5%
of total generated electricity, while in 1982 it accounted for 60.1%
(DOE 1982); the fraction has remained almost constant since the early 1970's.
Table 5.2 from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL 1979) gives a
breakdown of energy consumption in the R & C sectors in 1977 (note that
half the total is electricity, on a primary energy basis). Of the total
electric use, water heaters consume 9%, that is, 5.4% of total generated
electric energy, and opportunities to operate them off-peak have been
recognized for years. Electricity used for all heating and cooling (including
hot water and refrigeration) is 60% of the R & C total, and 36% of the entire
generated energy. This category includes devices with thermal inertia which
can be left to coast for varying times, almost always for minutes, sometimes
for an hour or more, without affecting the user adversely. Thus load
control can remove much of the high frequency system noise in Figure 5.2
without harming the user. Even if only half this component of the load is
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in blocks large enough to be worth the trouble of controlling, 18% penetration
of non-dispatchable units might be incorporated into a load-dispatched
system without having to install additional rapid-response spinning reserve.
Modern communication and control systems make this type of load
management possible now, at moderate cost that has been decreasing with
time. Schweppe and co-authors, leaders in this field, have described the
possibilities (Schweppe 1978; Schweppe, Tabors, Kirtley 1982). A more
general review is given by (Morgan and Talukdar 1979). Experiments are
underway to test these ideas in practice. For example, the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory and the Athens Tennessee Utility Board are now carrying out an
experiment on utility control of loads, in that utility district of about
25,000 residents and 77 MWe peak demand (McConnell et al 1982).
Another smoothing alternative is storage on the generation side,
as described earlier. This could be by batteries or hydro. The latter
has both the advantages of fast start and long term. The performance of a modern
bulb-type hydroelectric project at the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington state
has been described in detail (St. Onge, Harty, Click 1982). From a cold
start, it can be synchronized in 90 seconds; if already spinning, it can
go from zero to full load in 45 seconds. Responses of whole power plants
to changing loads is reviewed by (Reppen and Ribeiro 1979). Modern oil-fired
power plants are also being designed to follow load more quickly than before
(Bieber 1979). By such strategies, even larger non-dispatchable
penetration can be envisaged.
To conclude this chapter, we recapitulate what we wrote near the
beginning of it. If it is possible to modify the system to accept non-
dispatchable power via addition of control and storage either at the generator
or user end, then it should be possible-also to apply the same techniques to
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use baseload power during peaking periods. This latter option appears to us
likely to be much cheaper in most locations, because on an energy basis
the off-peak power is very much cheaper than non-dispatchable sources
developed or even envisaged up to now. In other words, many of the present
analyses of how to incorporate non-dispatchable units into otherwise
conventional grids may be far from an economic optimum.
To put the matter somewhat over-simply for the sake of emphasis, we can
fairly easily envisage a modest penetration (10%?) of non-dispatchables
incorporated into the grid, with the associated penalty taken up by relatively
inexpensive strategies such as load shedding of particularly simple items.
Beyond that, the costs of incorporation rise, and above some higher level
(30%?)baseload plus storage will be preferable, at least from this systems
point of view.
Which alternative is best depends on a holistic view which accounts
for diverse factors: cost per unit of electric energy, size of the system
(i.e., is it large enough for economical base-load units), on regional
opportunity to use non-dispatchable sources to best advantage (i.e., solar
PV in Albuquerque or wind in Hawaii), and on social and/or environmental
preferences of one system over another. But in any event, storage and load
control appear as essential ingredients in all good choices. Given that,
subsequent analyses and comparisons become much easier to make.
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TABLE 5.1
Nameplate
CapacityRegion
Effective
Capacity
Capital Operating
Credit Credit
Breakeven
Cost*
1 2
percent
of utility
(MW) system
200
1200
200
1200
200
1200
200
1200
3.1
18.3
3.1
18.3
3.1
18.5
3.1
15.9
3 4 = [3][1]
percent
of
(MW) nameplate
59
185
71
304
19
74
80
407
29.5
23.8
35.5
25.3
9.5
6.2
40.0
33.9
5 6 7 = [5] + [6]
(1980$/Watt)
.316
. 280
.286
.238
.139
.108
.287
.263
1.080
1.032
.806
.790
.465
.461
1.257
.803
1.396
1.312
1.092
1.028
.604
.569
1.524
1.066
Miami
Miami
Boston
Boston
Omaha
Omaha
Phoenix
Phoenix
*The breakeven cost is the amount the utility would be willing to pay, per watt,
such that the utility is no better or worse off after installation of the system.
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Table 5.2 U.S. energy consumption by sector, fuel type, and end use, 1977
(1015 Btu)
Electricitya Gas Oil Other Total
Residential
Space heaters 1.25 3.64 2.26 0.54 7.69
Water heaters 1.17 0.87 0.14 0.08 2.26
Refrigerators 1.49 1.49
Freezers 0.64 0.64
Ranges/ovens 0.52 0.31 0.83
Air conditioners 1.10 1.10
Lights 0.96 0.96
Other 0.68 0.48 1.15
Total 7.81 5.30 2.40 0.62 16.12
Commercial
-Space heaters 0.37 1.94 1.90 0.35 4.56
Air conditioners 2.03 0.16 2.19
Water heaters 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.23
Lights 2.23 2.33
Other 0.85 0.20 1.05
Total 5.62 2.39 2.00 0.35 10.36
Btu/kWhr).
the ORNL Commercial
aElectricity is reported as primary energy (11,500
Sources: The ORNL Residential Energy Use Model and
Energy Demand Model, as quoted in Ref. (ORNL 1979)
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Figure 5.1. Experience of a hypothetical electric utility system, at
four levels of aggregation (single residence, subdivision,
town, region), on different time scales. The solid lines
are electric power demand; dotted lines are output of a
wind generator. See text for discussion.
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Figure 5.2. Spectrum analysis of the "data" of Figure 1, showing
characteristic times and options for system response.
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Figure 5.5 BREAKEVEN CAPITAL COSTS FOR FLAT-PLATE PV SYSTEMS AT VARIOUS PENETRATION LEVELS
Assumptions:
Photovoltaic System Description:1200
1100
1000
900.
Silicon
50 m2
11.5%
87%
20* South Facing
Albuquerque, NM
350N
National Climate Center
SOLMET TMY
Hourly
EPRI Summer-Peaking
Scenario 'E'
. . 5000*MW
Albuquerque Data
Economic Assumptions:
Annual Fixed Charge Rate 15%
$/kW assume standard operating conditions of
2 0 2280C, 1 kW/m incident radiation, inverter
efficiency of 87%, ad cell efficiency at 28*C
of 11.5%.
Peak Penetration PV Capacity x 100
Peak Load
Cell Type . . . .
Cell Area
Cell Efficiency at 2
Inverter Efficiency
Tilt Angle . . . .
Site: . . . . . . . .
Latitude . . . . .
Data Source . . . .
Data Type . . .
Data Frequency
Utility System Model:
Peak Load .. ...
Load Temperature
Adjustment Based or
SOLMET TMY
800
700
1 10 30
- .
. .
. .
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Figure 5.6 Load Following and Spinning
Reserve Requirements versus
Penetration of MOD-0A Wind
Generation Capacity
(From SCI 1981).
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Chapter 6
DISCOUNTING AND CO2
In evaluating the impact of alternative energy policies on CO2 and
global climate, we inevitably have to compare outcomes at widely separated
points in time. There is considerable dispute over how this ought to be
done. One frequently suggested methodology is to calculate a present value
of the future costs and benefits of specific projects or policies, using
an appropriate "social discount rate." This methodology has generated enormous
literature and much controversy. The purpose of this chapter is not to
review this literature, but briefly to consider its relevance to the CO2
problem as we understand it at present.
We conclude that discounting may be used in two ways. One of these is
helpful in thinking about the CO2/climate problem; the other is not.
Discounting is helpful when considered as an explicit, technical/mathematical
way to represent preferences for different outcomes at different times.
Moreover, there are technical reasons why most economic models require
discounting or some other limit on the value of future resources. Without
such a representation of time preference, most economic models of investment
and growth reach the paradoxical conclusion that society never enjoys the
fruits of its labor but continually anticipates an enormous spree of
consumption in the future.
The unhelpful use of discounting is in simple net present value
calculations in relation to large and complex social decisions. Present
value calculations in the private sector almost always involve incremental
projects whose size and effects are small compared to the whole economy.
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Moreover, the costs and benefits involved are more or less readily
measured in money terms. I.n these circumstances, present value analysis
(i.e., discounting) is useful in order to assess the financial impacts of
decisions. On the other hand, CO2 /climate impacts are, potentially, large
enough that they cannot be considered incremental. More importantly, we
cannot completely express these impacts in money terms. As will be
demonstrated, these problems invalidate the assumptions which would make a
simple net present value analysis appropriate.
It should be noted that in addition to the economic problems with
discounting there are many people who consider social discounting invalid
on ethical grounds. This study does not address this argument. Instead,
the 'arguments summarized below imply that the proper evaluation of future
costs and benefits remains an uncertain and controversial economic issue
and introduces another source of uncertainty into decisions about CO2.
6.1 Problem Setting: What Does Discounting Do?
The basic discounting issue can be formalized using a model with only
two periods. Suppose in period 0 you have available for consumption an
0
endowment of goods of different types x.,j = 1,...,m. In period 1, in
J
the future, your endowment will be x.. You, as well as the rest ofJ
society, have a number of trading and production opportunities by which
endowments today can be transformed into endowments in the next period.
For example, if a part of your endowment consists of seed corn, you can
(1) consume it now, (2) plant it and grow corn to consume in the next
period, or (3) sell it to a farmer, who will plant it, harvest it, and
sell you (or someone else) corn in the next period.
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In order to determine what opportunities to take you need to consider
the rates at which you are willing to trade off consumption in this period
for consumption in the next period. Other individuals, with different
endowments and opportunities, do the same. The marginal rate at which you
are willing to exchange one unit of commodity j in period 0 for some
commodity j in period 1 can be expressed as an interest rate, p.. This
rate is called your "own rate of interest." Everyone else in society has
similar own rates of interest, too.
In principle, there are an infinite number of these interest rates.
However, it is a fundamental theorem of economics that in fact they will
all be the same under certain circumstances. In particular, we have the
following:
Proposition 1: If (1) one of the commodities in the economy is
money, (2) there are no taxes, (3) everyone has Derfect foresight
**
about the future, and (4) there are no transaction costs; then
(1) the own rate of interest for all commodities purchased by an
individual will be the same, and equal to the so-called "consumption
rate of interest," (2) all individuals' consumption rates of interest
in a period will be equal, and equal to the (marginal) rate of return
on any private investment in that period.
*
The original idea is in Fisher (1930, reprinted 1977).
In addition to these conditions, a formal statement of Proposition 1 would
put certain restrictions on individuals' preferences and firms' production
possibilities.
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To illustrate this proposition, consider Figure 6.1. It shows the
choices and preferences of an individual for consumption (say consumption
of corn) in periods zero and one. The convex curve pp' is called the
"production possibility frontier." It depicts the combinations of
consumption which can physically be produced in the two periods. Moving
along the curve, one trades off consumption in period one against
consumption in period zero. The (negative of the) slope of a line drawn
tangent to pp' gives the rate of substitution between consumption in the
two periods. For instance, if the seed-yield ratio on the last acre of
corn planted in period zero is 10, then the marginal rate of substitution
is 10 (bushels in period one per bushel in period zero). The corresponding
consumption rate of interest is 900%, i.e., 10 = 1 + r, where r is the
consumption rate of interest.
Also shown in the diagram.is an indifference curve, II', for an
individual. An indifference curve has a similar interpretation to a
production possibility frontier--all points along the curve are equally
preferable. (Points above and to the right of the curve are all more
preferable, while points below and to the left are less preferable.) One
can define marginal rates of time preference by the (negative of the) slope
of an indifference curve. To avoid cluttering the diagram, only one indifference
curve for one individual has been drawn in Figure 6.1. Actually, one must
imagine a family of indifference curves for each individual, and that
they are all present (although not shown) in Figure 6.1.
Obviously, nothing said so far guarantees that the marginal rate of
time preference (slope of the indifference curve) will equal the marginal
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rate of substitution (slope of the production possibility frontier).
Proposition 1 says, however, that they will be equal if trade is
permitted. Without going into details, trade among individuals establishes
a common rate at which consumption in one period can be exchanged for
consumption in another period. (If there were no such common rate,
opportunities would exist that would allow individuals to buy at one rate
and sell at another, making a sure profit. But competition should rule out
any such profit opportunities.) The effect of trade is to establish a line
such as LL', which is simultaneously tangent to the production possibility
frontier and the indifference curves of everyone in the market. The (negative
of the) slope of the line LL' establishes the market rate of interest. Because
of the mutual tangency, everyone's marginal rate of time preference equals
the market rate, as does every marginal rate of substitution in production.
Since an interest rate is just another way of expressing a trade-off ratio,
the interest rates also are all equal.
Notice also that the individual in the figure is better off with trade
than without it, which is why the indifference curve itself does not
touch the production possibility frontier. In effect, the individual has
borrowed so as to consume more in period zero, and less in period one.
There is a second proposition which is relevant for discounting:
Proposition 2: Suppose the conditions of the first proposition
hold, and that then an additional way is found to transform goods
incrementally between period 0 and period 1. (That is, only small
changes in goods held by individuals in either period will occur.)
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Furthermore, suppose it is possible to redistribute the outputs of
this transformation so that some individuals are better off and no
individual is worse off through using it. Then the present value of
the benefits of the transformation, evaluated at current prices and
at the market rate of interest, will exceed the present value of
the costs.
The implication of Proposition 2 is that if we evaluate a project using
present value, at market prices and interest rates, we will make efficient
choice from society's viewpoint if we accept projects whose net present
value is positive and reject those whose net present value is negative.
6.2 Complications
The propositions are unexceptional as stated. Their problem is that
their premises do not hold. In particular, the world contains:
* Risk
* Taxes
* Transactions costs
* Projects which are not incremental
These complications are responsible for the controversy about whether or
not the discounting is applicable, and if so what interest rates and
prices should be used. Consequently, if net present value analysis is
applicable at all it must be under much more limited circumstances than
those implied by Proposition 2.
*
For full proof of this proposition see(Varian__1978), p. 218.
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The search for specific cases where discounting is applicable has
generated an enormous literature. Most of this is concerned with the so-
called "second best" problem: when to use discounting if risk, taxes or
transactions costs are present, or when changes are not incremental.
It is evident the climate change produced by a CO2 doubling or tripling
is not expected to be an incremental one. Thus, even if there were perfect
markets, no risk, and the like, it might not be appropriate to use discounting
to make judgments between alternative policies. For a discussion of the
stability and resilience of societies in the face of climate perturbations,
see (Smith 1982) and (Timmerman 1981).
6.3 Technical Issues: Lind's Work
The complications reviewed above have led economists to adapt the
basic methodology of social discounting to particular situations. Such is
the subject of a recent book edited by Robert C. Lind (1983) and sponsored
*
by Resources for the Future
Lind's conclusions fall into two groups: the first are general, and
the second relate to picking a particular discount rate. The first set of
conclusions are more important for CO2 than the second.
Lind's first general conclusion is that when taxes, risks, and the
like are considered, a single social rate of discount cannot be used for
every project. This is another aspect of what we said above, namely that
*
The book is the outgrowth of a symposium originally held in 1975, at which
a number of leading economists presented papers. However, the symposium
apparently did not produce a consensus on when discounting was appropriate,
or what rate to use. Lind was therefore asked to write additional material
for the book summarizing the others' work and reconciling it where possible.
The result is a book whose technical level is rather advanced, but which
reaches some rather simple conclusions about the technical utility of
discounting.
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if discounting is useful it can only be under special circumstances. These
circumstances will require different discount rates in different situations.
Lind's second general conclusion also is the same as ours: that it
is generally incorrect to adjust for risk or opportunity costs by changing
the discount rate. One of the best discussions of this point is in Robert
Wilson's essay in the book. Briefly, discounting is inappropriate because
the result of a present value analysis using a "risk-adjusted" discount
rate may contradict an analysis using the theoretically correct method of
adjusting for risk, the so-called "certain equivalent." The certain
equivalent of any random payment is the payment which, if received for
certain, would make an individual indifferent between accepting the
certain and the uncertain outcome. Adjusting the discount rate for risk
implies that the certain equivalent is proportional to the mean of the
outcomes. However, Wilson shows that there are many cases of practical
significance where this is not the case.
Lind considers what the appropriate discount rate should be if risk
is not a factor. While this seems inconsistent, there are several
reasons for doing it. First, the book is specifically concerned with
energy projects where government support is or may be sought. This is
arguably a special instance of the general problem, i.e., evaluating a
privately unprofitable project as to its suitability for government
subsidy. Second, the background of this volume and the preceding
symposium suggests that the individuals involved were under pressure to
produce a consensus on discounting and an appropriate rate. Anyone
involved in energy policy during the period from 1975-83 will attest to
the fact that the discounting question seemed to come up with
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extraordinary frequency. There may have been considerable pressure to
produce a "defensible" value for use in project evaluation.
Against this background, Lind takes a sensible approach. He begins
by saying that the social discount rate should not be used to adjust for
*
risk or the existence of taxes. Lind then says that the social rate of
discount should equal the social rate of time preference on riskless investments.
The social rate of time preference is an abstraction. It is the rate at
which society in the abstract would exchange present for future consumption.
(As an aside, economists generally agree that consumption is the key
quantity to which all choices ought to be reduced. That is, consumption
streams are what is relevant, and discounting is one way to specify an
explicit preference function for consumption streams.)
The next step is to infer a value for the social rate of time
preference on riskless investments. Lind appears to assume that this rate
should equal the individual rate of time preference for riskless investment.
(The individual rate of time preference is the rate at which an individual
will exchange present for future consumption. If Proposition 1, or some
variation of it holds, then all individuals have the same rate of time
preference.) Lind then uses market interest rates on riskless securities
(specifically, US Treasury bills and bonds) to determine that the individual
rate of time preference for a riskless investment is somewhere between
*
Taxes themselves are less important than the fact that government investment
displaces private investment and consumption. The money, of course, is
raised by one form or another of taxation.
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*
0 and 2% on a real, after tax, basis.
Lind's next detailed conclusion relates to the difference in private
investment and public investment impacts on future consumption. Here, Lind
uses an adjustment factor called the "shadow price of capital." The
shadow price of capital is the present value of the future consumption
associated with one dollar of private investment, discounted at the social
time preference rate. The value of this quantity depends on how the
government taxes consumption and investment, and on individuals' and firms'
marginal propensities to save. Calculation of the shadow price of capital
needs to consider the fact that private investments generate future consumption,
some of which is saved and some of which is reinvested. Therefore, the shadow
price of capital depends on the savings rate and the private rate of return
on investment. Lind concludes that the marginal real, after-tax rate of
return on a private investment is. 4-6% (based on historical market rates of
return on a diversified stock portfolio). With this as a basis, he calculates
a shadow price of capital of about 3.8. That is, every dollar of federal
subsidy which displaces private investment should be treated as if it "cost"
$3.80. If the federal supply is raised by a tax on disposable income, the
shadow price is applied to the portion of income that would have been saved.
*
If the time horizon is infinite, there is good reason to question any
nonpositive time preference rate. This is because if the time preference
rate is zero, one would be willing to pay any amount in the present for an
investment that paid an infinitesimal sum indefinitely. Like the original
St. Petersburg paradox of D. Bernoulli, there are a number of ways of
resolving this one without invalidating the use of the zero discount rate.
However, many models of the CO 2 problem are formulated with an infinite time
horizon. These models require a positive discount rate if the mathematical
expressions for utility are to have a finite value.
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6.4 Relation to CO2 Problem
The Lind book highlights several factors that are relevant to our
consideration of the CO2/climate change problem. The first of these is
the need to focus attention on how consumption is affected throughout the
whole economy. For example, a number of studies of the CO2 problem have
shown that high rates of economic growth (i.e., high consumption) and high
rates of CO2 emission tend to go together. A project-level evaluation
might miss this interaction.
A second point is that even though discounting procedures may be
imperfect, decisions must nevertheless be made, and that using a discount
rate is an explicit way to evaluate outcomes at different times. By
changing the rate one can see whether or not a decision is sensitive to
particular preference patterns. I think, this use of discounting is helpful
in making an informed decision.
Indeed, discounting doesn't go far enough in providing appropriate,
flexible weights. The problem is that it is often very hard to think
about what a weight should b.e when the time period is very long. Below,
we suggest an evaluation procedure which includes discounting but provides
additional flexibility in evaluating future outcomes. For an application,
see the discussion of the energy model due to Hamm in Chapter 2.
This procedure uses a finite and comparatively short "time horizon,"
T. Discounting over consumption, or the utility of consumption, would
take place during this time horizon. At the end of the horizon there would
be an additional "terminal value" function whose arguments were the stocks
of goods and bads (e.g., non-fossil power plants and atmospheric CO2) left
for the future. One example of such a formulation is as follows:
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T
-rt
max f e u(c)dt + S[x(T)]
c 0
where c is consumption, r is the social rate of time preference, t is time,
T is the planning horizon, u is a function determining the utility flow,
x(T) is a vector of final stocks and inputs, and S is a function determining
the value of x(T) in the objective.
This objective function is somewhat unique. A value function for
final outputs and stocks, S[x(T)], is frequently not included in objective
functions because either an infinite time horizon is used or, if a finite
horizon, T, is considered, stocks are valueless after T. We feel that the
use of a time horizon, T, and value function for final outputs and stocks
S[x(T)], provides additional, valuable flexibility in the analysis.
The inclusion of the function S[x(T)) in the objective provides
several specific advantages:
1. Though there is disagreement over the appropriate short-term
discount rate, disagreements seem much greater about discount
rates out to infinity. The objective function suggested here
allows consumption in the short and intermediate terms to be
evaluated separately from costs and benefits in the distant future.
2. This formulation requires decision-makers to determine the
values they place on resources reserved for future generations.
This may be a simpler task for decision-makers than determining
their infinite horizon discount rate.
3. By changing the values we place on resources left to future
generations, we can examine if those values significantly affect
present decisions. That is, this formulation allows sensitivity
analysis over the value of resources left to future generations.
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6.5 Summary
To summarize, traditional discounting may be appropriate to situations
involving evaluation of an incremental project. Whether it is appropriate,
and how to do it if it is, depend on the circumstances surrounding the project.
However, traditional discounting is probably not a very valuable tool for
making decisions about CO2 policies at the present time. This is because the
effects of CO2 on climate are not well understood, and may be very large in
relation to present and future consumption. Discounting is helpful if it is
used to summarize explicitly certain aspects of one's tradeoffs between
present and future consumption. However, sensitivity of a policy to the discount
rate would suggest that extra care is needed in making the decision.
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Consumption in period zero
Figure 6.1 Illustration of Proposition 1
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Chapter 7
MATERIAL DEMANDS AND CONSTRAINTS
7.1 Introduction
The question arises: what material demand would various energy scenarios
make? Different energy technologies require markedly different mixes of
steel, concrete, glass, etc. and it will turn out that the renewable
technologies generally require larger amounts, principally because the
energy sources are more dilute, so larger facilities must be built to
accommodate then.
Similar analyses have been done before. For example, the Bechtel
Corporation (Gallagher and Zimmerman 1976; Gallagher, Caruso et al 1976),
the.Westinghouse Company (Love 1976), University of Pennsylvania (Malenbaum
et al 1973), and the U.S. Department of the Interior (US DOI 1976) all
forecast material requirements. But as the technological options and the
projections of energy use change, the prospective material requirements also
change. Therefore, this is a continuing process and this analysis takes its
place in this chain of assessments.
The materials to be considered are steel, nonferrous metals (mainly
aluminum and copper), concrete, glass, and silicon. In many of the applications
requiring simple structural materials, steel and aluminum are substitutable,
and options exist for building many things out of either metal or concrete.
Glass and silicon will be needed for solar PV systems, at least in the present
most technologically advanced systems. The possible need for and supply of
some other less common materials will also be mentioned.
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Our procedure was to collect and analyze the material requirements both
as reported in the literature and as obtained by a partial industry survey,
and then to make a best estimate in each case. This was done for all the
energy supply technologies of interest: fossil (oil, coal), nuclear, hydro,
and solar power. From this the requirements for each of the following 15
scenarios were calculated: IIASA Low, IIASA High, Colombo and Bernadini,
Lovins, and the eleven MIT/IEA scenarios (cases: A,B,C,D,E,F,H,J,K,L,M).
The energy mixes for the MIT/IEA scenarios have been described in Chapter 3
and the others are taken from the literature. These requirements have been
calculated as annual averages during the years 2000-2025. This 25-year period
appears to pose the most severe demands since during that period the most
materials-intensive technologies, the renewables, are forecast to grow most
rapidly.
Some general observations to place the detailed calculations in context
are as follows. A comparison of the scenarios shows that IIASA High projects
a large demand for coal, synfuels, and nuclear power; thus, there are large
demands on steel and concrete. By contast, in Lovins' low-energy scenario
the sources are mostly renewables; this imposes large demands for cement,
nonferrous metals, glass, and silicon. These two are more or less the
extremes, so if IIASA High and Lovins avoid material constraints then IIASA
Low and Colombo and Bernadini will also have no constraints. From examination
of the MIT/IEA Case projections it is not obvious which scenario will present
the most severe material constraints. However, Case H projects significant
utilization of solar energy, while Case E projects significant utilization of
both solar and nuclear energy.
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7.2 Material Requirements per Unit Energy
Appendix E of this report lists the various estimates of material
requirements for coal electric, synfuels from coal, LWR-fission, photovoltaics,
hydropower, wind electric, and biomass, to build plants that will produce
one EJ per year (~l quad/yr). This is electric output, except for synfuels
and biomass, which are assumed to be burned for their heat energy. Oil
and gas are not included due to the projected decreased reliance on them.
Many of the large ranges given in the appendix represent the possibility of
exchanging steel for aluminum (or concrete) etc. Thus a set of "reference"
requirements are needed, and these are listed in Table 7.1.
The scenarios as worked out do not distinguish among solar PV, wind,
and biomass. Photovoltaics will probably be the dominant solar technology,-
thus we assume all of the projected solar energy to be PV's. Although the
material requirements would differ if solar energy systems were considered
to be thermal-electric, the difference would not be significant since the
metal and concrete requirements for PV and thermal-electric systems are, in
general, very similar. The material requirements for wind energy systems
are moderate, but so are the projections for wind energy. If the material
requirements for wind energy are used in the Lovins' scenario, which projects
the largest increase in wind systems, the materials demand would fall within
the range already specified by the other scenarios. Therefore, the requirements
for wind systems were not considered in the projected materials demand.
Similarly, biomass, which has small material requirements and whose total
contribution to energy supplied is constrained (see Section 4.6) was not
considered.
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7.3 Global Material Requirements for the Scenarios
Appendix E also gives a breakdown of the material requirements
by energy source and the resulting total material demands for each scenario.
These totals are also given in Table 7.2 in metric tons and as a percentage
of 1980 global production, the latter being listed in Table 7.3. A few points
should be noted when examining the tables:
1) The values refer only to new additions not to maintenance or replacement
plants. In effect, any operating plant is assumed to last forever.
Thus the actual requirements will be larger than shown in the table.
As an example, scenarios in which the rate of coal consumption is
decreasing (IIASA Low and Lovins et al) show requirements for coal
plants as being zero. This assumption is adequate for our purposes,
because (a) the largest material demands are for systems not presently
existing, e.g., solar photovoltaic; (b) the most rapid changes appear to
be taking place in about 25 years, which is less than the lifetime of
most plants of this type; (c) we seek rough estimates only in order
to be able to distinguish material-frugal from material-intensive
options.
2) This table does not include oil, gas, wind or biomass systems. Materials
required for oil and gas facilities are relatively insignificant and
the projected demand for wind and biomass systems are very small.
3) Nonferrous refers mainly to aluminum, considered substitutable -for
steel, as described earlier, for photovoltaic plants. Thus, the
projected production rates for both steel and aluminum will not be
required in the year 2000.
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4) The percentage of 1980 glass production refers only to the percentage
of rectangular flat glass produced in 1980 (6.1 million metric tons), used
mainly for doors, windows, greenhouses, etc. The total glass production
in 1980 for the world was approximately 11 million tons.
5) The 1980 silicon production in Table 7.3 is the amount of semiconductor
grade polysilicon produced in the world outside the centrally planned
economies. (Snyderman 1981).
Overall, the requirements for steel and cement appear as though they
will not pose a barrier for implementation of any of the scenarios;
but nonferrous metals (mainly aluminum), glass and silicon will impose significant
demands on the respective industries. Each of the materials projected is
reviewed separately below.
7.3.1 Specific Materials
STEEL. Global raw steel produced in 1980 was 708,400 thousand metric
tons. The projections of steel needed in the year 2000, range from 1.7%
to 12.0% of the 1980 production level. The most demanding use per unit power
capacity is in solar photovoltaics, and the worst case is H (nuclear
moratorium, cheap solar power). Case H requires 12.0% of 1980 steel production
by the year 2000. Of this 12.0%, the steel needed for PV systems accounts for
92%.
The steel demands projected in the scenarios are not expected to pose
any problems. Excess capacity exists in the United States now (72.9%
utilization of capacity in 1980) (Amer. Metal Market 1981). Worldwide,
193
715 million metric tons of steel were consumed and according to Lenhard
Holshuh, secretary-general of the International Iron and Steel Institute,
consumption will increase by 2.7% in 1982 (Brown 1981). Furthermore, steel
production in the United States alone is expected to increase to more than
180 million metric tons by the turn of the century (U.S. Bu. Mines 1980).
The basic raw materials, iron ore, coke, and limestone, are abundant and
widely distributed throughout the world.
CEMENT. Concrete is the most versatile and widely used structural
building material, and is about 20% cement. The materials to make it are
commonly available.
The projected demand for cement in all the scenarios is a substantial
amount, yet all the projections are a small percentage of present production
rates. The percentages range from 2.1% for Colombo and Bernadini to 20.7%
for MIT/IEA Case H. Similar to the steel projections, most of the concrete
required is for foundations and structural components of solar photovoltaic
systems. All of the scenarios except for IIASA Low, IIASA High, Colombo and
Bernadini, and Case A, project solar as the energy source requiring the most
concrete, thus the most cement. In summary, no supply problems are
anticipated in meeting the projected cement requirements.
NONFERROUS METALS. As mentioned previously, the need is principally
for aluminum in structural materials, and that mainly for renewable energy
supplies; solar, PV and wind. A glance at Table 7.2 shows that the annual
needs would be at least 17% and as high as 460% of 1980 production, if
aluminum is the chosen material. Because steel can in principle be substituted
for it, the first reaction to these numbers is that aluminum will not be used
to any great extent, but rather more plentiful steel will be used. To be sure,
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such substitution will certainly occur, but the demand for aluminum is likely
to strain the supply nevertheless. The reason is that the solar installations
will be mostly untended, outdoors. Aluminum requires much less protection
against corrosion, and will be the material of choice in many cases.
As expected, Case H, the nuclear moratorium scenario, projects the
largest nonferrous material requirements--over four and a half times the
1980 production rate. The second highest projection of 271% of 1980 rates
is for a more probable projection--Case E. All of the scenarios except two
project nonferrous demand to be at least 50% of 1980 production rates. Aluminum
and copper are each reviewed separately.
(a) ALUMINUM. Present production of primary aluminum is heavily
concentrated in the industrialized regions. Three fifths of the world
production is from the United States, the U.S.S.R., Japan, Canada, and West
Germany. However, production is expected to shift heavily to countries with
large bauxite reserves: Australia, Brazil, and Venezuela (U.S. Bu. Mines 1980).
In particular, Latin America will experience dramatic growth in all stages
of the basic aluminum industry--bauxite mining, alumina production, smelting
and use of aluminum (Altenpohl 1980).
The United States' total annual primary aluminum capacity at the end
of 1980 was 5 million metric tons, up 4.2% from 1979. In 1981, global
primary aluminum was produced in overcapacity and 3 million metric tons
were stockpiled (Kramer 1981). Furthermore, capacity additions will occur
more rapidly in the next five years than in the previous five years (U.S. Bu.
Mines 1980). Thus, production rates will be significantly higher by 2000.
Over the period from 1970-1980, world production increased 59 per cent,
an annual growth rate of 4.8%. However, world production of primary aluminum
195
in 1980 was up 5.5% from 1979. If global production continues at this rate
until the year 2000 (excluding copper production), then only the demand
projected by three scenarios (MIT/IEA Cases E,H,J) will not be matched.
Although future U.S. aluminum requirements cannot be met by domestic
resources of bauxite there is an adequate supply in nonbauxitic materials
in the United States. But, at the present time no industrial plants exist to
treat the nonbauxitic materials. Although large quantities of bauxite are
imported, there are substantial reserves to meet domestic demand to the year
2000. In addition, aluminum recovery from scrap is an important contributor
to the domestic aluminum supply. From 1970-1980, scrap accounted for about
22% of the total U.S. aluminum supply (Aluminum Assn. 1980). Furthermore,
the world reserve of bauxite contains almost 5 billion metric tons and is
sufficient to meet forecast world demand through the year 2000.(U.S. Bu.
Mines 1980). Consequently, no supply problems' are expected.
(b) COPPER. Total land-based resources, including hypothetical and
speculative deposits, are estimated to contain 1,480 million metric tons
of copper. An additional 690 million tons are estimated to exist in deep
sea nodule resources. (U.S. Bu. Mines 1980). Future demand for copper is
projected to increase, with the electric utility industry being a major
consumer, but the copper resources will be adequate. However, current
supplies at current prices are inadequate to maintain demand by the year 2000,
even with scrap recovery maintaining a 1979 rate of 35%/yr of total
production. (CIPEC 1979). As a result new supplies will be sought and
developed, lower grade ores will be mined, and the price of copper will rise.
(GE 1977). Due to this increase in price, copper will become substituted in
many applications, including aluminum for conducting electricity, steel for
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shell casting, and plastics for plumbing (U.S. Bu. Mines). For the near future,
new mining and smelting capacity coming on-stream will maintain a period of
sufficient supply (Kramer 1981). Although limitation on the supply of high
grade copper is foreseen, it is not expected to constrain the implementation
of any of the energy scenarios.
GLASS. Either glass or plastic can be used to cover photovoltaic
modules. Soda-lime glass, borosilicate glass, acrylic, Poly-n-butylacrylate
(PnBA), Mylar, Teflon, Lexan, and Saran have been considered
(Minnucci et al 1976; Carmichael et al 1976; Carroll et al 1976; Dennis 1980;
Liang et al 1981). Glass is more resistant to weathering; it will retain its
clarity for a longer time. If glass is washed regularly, the amount of light
transmitted is expected to remain within 5% of that at the time of manufacture
for a period of twenty years or more, whereas plastics will lose 25% and
more of their transmissivity within several years (SERI 1982).
Raw materials for glasses are abundant and accessible. But the demands
for it would strain the supply in the large PV scenarios. The glass industry
is divided into three main divisions according to its products: flat-glass,
containers, and special glass. The flat-glass division is relevant to our
needs.
The percentages listed in Table 7.2 pertain to 1980 production of flat-
glass. The majority of all glass produced is soda-lime glass; it is cheap,
and is used in windows, bottles, and mirrors. As can be seen from the
table, additional glass manufacturing facilities will be required to meet
the projected demands, even though raw materials will be sufficient. In
addition, new manufacturing processes may be needed. The most likely
scenario not to be affected by glass requirements is Colombo and Bernadini,
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followed by IIASA Low. The remaining scenarios may encounter problems in
attaining the projected solar energy supply because of the glass requirements.
However, the amount of glass required may be reduced by using Fresnel
lenses which can be made of plastic. These lenses can serve the purpose of
both a concentrator and an encapsulating cover.
SILICON. The dominant solar cell technology is based on single crystal
and polycrystalline silicon. The rates projected by the scenarios represent
the amount of silicon needed to meet the projected solar energy supply.
The 1980 world production of metallurgical silicon was approximately
2800 thousand metric tons, but the volume of semiconductor-grade polysilicon
consumed in the world outside the centrally planned economies.was only 2775
tons .(Snyderman 1981). Furthermore, the quantity of polysilicon required
worldwide in 1979 for solar cells was a mere 44 mtons (Snyderman 1979).
In this analysis the total semiconductor-grade polysilicon production can
be considered for comparison, since this material is applicable in both the
electronics and solar industries. Present production is a factor of 100 to
2500 short of early 21st century needs, in all the scenarios.
As of mid-1981 there were twelve silicon producers in the western world:
4 in the U.S., 5 in western Europe and 3 in Japan (Chemische Ind. 1981).
Essentially a complete silicon cell manufacturing industry must be established.
If the semiconductor-grade polysilicon industry continued growing at its
present rate of 50%/yr to the year 2000, the projected demands of all the
scenarios would be met, but no other industry ever grew that fast, for that
*
long, as attested to by Edelson and Lee.
*
For a brief description, see the bibliography accompanying the solar
photovoltaic assessment.
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When considering the material requirements for photovoltaic cells it is
important to realize that various other materials can be substituted for
silicon wafers. These materials include thin films and compound semiconductor
cells. A second point to realize is the design of the photovoltaic array
affects the amount of silicon needed. Less silicon is needed to produce a
given amount of energy with a concentrated array than with a flat-plate array;
a shift that transfers the burden of supply to the glass and plastics
industries.
In conclusion, silicon is the material most likely to pose the barriers
to implementation of the energy scenarios. This is due to the projected
rates of solar energy. The most viable energy future is projected by Colombo
and Bernadini which has the lowest projection of solar energy.
7.4 Conclusion
Overall the following can be concluded: the projected demand for
steel, nonferrous metals, and cement are seen to be small or moderate
compared to present day production rates and no great supply shortages are
foreseen. The largest problems arise with respect to solar PV systems,
in particular for glass and pure silicon (and by inference, other semiconductor
materials). Although projected glass demand is very large, 1980 production
must expand at about 10% per year to meet the highest projected requirements
in 2000 of MIT/IEA Case H. That scenario is somewhat extreme to be sure
(nuclear moratorium, good success at developing cheap PV systems); many of
the solar scenarios would give trouble to the glass industry, a massive
industry with much inertia. The production of silicon cells needed for the
photovoltaics may pose the largest barriers on implementation of the scenarios.
1?9
The silicon industry must grow at 25%/yr for 20 years to sustain the lowest
solar energy projection and at the current 50%/yr to meet all the scenario
projections. That does not mean that the lowest solar scenario futures
(Colombo and Bernadini) are the most likely. The whole pure silicon industry
is too small to have much leverage over the world's energy supply. Rather,
it appears to us that the industries that produce materials for solar cells
will grow very fast.
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Table 7.1
Best Estimates of Material Requirements for Energy Technologies
(Thousands of metric tons per EJ/yr)
Technology
Coal Electric
Synfuel from Coal
LWR-fission
Photovoltaicsc
Hydroelectric
Wind Electric
Biomass d
Steel
1500
600
2500
20000
3500
8000
4500
Concretea
5500
*
15000
210000
60000
35000
12000
Nonferrousb
30
30
125
30000
200
1000
*
- These quantities are relatively insignificant.
* Data not available
a Concrete is a mixture of sand, gravel, water, and cement. Cement
is approximately 20% of the total mass.
b Nonferrous refers mainly to aluminum and copper.
c Steel and aluminum are substitutable as construction materials.
d Values are for conversion plants.
Glass Silicon
12000 1800
Table 7.2
Annual Projected Materials Demand for 2000-2025
(106 metric tons per year, (% of 1980 production)
Scenario
IIASA Low
IIASA High
Colombo &
Bernadini
Lovins
Case A
Case B
Case C
Case D
Case E
Case F
Case H
Case J
Case K
Case L
Case M
Steela
19.1(2.7)
32.7(4.6)
12.3(1.7)
24.6(3.5)
23.7(3.3)
25.1(3.5)
26.3(3.7)
41.5(5.8)
62.1(8.8)
23.3(3.3)
85.4(12.0)
44.4(6.3)
23.9(3.4)
40.5(5.7)
47.1(6.6)
Cementb
29.7(3.4)
46.5(5.3)
18.8(2.1)
54.1(6.1)
41.2(4.7)
47.9(5.4)
52.4(5.9)
80.1(9.1)
129.8(14.7)
45.6(5.2)
182.6(20.7)
92.4(10.5)
45.2(5.1)
84.6(9.6)
99.0(11.2)
Nonferrous c
7.4(28.8)
13.8(53.8)
4.3(16.8)
34.3(134)
12.1(47.1)
13.7(53.4)
19.6(76.4)
39.0(152)
69.6(271)
14.5(56.5)
118.0(460)
50.4(196)
17.7(68.9)
44.9(175)
54.6(213)
Glassd
2.6(42.6)
5.0(81.9)
1.6(26.2)
13.7(225)
4.6(75.4)
5.2(85.2)
7.6(125)
15.4(253)
27.5(450)
5.5(90.2)
47.0(770)
19.9(326)
6.8(112)
17.8(294)
21.6(357)
a Percentage given is for 1980 raw steel produced.
b Cement is 20% of concrete mass.
c Refers to aluminum and copper, but it is mostly aluminum due to solar
photovoltaics.
d Refers to rectangular/flat glass only.
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Silicon
0.39
0.76
0.23
2.05
0.68
0.77
1.13
2.30
4.12
0.83
7.06
2.99
1.03
2.66
3.24
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Table 7.3
1980 Global Material Productiona
(Thousands of metric tons)
Raw Steel 708400
Cement 882545
Primary 15363
Aluminum
Refined 10300
Copper
Flat Glass 6056
Siliconb < 3
a Production rates are listed by region in Appendix G.
b Semiconductor grade polysilicon produced in the world
outside the centrally planned economies,
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Chapter 8
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CO 2-CLIMATE PROBLEM -
8.1 Introduction and-Discussion
Dealing with the CO2 climate problem requires both national and global con-
sensus. That does not mean political forcing, certainly not a priori. Things
do not work that way. Building international consensus in one region, let alone
globally, is an incremental activity, as the protracted negotiations on pro-
hibiting the catching of whales, acid rain, and the Law of the Sea attest.
International laws and conventions are more subtle things than, say, national
criminal law. They tend to express agreed attitudes, and the very process of
working toward them - international meetings, discussion papers, debates, etc.
serves to raise the consciousness of nations and people, and to create a climate
of opinion and understanding. In this spirit of constructive incrementalism
we write this chapter.
Among the many conclusions that flow from serious CO2 - climate studies, two
stand out as germane to starting a debate on this topic. They are robuqt, and
represent the majority view by far:
A: The climate modelers are not wrong by such a large factor that they
have been calculating effects of CO2 buildup when in fact those
effects are very much smaller. In other words, if a lot of coal
is going to be burned in the next century, serious climate changes,
leading to shifts in agricultural productivity, political disruptions
and mass migrations will occur in due course.
B: Enough of those changes will be deleterious that there will be
winners and losers, both within given countries (e.g. shifts in U.S.
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Midwest agricultural productivity, inundation of part of Florida), and
internationally (shifts of monsoon rains, shifts of global agricultural
productivity, etc.). Disputation among groups about these matters
does not require full documentation. The perception of winning or losing
will trigger the disputation. The existence of such perceptions will
be enough to warrant serious international attention.
Apart from doing nothing about the problem, or just "research," which is
practically the same, (a trivially inadequate repsonse) we see just three major
classes of events that affect the outcome.
1. So much coal is not burned after all, for non CO 2-climate reasons. For
instance, there could be greater economic attractiveness of some other energy
provision strategy or of conservation, or large, non-CO2 social costs associated
with coal.
2. Developing adaptive strategies for crops, living patterns, coastal zone
development, etc.
3. Attempting to make international agreements to limit coal use because
of expected climate change, and/or to compensate losers and make other adjust-
ments via international law.
A few comments about the first two options are in order, before we discuss
the third, which is the main topic of this chapter. Regarding option 1, the
relative prospects of coal, solar, nuclear power, and fuel efficiency were
discussed in chapter 4. Those analyses explored various dimensions of the choice:
technical, economic, environmental, and socio-political; we will exhume such
issues here, to the extent that they bear on international conventions; the acid
rain question is excellently educational, and will be a principal topic of dis-
cussion.
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As for option 2, we see, as do many others, the benefits of developing
plants - indeed whole biosystems, if it can be done - that are more resistant
to climate fluctuations. Those involved with the managed biosphere point to
great success - wheat now grown successfully in Northern Alberta for instance.
Those involved with the unmanaged biosphere - foresters, for example - are less
sanguine about timely benefits, pointing out that forests are pretty resiliant
as it is, because they change their detailed makeup slowly as they adapt to
changing conditions; furthermore, the time constants of mature forests are
centuries, uncomfortably long for these CO2-climate questions of concern
today.
But other implications of option 2 seems to us less productive: for
example, while it is possible technically to build dikes around the U.S. (for
instance), it would not be possible to do that for many other countries around
the world. Thus the rich/poor, winner/loser problems would be vastly aggravated.
Thus we come to this chapter's principal topic, international conventions,
agreements, etc., but of course the three options will not be exclusive.
Difficulties with one will trigger responses of the other two, and the real
future will contain a mixtures of all three that changes with tiue, geographical
location and particular details.
This essay contains material about other experiences with transboundarypollu-
tion, principally but not exclusively air pollution, from which we seek insights
on what to expect in the CO 2-climate case. No substantial material in inter-
national law noy deals directly with CO 2-climate. This is not surprising; laws
generally are enacted in response to specific challenges to which some finding
can be beneficially and constructively applied. For CO2-climate, there are
not yet any well-recognized data to cite, no states, corporations or individuals
to hold accountable, nor are there likely to be any for a decade or two.
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Nevertheless, some useful literature has appeared. Westview Press
assembled a book of essays (Nanda 1983), and articles have appeared in many.
places, which will be referred to later on.
Two noble principles,and a third less-noble one, seem to guide much of
both the discussion and (lack of) action. These are:
1. A principle of equitable use with respect to shared resources.
2. A principle of national responsibility for damage that a country
causes to the environment of other states.
These first two principles reflect the principle of old Roman law sic utero
tuo ut alienum laedas (use your property in such a way as not to injure that of
another). Such views are consonant with what philosophers, naturalists and
theologians have preached since ancient days about the necessity and benefits of
long-term stewardship over the earth, some by pragmatic arguments, others
describing Earth as a part of created order, to be loved because God made it.
The messages were similar: take care or troubles will come. We admire such
sentiments; they often form an almost invisible but strong foundation upon which
public attitudes and laws are built. Granting all that, we are concerned here
with how things are turning out in actual practice. Compliance with those two
principles has been spotty, leading to the third (lack of) principle:
3. Nations will not usually respond to pleas about international
air quality (or other commons) unless it is in their own national interest,
and act as if they had no international obligations.
However, this third principle, depending as it does on perceptions
of national interest, is susceptible to change via development of new global
perceptions, and threats of economic or other retaliation. Thus arises
pragmatic hope.
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It is both timely and useful to review progress over the last half-century
in dealing with transboundary pollution, with the object of asking whether
it would be reasonable to start analyzing the relevance of present and prospective
international law as it might apply to CO2-climate. The process of legal
adjustment is slow. Additionally:
1. Experience with other selected problems tells us about how long it
takes to receive data affectively, as distinct from academcially.
2. We detect what appears to be a slow secular shift in national and
international environmental law from simple compensation for proven damage
toward anticipatory negotiations. If so, the outlook for timely attention
to CO 2-climate improves.
Acid precipitation makes a case study applicable to both these points;
but other transboundary pollution events also apply.
8.2 Some Early Years, 1909-1940
The earliest exhibit we present is the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
(BWT 1909) between the U.S. and Canada, relating mainly to the Great Lakes,
but not exclusively. Although concluded and observed mainly for management and
utilization, the treaty even in those days stated that the boundary waters were
not to be polluted by either party to the detriment of the other (Article IV).
An International Joint Commission (IJC) set up as part of the treaty has
successfully bridged the gap between agreement in principle and implementation
of specific actions.
Failure to keep Great Lakes pollution under control, especially in Lake
Erie, led to much more detailed agreements in 1972 listing specific standards
and abatement techniques. Then in 1978 a new accord included also atmospheric
deposition (Great Lakes Treaty 1978).
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We see in this example an early intent to anticipate future damage, and
in the sequence of agreements a developing sophistication in international
law that reflects the increasingly sophisticated technological and scientific
"state of the art." This important point, to be reintroduced throughout this
chapter, suggests that as our present climatic predictive powers increase, so
will our time horizons move further ahead, perhaps even far enough to handle
CO 2-climate in a timely way.
The Trail (British Columbia, Canada) Smelter case is revealing and important.
That large plant, owned by Consolidated Mining and Smelting Ltd., located on the
Columbia River at Trial, polluted the air of the downstream valley, damaging
fruit crops miles away in Washington State. Damage occurred mainly in the 1920's,
and in 1928 the U.S. referred the question to the IJC, which reported in 1931,
leading to an Arbitration Tribunal in 1935, and compensatory payments in 1935
and 1938 by Canada to the U.S. In the Tribunal's final decision, we find this:
The Tribunal therefore finds ... under the principles of international
law, as well as the law of the United States, no state has the right
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the property or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury
is established by clear and convincing evidence (Trail Smelter 1941).
The last clause and the specific payments ($350,000 and $78,000) have often
been cited as supporting two narrow principles:
(a) Compensation for past damage only, with no anticipatory features;
(b) Only specific monetary considerations were allowed -- for example
no account was taken of environmental or nonmarket values. The
United States attempted at the time to have such considerations
included, to no avail.
To be sure, such interpretations reflect prevailing attitudes of the early
1930s, a time of somewhat simple views toward science, technology, and industry.
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The motto of the 1932 Chicago World's Fair, "Science discovers, technology
provides, man conforms," seems to have been accepted as a matter of course at
the time.
But this much-referenced Trail Smelter case has more in it. Article II
of the Convention states that the Smelter will refrain from causing damage in
the future, to such an extent that the Tribunal shall determine; this combined
with the substantive findings of past damage, should be interpreted as a recipe
for future action (Weston et al 1980).
8.3 Acid Precipitation: Establishing the Fact
Before discussing the international (or national) responses, it is necessary
first to show that the problem is real and can be fairly well quantified.
As the National Resource Council points out (NRC 1983), the largest source
of acid deposition in the U.S. and Canada is sulfur oxides. Figure 8.1, from
that source, shows these SO2 emissions; most of them come from burning coal.
Roughly speaking, the region is bounded by Northern Alabama on the south,
Southern Canada (principally the province of Ontario) on the north, a line
a little west of the Mississippi River, and the Atlantic Ocean. The region is
about 1500 km on a side, 2.3 x 106 km2 In it, almost 500 x 106 tons of coal
were burned per year in the late 1970's, with an average sulfur content of
about 2.0%. Ore-smelting and other operations brought the total SO2 emissions
in that region close to 18 million tons. The prevailing winds blow from west
to east, about 750 km per day, and on the average it rains (washing out much of
what is in the atmosphere) once in five days. The rainfall is about 1 meter/year.
What is the average acidity of the rain?
We need a little more information, and can afford to be carefully cavalier
in deriving an approximate answer. Much of the SO2 will be converted to SO3
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in the air, often aided by adsorption on fine particulates which make reasonably
good catalytic surfaces, and by water vapor. Thus, the SO2 tends to convert to
sulfuric acid (H2So4 ) the same way as it is made commercially; much of it
combines with alkaline particulates present in the air. Assume that half the
acidity so disappears. Also, the two-day travel time across the region and the
five-day rain-out time imply that 60% of it drifts off the east coast (to seek
a fate to be mentioned in a later section). Not all of it waits for rain, but
about 30% falls out by dry deposition. This contributes substantially to
acidity at ground level, and affects things on and near the ground, but we will
not include this complication.
We can now proceed. The annual average sulfur production over the area is
4.0 x 10-3 kg/m2, and 20% of it (one-half of 40%) is effectively H2so4 rained
out in the area itself. It is dissolved in 1 m of water, doubly ionized, i.e.
HSO -- 2H+ + SO-. Thus we find a molar density [H+] of hydrogen ions in the
water of 4.9 x 10-5 moles/liter. Nitrogen oxides from both vehicles and power
plants add on an additional 30% approximately bringing our total now to 6.4 x 10-5
moles/liter. The conventional measure of acidity or alkalinity being the quantity
pH = - log (H+
we finally get the answer of pH = 4.2. The pH of pure water is 7.0, and of rain-
water saturated with atmospheric CO2 is about 5.6. A pH of 4.2 corresponds to
25 times the acidity of CO2-saturated rainwater. While we cannot expect this
average number to be very accurate, derived with assumptions that are individually
inaccurate by as much as a factor of two (but some of the errors tend to cancel),
it should give an idea of what to expect.
Now inspect Figure 8.2, taken also from the NRC report. The range of pH
values and the geographic distribution corresponds fairly well with our sample
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calculation. What goes up must come down. While more authoritative and
better documented than before, these results are not new; nor have they been
hidden from public view. In 1974, Scientific American published similar results
measured by 1600 high school students through the U.S., and in 1979 published
another confirmatory article.
Effects of acid deposition have been extensively documented--in particular
acidifying lakes, reducing or eliminating fish populations, modifying the trans-
formation of forest litter and'of soil materials, stunting plant growth and affecting
plant growth via complex nutritional pathways (Likens et al 1974, Glass et al 1976,
Cowling and Lindhurst 1981, Hutchinson and Havas 1980).
Data like those illustrated here and given in more detail in the literature
give rise to what is often called the Long Range Transport of Air Pollutants, the
origin of the otherwise inscrutable acronym "the LRTAP problem."
8.4 Some Institutional Responses to Acid Precipitation, etc.
With this in mind, what are we to make of such articles as "Tracking the
Clues to Acid Rain" in the EPRI Journal (EPRI 1979), published at the same time
as the article in Scientific American; the EPRI Journal states that
The idea has been publicized that fossil fuel combustion is the main source
of the sulfates and nitrates that can produce acid rain. Acid rain has been
given as the primary reason for acidification of surface waters, for decline
in fish populations, and for decreasing forest productivity.
The data on acid rain effects that were collected over the past two decades
have validity, but the conclusions drawn from them are highly inferential.
Too few avenues of the acidity network were traveled; too few scientific
disciplines were included in tracking the facts.
That is, the closet the EPRI author comes to identifying any source at all
for the rain. It is a mystery, the article says.
Some industry-based analyses are more direct. The journal Chemical and
Engineering News published an excellent summary in 1981 (Ember 1981) disagreeing
with the EPRI view, supporting the NAS position and the one offered here.
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Despite statements that it is (or is not) too soon to act, the principle
of anticipatory action appears to have gained considerable ground and international
acceptance since the 1930's and 1940's.
The move toward anticipatory action was gaining ground during the 1960's and
1970's and a summary of most of it can be found in articles by (Whetstone 1980),
(Maclure 1983) and Nanda (referenced earlier), and some of the material recorded
there is used here. Dealing more specifically with water but applying in
principle to the air also, the Helsinki Rules (ILA 1966)hold that states bene-
fitting from an internationally shared resource must temper their utilization
reaonably and equitably; liability can be incurred on the occasion to act
reasonably, and appropriate reparations and compensation are due for physical
damage.
The principal of anticipatory response received further support in 1972.
Acid precipitation from England, the German Ruhr, and lately even more from
East Germany and Poland falls on Scandinavia, where the lakes tend not to be
buffered with limestones, hence vulnerable to acidification. As its contribu-
tion to the 1972 UN Conference on the Environment in Stockholm, the Swedish
government prepared and distributed in 1970-71 its own report on the existence,
effects, and sources of acid rain in Sweden (Brolin 1972). Evidence of this and
other submissions led to Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment, including the passage:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. (UN 1972).
In addition, Principle 22 of the same declaration called for anticipatory
cooperation and development of rules of liability and compensation:
213
States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding
liability and compensation for victims of pollution and other environmental
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such
States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
In 1979, the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE, an association of
35 nations including the U.S.S.R, the U.S. and Canada, not to be confused with the
European Economic Commission, or "Common Market") signed a convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (ECE 1979), those content shows both the hopes
and the difficulties. It emphasizes pollution by sulfur oxides and their trans-
formation products; the Director of the ECE's Environment and Human Settlements
Division summarizes some of tis features in these words (Bishop .1980):-
- The Convention is the first legal instrument which directly applies,
on a broad regional basis, Principle 21 of the Declaration of the
Stockholm Conference; this principle expresses the common conviction
that states have, inter alia, "the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their own jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limit of national
jurisdiction."
- Despite its title, the scope of the Convention has a somewhat broader
connotation; it addresses itself throughout to problems of "Air pollution,
including long-range transboundary air pollution."
- The Convention legally binds the contracting parties to "endeavor to
limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent, air pollution,
including long-range transboundary air pollution."
- In this connection, each Contracting Party "undertakes to develop the best
policies and strategies including air quality management systems and, as
part of them, control measures compatible with balanced development, in
particular by using the best available technology which is economically
feasible and low- and non-waste technology."
- Pending ratification of the Convention,* the Signatory States have
(through adoption of the accompanying resolution) formally taken an
unusual and far-reaching decision. Specifically, they have decided to
initiate, "as soon as possible and on an interim basis," the provisional
implementation of the Convention and to carry but the obligations
arising therefrom to the maximum extent possible, pending its entry
into force. In this respect they will seek, inter alia, "to bring
together their policies and strategies for combatting air pollution
including long-range transboundary air pollution."
*Twenty-three of 24 required ratifications were achieved by July 1982
(Amasa S. Bishop, private communication).
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The ECE looks upon this Convention as an important advance both in the
development of international law and in the development of effective institutions.
The Convention, recognizing the pollution problems, describes avenues of coopera-
tion in monitoring and research, but sets no standards, obligates no one to any
abatement policy, has no mechanism for enforcement of any future regulations,
and delineates no responsibility for compensation for damages. Regarding
transnational claims for redress of perceived real damage, recourse can be had
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as before.
Up to the present time, the ICJ has been permitted to rule on cases like this
only after all involved nationals have consented to the action. But change is
in the air; Appendix F contains a copy of a uniform ("model") law designed with
this very problem in mind: once the various states have signed it, citizens or
organizations of one state can press for action in another signatory state,
without petitioning for permission. More on this point later.
At about the same time, U.S.-Canada bilateral discussions on acid precipi-
tation had made progress. On the U.S. side a 1978 Congressional Resolution that
the Department of State initiate negotiations toward a formal air quality agree-
ment with Canada (C.R. 1978) led to several events. After preparatory meetings,
the two governments issued a Joint Statement on Transboundary Air Quality
(DOS 1979). It showed a common.determination to reduce or prevent transboundary
air pollution, and outlined a "substantial basis of obligation, commitment and
cooperative practice in existing environmental relations."
These negotiations led to a Memorandum of Intent (Int. Env. Rep. 1980).
Maclure (referenced above) summarizes the principal advances well:
Through the MOI, the United States and Canada reiterated their "common
determination to combat transboundary air pollution in keeping with their
existing international rights, obligations, commitments, and cooperative
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practices," specifying a number of treaties, conventions and declarations
subscribed to by the two nations.
Significantly, the MOI discusses the grave -- and still growing --
ecological implications of the situation by stating the existence of a
"concern about actual and potential damage resulting from transboundary
air pollution ... including the already serious problem of acid rain,"
noting:
Scientific findings which indicate that continued pollutant
loadings will result in extensive acidification in geologically
sensitive areas during the coming years, and that increased pollutant
loadings will acclerate this process
and that:
environmental stress could be increased if action is not taken to
reduce transboundary air pollution.
With these concerns identified, the MOI expresses the Governments' joint
intention to develop and facilitate the conclusion of a bilateral cooperative
agreement on transboundary air quality. To this end, a detailed plan of
interim actions is established that both aids negotiations and advances
efforts at controlling current pollution. These interim actions include the
creation of a Coordinating Committee to effect preparations for the conduct
of negotiations, and a resolution to apply enhanced pollution control and
management measures. The long-standing practice of bilateral notification
and consultation on proposed industrial development and policy changes is
also to be expanded, as is the exchange and coordinated development of
pertinent scientific information and research.
The MOI interim actions provide for the establishment of technical and
scientific Work Groups to assist the Coordinating Committee in its negotia-
tions. The Work Groups are to function in five general areas: Impact
Assessment; Atmospheric Modeling; Strategies Development and Implementation;
Emissions, Costs and Engineering; and Legal, Institutional Arrangements and
Drafting. The Work Groups' terms of reference provide for reports in each
of their respective subject areas to serve as a basis for proposals for
inclusion in a transboundary air pollution agreement. The specific tasks of
the Work Groups are described in the MOI, including the mandate of the Legal,
Institutional and Drafting Work Group to "develop the legal elements of an
agreement such as notification and consultation, equal access, non-
discrimination, liability and compensation."
The Legal, Institutional and Drafting Work Group submitted its report
in the summer of 1981, presenting "an initial effort to draw together
available information on international and domestic legal matters which
may pertain to the negotiation of a cooperative agreement to deal with
transboundary air pollution" (U.S.-Canada MOI 1981). The report's contents
include a review of multilateral principles and practices, bilateral
obligations and their implementation, and an overview of domestic
authorities (both U.S. and Canadian) in the field of air pollution.
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Maclure comments that this material has set the course toward the desired
conclusion of a U.S.-Canadian air quality agreement. The Canadian Government
in late 1982 and early 1983 expressed a feeling of frustration that since 1981
the U.S. had not cooperated satisfactorily (if at all), and the U.S. was suddenly
demanding specific actionable evidence, as well as ecological and environmental
analyses, measurements of emissions and deposition, etc. Such a U.S. attitude
stands in striking contrast to the view that it tried to have adopted in the 1930's
with respect to the venerable Trail Smelter case, at which time the U.S. tried to
make the debate more general, in opposition to Canada's wishes. Such a switch
is an example of the principle cited before, that attention to and adherence to
ideas of global environmental protection change with circumstances.
Besides these notable cases, a growing literature dealing with anticipatory
response to transboundary pollution is developing. (Bilder 1976) concludes that
while international law does not presently (1975) impose general obligations -on
states to avoid disputes, in the special field of international environmental law
a principle of dispute avoidance via notification and consultation appears to be
developing. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in a 1975 document (OECD 1975) recommended that member states notify others of
activities creating significant risk of transboundary pollution, exchange of infor-
mation, scientific cooperation and joint establishment of monitoring systems, and
goes on to state a Principle of Equal Right of Hearing, that citizens in one
country who may be affected by the environmental impacts of proposed projects
should have the same rights of standing in judicial and administrative proceedings
as do citizens of the action state. The 1974 Scandinavian Convention (Scandinavian 19
provides for abatement and compensatory relief and also gives non-citizens equal
access to agencies and domestic courts.
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Of course, the legal outlook is not entirely clear. The U.S. Clean Air
Act does not address specifically the problem of long-range acid deposition;
Section 115 allows the EPA to order special emission limitations for any pollutant
if it endangers the health or welfare of a foreign country, but only if the
endangered country provides a reciprocal agreement concerning emissions that
might harm the United States. Apart from whether that section is invoked, the
reciprocal arrangement could be used to hobble implementation: prevailing winds
and rivers to not blow or flow reciprocally.
8.5 Application to CO2 -Climate
While few of the conventions, agreements, etc. so far cited deal directly
with CO2, many of them could be interpreted as not excluding it. Furthermore,
we see a slow but more-or-less steady progress toward the idea of anticipatory
action, and a softening of hitherto national attitudes toward sovereignty.
The ECE, Scandinavian and other conventions cited earlier support that view.
Other general considerations and recent actions either support such an
attitude or help to build a foundation for it. In this latter category, we
note that injunctions to preclude land uses that would cause unreasonable
pollution have been available in English law since the Industrial Revolution;
the principle has been long accepted in the American and Canadian legal system.
It formed part of the base for setting up the International Michigan-Ontario Air
Pollution Board in 1976 (by the IJC).
To be sure, CO2-climate is a heavier problem than other transboundary
pollution issues. Who is the defendent: The U.S.? The U.S.S.R.? OECD?
Assigning responsibility for acid rain in Scandinavia has been frustrating
enough; CO2 will be worse, perhaps impossible in any narrow sense. It is
a very long-time problem, with intergenerational aspects that daunt economic
discounters, as well as lawyers. It would be very hard to agree on quotas.
Perhaps it would be easier to seek some sort of advance agreement that winners
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should compensate losers; but will the bill be paid when it comes due?
Several international organizations have paid attention to parts of
this problem. One of the first to come to mind is the United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP); it has no formal mandate to develop law, but
having the responsibility to implement the 1972 Stockholm resolutions, it has
a de facto obligation to propose rules, actions, etc. In our view it would be
the most logical organization to lead global CO2 discussions, except for a
proclivity for UN organizations to become paralyzed by politicization in
the too-narrow sense.
Working in collaboration with UNEP but separate from the UN is the
World Meteorological Offices (WMO). In 1979, the Eighth World Meteorological
Congress established a climate program, stimulated primarily by acid rain,
but secondarily by CO2. While mainly attended by professional meteorologists
and climatologists, it did receive some institutional recognition, and
recommended introducing acid rain and CO2 issues into international agendas.
Another nongovernmental organization ("NGO"), the Scientific Committee on
Problems of the Environment ("SCOPE"), founded in 1969, has a long-term
global scientific program, including CO2 effects, complementary to WHO
activities. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
has also touched upon the topic.
Other regional and national activities are worth citing. In 1979, the
OECD Council on Coal and the Environment recommended that member countries try
to work on defining appropriate fuel uses and CO2 emission levels, to minimize
deleterious climatic change. The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific (ESCAP) has been active on regional environmental issues. The
International Law Association also comes to mind. Any or all of these
organizations could play important roles; careful intellectual work needs to
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be done, yet publicly enough to command attention as well as respect.
Some proposed and extant laws already move us toward increased international
responsibility. U.S. Congress Senate Resolution 49 in 1977 related to international
environmental impact statements; its proposer, Senator Clayborne Pell,
would have required EIS's for major national undertakings that could affect
the international environment.
Most important perhaps, although not dealing with the air at all, is the
Law of the Sea, because it established a principle of global managements of
the global commons, contains broad proscriptions against pollution, and
requires notification of plans for activities liable to pollute. It has many
"requirements" rather than exhortations. Signatories can be brought before
the International Court of Justice, with or without consent. Of course, the
sea has many fixed resources, so many incentives exist to write laws for their
use, that do not exist for the atmosphere. Nevertheless, if the attitude of
the ECE or Scandinavian transboundary air pollution conventions were combined
with the legal structure of the Law of the Sea, the global CO2 problem could
probably be addressed vigorously in the world's courts.
Pessimists will point out that the Law of the Sea is in trouble, and
so are acid rain conventions of all kinds. That is so, but the troubles seem
to us temporary rather than permanent, in the nature of growing pains rather
than symptous of terninal disease.
The question arises: is the time about right to review the situation in
international law, at least to the extent of seeing how well equipped it is now
(and is liable to become if the trend toward looking ahead continues) to deal
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with the CO2-climate issues, if and when they arise? Several points are germane.
1. Timing of discussions should recognize response lags. A response lag of
about one decade appears for simple cases (e.g. Trail Smelter) and two to three
decades for complex ones (acid precipitation), from development of technically
plausible data or analyses to constructive action. Global CO2 is yet more complex
-- tropical and temperate zone countries, rich and poor ones, not just relatively
homogeneous OECD ones, for instance; more ambiguity about costs and benefits;
consequences that come only much later in time; no group presently affected
adversely.
Furthermore, when viewed at any one time, development of new perceptions
about transboundary pollution seems to come very slowly, and the idea of
effective anticipatory action agreements may seem as remote as January dreams
of summer beaches. However, summer does come.
2. Observational data exist for acid rain, but not yet for CO 2-climate
(but none are yet expected). However, increasing technological and scientific
sophistication may lead to substantive information in a decade.
3. The CO2-climate models are probably as good as, perhaps even better
(for their purposes) than the regional acid rain transport models.
4. If history is any guide at all here, any long delay in amelioration
will not be the result of the lack of appropriate amelioration techniques, but
of waiting for favorable economic circumstances and for development of appropriate
laws to apply the techniques. The record is quite clear here:
* SO2 scrubbing techniques were developed in less than a decade; cheap
coal cleaning techniques have been available for many decades.
* Toxic waste problems are mainly economic and legal, not fundmentally
technical.
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* Automotive emissions were reduced rapidly, auto safety systems were
introduced rapidly, and more energy-frugal cars all came along in about
one decade, once decisions had been made to go for them.
5. CO 2-climate and acid rain are not the only things for which we need
to review the need for and status of international environmental law. Consider
for example Mediterranean pollution and disposal of wastes in the ocean (to
which the Law of the Sea already applies).
6. The process of amelioration, if required, will surely be long and
complex, requiring the development of consensus about global commons.
From all this, we conclude that the C02-climate topic is ripe for preliminary
exposure in international legal forums; given the trend in thinking, some state
is likely to raise the issue soon anyway, particularly in terms of and in con-
junction with developing non-fossil energy sources, in order to satisfy a number
of other resource constraints. It is much better to be in front of the discussion
than behind it.
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Figure 821 SO2 emissions in the United States and Canada in 1980
(thousands of metric tonnes/year) From Acid Deposition: Atmospheric
Processes in Eastern North America, National Academy Press, Washington DC,
(1983) (their Fig. 1.2)
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Figure B2 Annual mean value of pH in precipitation weighted by the amount
of precipitation in the United States and Canada for 1980. From Acid Deposition:
Atmospheric Processes in Eastern North America, National Academy Press,
Washington DC, (1983) (their Fig. 1.1)
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF INPUTS TO THE
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY ANALYSIS
ENERGY MODEL
(THE "EDMONDS-REILLY" MODEL)
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Note: 1 = region, I =
k = sector, Y =
Input
Price Development
World Prices
Transportation Costs
Import/Export
Trade Barriers
Energy Taxes
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Actual Population
Base GNP
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GNP
Refinery Parameters
Conversion efficiency
Mark-up cost
primary energy type, M = period,
income.
Applied to
Fossils: oil, gas coal
Global
Fossils: oil, gas, coal
Global
Fossils: oil, gas, coal
Each region
Fossils, each period
Each region
Oil, gas, coal & electricity
Each period, each region
Each region, base year
Each region, base year
Each region, each period
Each region, each period
Oil, gas, coal
Global
Oil, gas, coal
Global
R = elasticity, P = price, KK = aggregate fuel, J = secondary fuel,
Symbol Comments
PI One price (1975$/GJ) for each fossil fuel.
It represents a global price in base year
1975.
TRI One price (1975$/GJ) for each fossil fuel.
It represents a global transportation cost
in base year 1975.
NXIL This NXIL has a value of 1 or -1, where 1
indicates exporter and -1, importer.
TXILM Factor applied to fuel prices
TXJLM Taxes on final consumption
ZL Actual population (in thousands)
in year 1975 of each region
GNPBL Gross nation product in millions
of 1975 $ for year 1975.
ZLM Projected populations indexed with
1975=1.00
GNPPCM Projected economic activities (GNP's)
indexed with 1975=1.00 (per capita)
CIJ Ratio of Joules of primary energy in to Joules
of energy product out (exclusive of fuels used as
energy by the refinery
HIJ Accounts for cost of refining and distributing
energy products
Input
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Generation efficiency
Non-energy costs
Logit substitution
Multiplicative
factor
Utility fuel
weights
share
Technological change
parameter
Applied to
All fuels
All fuels, each region
Oil, gas, coal, nuclear,
solar
Liquids, gas, solids
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Oil, gas, coal, nuclear
solar. Each region, each
period.
Liquids, gases, solids,
electricity. Each period.
Each region.
Comments
GUI Ratio of Joules of energy in to Joules of electricity
out (GUI should equal 1 for nuclear, solar, and
hydro)
HUIL Reflects non-energy costs 1975$/GJ.
(fixed or capital costs)
RUI Parameter governing conversion response of
utilities to price increases of a given
technology (Hydro is fixed)
PAUIL Adjusts refined fossil fuel price to account
for different fuel types and distribution
costs.
BSUILM Ranges from 0 to 0.2.
TJKLM Read as an index wi
increasing value ov
per unit output. T
into 3 sectors: re
and transportation.
th 1975=1.0. Additive. An
er time implies energy savings
he OECD regions are disaggregated
sidential/commercial, industrial,
Resource Constrained Technologies (Exhaustible)
Cumulative production Oil and gas. Each region
Shape parameter
Resources
Gas Flaring Parameters
Flaring fraction
base year
Ultimate flaring
fraction
Years to FLR2
Oil and gas. Each region
Oil and gas. Each region
Gas. Each region
Gas. Each region
Gas. Each region
AIL Cumulative production of conventional fuels to base
year 1975 (EJ).
BIL Determines the shape of the logistic function.
RESIL Total conventional resource (EJ) in each region.
FLRL1 Fraction of gas supply being flared in 1975. Flaring
= Burning + Reinjection.
FLR2 Ultimate fraction of gas that will be flared in each
region.
FLR3 Number of years to reach the ultimate flaring
fraction.
(A~
Symbol
Applied to
Renewable Resource Constrained Technologies
Orientation Paramenter Hydro. Each region
Shape Hydro. Each region
Resource Hydro. Each region
Price Hydro. Each region
Electricity share Hydro. Each region
Backstop Technologies Unconventional oil, unconventional
Base breakthrough BT. Each region
price
Ultimate breakthrough BT. Each region
price
Years to CIL2 BT. Each region
Elasticity
Base Quantity
Reference Price
Synfuels (from coal)
Conversion Efficiency
Base year add on costs
Ultimate add on costs
Years to HCILT2
Elasticity
interpolation
Unconventionals &
coal. Each region
Unconventionals &
coal. Each region
Unconventionals &
coal. Each region
Syncrude, syngas
Syns. Each region
Syns. Each region
Syns. Each region
Syns.
HYDROlL Orients production path in time of logistic function
HYDR02L Determines the shape of the logistic function.
IIYDR03L Resource (EJ) amount available in each region.
HYDRO4L Production price in 1975$/GJ
IIYDR05L Electricity share of hydro in each region.
gas, coal, nuclear, solar = BT
CILl Price below which there is no production in
1975 ($/GJ).
CIL2 Ultimate price (1975$/GJ) below which no
production exists.
CIL3 Number of years to reach ultimate breakthrough
price.
RIL Supply price elasticity referenced at and base
quantity and reference price.
BESILM Amount of resource (EJ) available for production
at a "normal" price.
DILSET Price (1975$/GJ) of BESILM, but expressed as a ratio
to CIL. [CIL x DILSET = "normal" price].
GCI
HCILT1
HC ILT2
HCILT3
Ratio of primary Joules in to energy product out.
1975 $, mark up cost in 1975.
1975 $, ultimate mark-up cost.
Number of years to reach ultimate add on costs.
RCI Elasticity control parameter, allows
for intermediate years.
0
I.
p.
Symbol CommentsI nput
Input Applied to Symbol Comments
Energy Service Input-Output Coefficients for oil, gas, coal, electric
(sectors = Res/Com, Ind, Trans for USA, WE/CAN, OECD-PAC; Aggregate for other regions.)
Energy transformation Each sector: GJK Energy price = (GJK) x (secondary energy price) +
Aggregate: GJ HJK
Non-energy trans- Each sector: HJK Non-energy cost of secondary fuels
formation Aggregate: HJ
Base Sectors for each SJKP Undimensioned. Specifies a share of service by
consumption weights region fuel type in 1975.
Base service energy Sectors for each BSKL Amount of energy used by a sector in 1975.
consumed region
Scale Parameters Sectors each period BSJKLM Undimensioned parameter scaling the logit function
Elasticity Each sector, aggregate fuel RPKK End-use price elasticity
type
Each end use energy, each RPJK End-use substitution elasticity
sector
Aggregate sectors RPK General end-use price elasticity
aggregate fuel
Aggregate sectors RPJ General substitution elasticity
each fuel
Income Elasticity Each sector RYKK End-use income elasticity of demand
Each sector RYJK End-use income substitution elasticity
USSR and all non-OECD regions RYKT General end-use income elasticity
Energy-GNP RY Feedback elasticity on GNP
(-n
Input
Carbon Accounting
C-Coefficients
Base flared gas
burned
Ultimate flared gas
burned
Years to SBURNL2
Shale fraction
Feedstock fractions
Biomass
Price/share combos
Applied to
Combination of oil,
gas, coal, coal liquefact
coal gasificashale prod.
biomass
Each region
Each region
Each region
Each region
Each period
Oil, gas, coal.
Each region
Price, share, waste,
energy farms
Waste, energy farms.
Each region
Comments
COI Teragrams of C released per exajoule
SBURNL1 Fraction of the flared gas which is burned (as
opposed to reinjected) in 1975.
SBURNL2 Ultimate fraction of flared gas burned.
SBURNL3 Number of year to reach the ultimate fraction of
flared gas being burned.
Fraction of backstop technology from shale
SFEDIL. Share of each fossil fuel used as a feedstock
BIOPSM
BIOLM
Fractions of total biomass resource available at a
particular price.
Max resource amounts available.
0'
Symbol
B-1
APPENDIX B
THE IEA BASE CASE
AND THE MIT/IEA VARIATIONS
IEA BASE CASE
4..** BASE CASE INO COZ TAXES) *****
****
PRICE DATA DEVELOPMENT
FOSSIL FUELS
WORLD PRICES (PIt AND TRANSPORT COSTS ITRI)
IIN 1975 DOLLARS PER GJ IGIGAJOULE11
OIL GAS
PI TRI P1 TRI PI
COAL
TRI
1.8398 0.1391 0.6256 2.8.58 0.5121 0.3409
IMPORT/EXPORT STATUS INXIL)
ENXILM INDICATES EXPORTERS NXIL-A. IMPORTER.)
OIL GAS
-1 1
-1
-1
1
I
COAL
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
REGION
I us
2 WEUR4CAN
3 JANZ
4 EUSS
5 ACEt4P
6 MIDEAST
I AFR
8 LA
9 SEASIA
MIT/TEA CASES
The following is a list of all input values that were
changed from the IEA Base Case. All values not listed
for the cases are the same as the values in the IEA
Base Case (left side of page).
There are eleven MIT/IEA cases:
A, B, C, D, E, F, H, J, K, L, M.
General references for some letters used in the
variables:
I = fuel (primary, refinable)
L = region (1-9)
T = period
J = secondary fuel
M = time period
K = sector of energy consumption
Regions:
TXILM - TRADE BARRIERS ISCALE FACTOR APPLIED TO FUEL PRICES)
OIL - IXILM
1915 2000
0.9800 1.0000
1.4800 1.4800
1.1000 1.1000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
0.100 0.4000
2.1500 1.5000
1.0700 1.0200
0.8500 1.0000
GAS -
1975
1.0000
1.8000
1.8400
1.0000
1.0000
0.5000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
TXILM
2000
1.0000
1.8000
1.5500
1.0000
1.0000
0.7000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
COAL - TXILM
1975 2000
1.0000 1.0000
2.0700 2.0700
1.0000 1.0000
1.0200 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
2025
1.0000
1.4800
1.1000
1.0000
1.0000
0.7000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2025
1.0000
1.4000
1.2500
1.0000
1.0000
0.8500
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2025
1.0000
1.1500
1.0000
1.000
1.0000
1.0000
1. J040
2050
1.0000
1.4800
1.1000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2050
1.0000
1.2000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2050
1.0000
1.5000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
USA
CANADAEUR
JAN2
EUSSR
ACENP
MICEAST
AFR
LA
SCE ASIA
USA
CANADACEUR
JAN!
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFR
LA
SEE ASIA
USA
CANADALEUK
JANZ
EUSSA
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFR
1 USA = United States
2 CAN/WE = Canada, Western Europe, and Turkey
3 JANZ = Japan, Australia, New Zealand
4 EUSSR = Soviet Union and Centrally Planned
Europe
5 ACENP = Centrally Planned Asia
6 MIDEAST = Middle East
7 AFR
8 LA
= Africa
= Latin America
9 SEAsia = Noncommunist South, East, and
Southeast Asia
--1
-1
-1
1.0800 1.0400 1.0000 1.0000 LA
1.0800 1.0400 1.0000 1.0000 SEE ASIA
TXJLM - ENERGY TAXES ON FINAL CONSUAPTICN BY FUEL. REGION AND PERIOD
OIL -- TXJLM
1975 2000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 A.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000-
GAS -- TXJLM
1975 2000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
COAL - TAJLN
1975 2000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
ELECTRICJTY - TXJ
1975 2000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
2025
1.0000
.1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2025
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2025
1-.0000
1.0000
1.00000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
LM
2025
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2050
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2050
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2050
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2050
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
.000.1
1.0000
1.0000
USA
CANADA&EUR
JANZ
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFR
LA
SEE ASIA
USA
CANAQAEEUR
JANZ
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFR
LA
SEE ASIA
USA
CANAVACEUR
JANZ
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFR
LA
SEE ASIA
USA
CANADALEUR
JANZ
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFR
LA
SEE ASIA
1975 ACTUAL POPULATION ZL. THOUSANDS) AND BASE 6NP IMIL 75 DOLS)
OECO REGIUNS
UNITED STATES WEUROCAN DECD PACIFIC
POPULATION GNP POPULATION GM4P POPULATION GNP
213925. 1519090. 40502S. 1011d60. 127961. 5d6400.
TXJLM = 1.0 means no CO2 tax.
A2
NO CHANGES
'U
j
tri
I
CENTRALLY PLANNED AND MIDDLE EAST REGIONS
EUSSR ACENPL MIDEAST
POPULATION GNP POPULATION GNP POPULATION GNP
394582. 966400. 910964. 323600. 61371. 138410..
DEVEL6PING COUNTRY REGIONS
AFRICA LATIN AMERICA SOUTH L EAST ASIA
POPULATION GNP POPULATIGN GNP PtPbLAT IOh GNP
399310. 154690. 312631. 315490. 11244957. 233620.
POPULATION I2LM) AND BASE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IGNP)
IPOPULATION AND GNP ARE READ IN AS AN INDEX, 1975-I.OC
UNITED STATES
POPULATION GNP
1.0000 1.0000
1.1890 1.8170
1.3170 3.0210
1.3470 4.5050
CENTRALLY
EUSSR
POPULATION GNP
1.0000 1.0000
1.1960 1.8150
1.3080 2.9430
1.3510 4.4420
AFRICA
POPULATION
1.0000
1.7450
2.3610
2.7580 1
GNP
1.00
3.06
7.32
3.80
DECO REGIONS
WEUR+CAN
POPULATION GNP
1.0000 1.0000
1.1160 1.9180
1.3030 3.5340
1.3650 5.7090
DECO.PACIFIC
POPULATION GNP
1.0000 1.0000
1.2010 2.7010
1.2790 5.4320
1.3050 9.1210
PLANNED AND MIDDLE EAST REGIONS
ACENPL MIDEAST
POPULATION GNP POPULAIION UNP
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.3100 2.6650 1.8J00 3.6490
1.6450 5.4680 2.4480 8.9590
1.7100 10.3350 2.8470 18.0440
DEVELOPING COuNTRY REGIONS
LATIN AMERICA SO
POPULATI6N GNP PUP
00 1.13000 1.0000
90 1.7280 3.4750
70 2.2980 9.0050
60 2.6310 16.3950
UTH & EAST ASIA
ULATION GNP
1.0000 I.COOO
1.6850 3.C190
2.2260 7.1690
2.5560 13.5020
YEAR
1975
2000
2C25
2050
YEAR
1975
2000
2025
2050
YEAR
1975
2C00
2025
2050
REFINERY COEFFICIENTS 4GIJ AND HIJ)
"GIJ" IS A CONVERSION EFFICIENCY, THE RATIO OF JOULES OF PRIMARY
ENERGY IN TO JOULES OF ENERGY PRJOUCT 0U IEXCLUSIVE OF FUELS
USED AS ENERGY BY THE REFINERY). IT IS APPROXIMATED AS 1.
"HIJ" IS A MARK-UP COST. ACCOUNTING FOR C051 OF REFINING AND
DISTRIBUTING ENERGY PRODUCTS.
OIL
GIJ HIJ
1.0000 1.4250
GAS
GlIJ H1J
1.0000 0.3487
ELECTRICITV GENERATION COEFFICIENTS (GUI. HUIL. AND RUI)
OGUIN IS A GENERATION EFFICIENCY COEFFICIENT -- THE RATIO CF JOULES
OF ENERGY IN TO JOULES OF ELECTRICITY OUT. BY DEFINITION, 6UIal FGR
NUCLEAR, HYDRO. AND SOLAR.
"HUIL" REFLECTS NONEMERGY COSTS IN 1975 DOLLARS PER GJ.
*RUI" IS A LOGIT SUBSTITUTION PARAMETER GOVERNING THE RESPuNSE OF
UTILITIES TO PRICE INCREASES FOR A GIVEN TECHNOLOGY - HVDRU ENTERS
AS A FIXED AMOUNT.
NO CHANGES
COAL
GIJ
1.0000
hiJ
0.2600
OIL
3.6580
4.5330
4.5330
4.5330
4.5330
4.5330
4.5330
4.5330
4.5330
4.5330
-3.0000
GAS
3.6580
4.5052
4.5052
4.5052
4.5052
4.5052
4.5052
4.5052
4.5052
4.5052
-3.0000
FUEL
COAL
3.3250
6.8660
6.8660
6.8660
5.8630
5.8630
5.8630
5.8630
5.8630
5.6630
-3.0000
NUCLEAR
1.0970
1.7000
1.7000
1.1000
1.1000
1.7000
1.1000
1-.7000
1.7000
1.7000
-3.0000
SOLAR
1.0970
1.1000
1.7000
1.7000
1.1000
1.1000
1.1000
1.1000
1. 1000
1.7000
-3.0000
HYDO
1.0970
1.1000
1.1000
1.7000
1.1000
1.1000
1.1000
1.1000
1.1000
1.1000
PAUIL - ELECTRICITY GENERATION CUEFFICILNIS
IPAUIL 15 A MULTIPLICATIVE FACTOR kHICH AOJbSTS IHE REFINED
FOSSILE FUEL PRICE TO ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERENT FUEL TVPE (E.G.
RESIDUAL US GASOLINE$ AND DISTRIBUTION CGSIS.I
FUEL
GAS SOLID
0.7330 1.0000
0.6195 0.8293
0.9595 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
REGION
US
WEUR+CAN
DECD PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFRICA
L AMER
SEE ASIA
BSUI1.K: ELECTRIC UTILITY FUEL SHARE WEIGHTS,
BY PERIOD. FUEL AND REGION
1915
OIL
0.0915
0.1680
0.1937
0.1157
0.0547
0.2000
0. 1851
0.2000
0.1158
GAS
0.02-14
0.0694
0.2000
0.0565
0.00 14
0.0408
0.0128
0.0453
0.0007
COAL
0.2000
0.2000
0.0458
0.2000
0.2000
0.0
0.2000
0.0319
0.2000
NUCLEAR
0.0346
0.0192
0.0082
0.0060
0.0013
0.0001
0.0011
0.0080
0.0039
BSUILM - share of electricity generated by
fuel I in period M in region L.
Maximum value = 1/5.
SOLAR
G.0253
0.0172
C.0056
0.0060
0.0011
0.0
0.0009
0.0061
REGION
US
hEUR#CAN
OECD PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFRICA
L AMER
0.C036 SEE ASIA
BSUILIS YEAR 2000
OIL
0.0181
0.1403
0.2000
0.2000
0.1346
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.1600
GAS
0.0288
0.0542
0.0667
0.1359
0.0082
0.1102
0.02 16
0.1174
0.0118
COAL
0.2000
0.2000
0.1118
0.2000
0.2000
0.0200
0.2000
0.0951
0.2000
NUCLEAR
0.0702
(.0118
0.0433
0.0373
0.0161
0.0045
0.0148
0.0428
0.0291
SOLAR
0.0651
0.0458
0.0347
0.0370
0.0062
C.0045
0.0134
0.03 16
0.0280
REGION
US
hEUR*CAN
GECO PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEASI
AFRICA
L AMER
SEE ASIA
CASES
AR B, C, D, E,
F, H, J, L, M I
BSUILM YEAR 2000
Solar Region
0.0100 ACENP
PARANETER
GUI
HUIL La
HtIL.Lu2
HUlL La3
HUIL Le4
HUlL Log
HUIL Lw6
HUIL Lal
HUlL L=8
HUIL L=9
RUN
LIQUID
0.4850
0.5147
0 .5243
0.4000
0.4000
1.0595
0.4165
0.4013
0.6059
t,
BSUILMt YEAR 2025
OIL
0.00850
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2J00
0.20000.2000
0.2000
A, C, B, D, E,
F, H, J, L, M
BSUILMs YEAR 2050
REGI0N
US
hEUR+CAN
GECD PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AER
L AMER
SEE ASIA
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE £TJKLMH
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IS READ IN AS AN INDEX WITH 1975-1. AN
INCREASING VALUE OVER TIME IMPLIES ENER6Y SAVINGS PER UNIT OUTPUT.
OECD REGIONS
TJKLM - increase in efficiencies for end-use
of energy
period M.
J, in sector K, region L,-
UNITED STATES
LIQUIOS GASES
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
UNITE STATES
LIQUIDS GASES
1.0000 1.0000
1.2500 1.2500
1.5000 1.5000
1.7500 1.7500
UNITED STATES
LIQUIDS GASES
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
- AESIDENTIAL/COMMEACI AL
SOLIDS ELEC YEAR
1.0000 1.0300 1915
1.0000 1.0000 200C
1.U000 1.0000 2025
1.0000 1.0000 2050
- INDUSTRIAL
SOLIDS ELEL
1.0000 1.0000
1.2500 1.2500
1.5000 1.5000
1. 1500 1.7500
- TRANSPURIATION
SOLIDS ELEC
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
YEAR
1915
2000
2025
2C50
YEAR
1975
2000
2025
205C
CASES
A, B, C, D, E,
F, li,
0.01 per year
OCED REGIONS
arithmetic progression
per year in all OECD
Regions for all secondary
fuels J
Res/Com Trans Ind
0.01/yr 0.01/yr 0.01/yr
WEUR+CAN -
LIQUIDS GASES
1.0000 1.0000
t.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000
RESIDENT-IAL/COMMERCI.AL
SOLIDS ELEC YEAR
1.0000 1.0000 1975
1.0000 1.0000 2000
1.0000 1.0000 2025
1.0000 1.0000 205C
GAS
0.1214
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.1300
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
COAL
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.4Z000
0.2000
0.1000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
NUCLEAR
0.1154
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
SOLAR
C.2000
0.2000
0.2000
C.2000
0.0353
C. 2000
C. 2000
C.2000
0.2000
MEGIEN
bEUR+CAN
tECO PAC
ELSSI
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFRICA
L AMER
SLE ASIA
}Solar0.2000 RegionACENP
OIL
0.12 15
0.2000,
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
GAS
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
COAL
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.1000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
NUCLEAR
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
C.200a
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
SOLAR
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
C.2000
0.2000
C.2000
0.2000
tdz
I'
CASES BSUILM YEAR 2025
ELEC
1.0000
1.2500
1.5000
1.17500
WEUR+CAN - TRANSPORTATION
LIQUIDS GASES SOLIDS ELEC
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
OECD PAC - RESIDENTIALCODMMERCIAL
LIQUIDS GASES SOLIDS ELEC
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
OECD PAC - INDUSTRIAL
LIQUIDS GASES SOLIDS
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.2500 1.2500 1.2500
1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1.7500 &.7500 1.7500
DECO
LIQUIDS
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
ELEC
1.0000
1.2500
1.5000
1.7500
PAC - TRANSPORTATION
GASES SOLIDS ELEC
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
TJKLM continuedWEUR+CAft -
LIQUIDS GASES
1.0000 1.0000
1.2500 1.2500
1.5000 1.5000
1.7500 1.7500
CASES
INDUSTRIAL
SOLIDS
1.0000
1.2500
1.5000
1.1500
YEAR
1975
2000
2025
2050
YEAR
1975
2000
2025
2050
YEAR
1975
2000
2025
2050
YEAR
1975
2000
2025
2050
YEAR
1915
2000
2025
2050
K
Ind
0.01 /yr
Trans
0.01 /yr
geometric progression (%/yr) in all OECD
Regions for all secondary fuels J
Res/Com
0.0
Ind
0.01. /yr
Trans
0.0
NON-OECD REGIONS
A, C B, D, E
F, H
arithmetic progression per year
in all Non-OECD Regions for all
secondary fuels J
0.04/yr
NO-OECD REGIGNS
iNON-ECD REGIONS ARE NOT DIFFERENTIATED 8V SECTOR)
LIQUIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
LIQUIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
LIUVIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
GASES
1.0000
1.1B00
1.2000
1.3000
GASES
1.0000
L . 1000
1.2000
1.3000
GASES
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
I . 3000
EUSSR
SOLIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
ACENP
SOLIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
MIDEAST
SOLIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
ELEC
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
ELEC
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
ELEC
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
YEAR
1575
2000
2025
2050
YEAR
1975
2000
2025
2050
-VLAR
1975
2000
2025
-2050
J, L, M
K
geometric progression (
in all Non-OECD Regions
all secondary fuels J
0.01 /yr
/yr)
for
geometric progression ( /yr)
in all Non-OECD Regions for
all secondary fuels J
0.004 /yr
J, L, M geometric progression ( fyr) in all OECD
Regions for all secondary fuels J
Res/Com
0.01 /yr
A
LIQUIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
LIQUIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
LIQUIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
*3000
PAAAMETER VALULS FOR RLSOURCE LONSIRAINEU SUPOLY IECHtLLOGIES
EXHAUS(AtILE. RESOURCE CONSFRAINED IECHNGLOGIES
PAAAMETERS ARE THOSE OF LC61STILS FUNCTION -- "AlL" IS ThE AMOUNI
OF CUMULATIVE PROUCIIuN LF CCNVENTIONAL FUEL I IN REGIO I. 10
THE 8AiE PERIOD. "OIL" DEIERMINES Tdt SHAPE CF IHE FUNLIICN ANL
"RESIL" IS THE TOTAL RESOURLE IN EXAJOLLES.
OIL
OIL RESIL
0.052+ 1605.5310
0.u0520 988.0960
0.1200 34.5110
0.0600 2041.4510
0.0700 680.1210
0.1000 3854.0520
0.0600 1687.0500
'3.0600 1449.9560
0.0943 368.1190
mkEGLuN
aEIjR*CAA
LCO PAC
EUSu(
ALEAP
hi UEASU
AFR
LA
SEASIA
EXGGENOUS MIDEAST SUPPLIES OF OIL AND GAS (UNI1S=EXAJOULES -- J*10**18)
2000 2025 2050
31.0000 37.0000 31.0000
10.5500 15.0000 30.0000
GAS FLARING
"FLRLI" IS THE FLARING RATE IN 1975.
Resource constrained technologies are
conventional oil and gas.
RESIL - the resource of conventional fuel I
in region L after the year 1975 (EJ)
GASES
1.0000
1.1000
t.2000
1.3000
GASES
1.0000
1. 1000
1.2000
1.3000
GASES
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1. 3000
AFS
SO I DS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
LA
SOLIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
SEAS IA
SOLIDS
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
*In the MIT/IEA Cases BIL is specified as
the year of peak production of conventional
fuel I. The values in the IEA Base Case for
the USA are equal to 1983.12 for oil and
1989.98 for gas.
BIL
A, C, E, F Oil
H, J$ LM 1960.1
Gas
1960.0
Exogeneous Mid-East Supplies
CASES
A, C, E, F, Oil
H, L, M Gas
FUEL
OIL
GAS J
"FLRL2" IS IHE UtlIMATE
FLARING RATE. AND "FLRL3" IS-THE NUMBtR OF YEARS 10 REACH "FLRL2."
THE MODEL EXPONENTIALLY INTE4POLATES uEIWLEN THE RAIES.
FLRL3 REGION
10.0000 US
10.0000 hEUR+CAN
0.0100 10.0003 JANL
0.0500 10.0000 EUSSR
0.0500 10.0000 ACENP
0.0500 50.0000 MIDEAST
0.0500 50.0000 AFR
0.0500 28.0000 LA
0.0500 15.0000 SEASIA
2000 2025 2050
35.0 30.0 30.0
10.6 10.0 10.0
Oil 37.0
Gas
0 0
10.6 15.0 30.0
Flared gas is considered to have a portion
reinject and a portion burned.
CASES
A, B, C, D,
E, F, H, J,
L, M
REGION FLRL2
ME
AFR
LA
FLRL3
30
same as
LEA Base 30
Case
td
20
The portion burned is defined as SBURNLT
on page 13.
ELEC
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
ELEC
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
ELEC
1.0000
1.1000
1.2000
1.3000
YEAR
1915
2000
2025
2050
YEAR
1975
2000
2025
2050
YEAR
1915
2000
2025
2050
Gas - 1/2 (Base Case)
791
544
79
1279
202
1044
398
451
187
A, C, F, H
J, L, M
Region Oil
USA 1106
WE/CAN 513
JANZ 20
EUSSR 1502
ACENP 353
ME 2135
AFR 702
LA 702
SEA 207
GLOBAL 7240
AlL
634.5850
54.5690
5.2300
303.8180
31.4550
482.690
160.1910
258.6050
52.1550
Alt
51'.. 1000
16.0960
0.0980
14d.92 10
5.2610
55. 1290
18.2840
66.5840
12.2.550
GAS
0. 024
0. C520
0.1200
0.0600
0.C 100
0.C 100
C. 0600
C. C600
0.G943
RESIL
1,5e.5000
IC8.7050
158.2500
2551.6680
40).CICO
20e.1*40
196.5250
S02.0250
314.L250
1975
42.5000
10.5500
FLRL2
0.03500
0.0500
FLRL I
0.0550
0.0100
0.0050
0.0490
0.1070
0.12 10
0.1360
0.5230
0.3490
RENEWABLE RESOURCE CONSTRAINED TECHNOLOGIES
PARAMETERS INCLUDE LOGISTICS FUNCTION PARAMETERS* COST@ AND SHARE
DATA. "HYDROIL ORIENTS THE PRODUCTION PATF IN TIME; "HVDRU2L"
OETERMINES ITS SHAPE$ NHYDR03L IS THE RESGURCE AMOUNT IN EJ;
"HYDR04Le IS PRODUCTION PRICE In 1975 DOLLARS PER GJI AND
"HYORO5LO IS THE ELECTRICITY SHARE OF HYCRO.
HYDRO3L
1.8300
3.5100
0.7100
4.9100
5.1600
0.b 100
1.3 100
- 6-.4800
4.1100
HYDR04L HYDR05L REGICN
4.0300 0.1530 US
4.0300 0.3421 kEUR#CAh
4.0300 G-2100 JANZ
4.0300 0.1159 EUSSR
4.0300 043467 ACENP
4.0300 0.C969 MIDEAST
4.0300 0.2812 AFR
4.0300 0.5624 LA
4.J300 0.2693 SEASIA
Unconventional fuels (e.g. shale oil) do not
include syfuels from coal or biomass.
Note that CILT x DILSET = reference price at BESILM
CIL is the price below which no production occurs
Oil CIL2 for all regions
A, C, E, F
H, L, M
K
J
6.00
3.70
7.00
Oil BESILM
PARAMETER VALUES 'OR BACKStOP SUPPLY tECHNCLOGIES
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL. UNCONVENTIONAL 6ASe LOAL NUCLEAR. AU SLLAR
ARE DESCAIBED SIMILARLY. EACH TECHNGLJGY HAS 9 CAIA ELEMENFS
WHICH MUST BE READ IN FOR EACH REGION. IHESE ARS "CIlI" --
THE BASE YEAR BREAKTHROUGH PRICE; "CIL2" -- THE ULTIMAIT
BREAKTHOUGH PRICE; AND OCIL30 -- THE NUMBER OF YEARS 16 REACh
CiL202. "RIL -- SUPPLY PRICE ELASTICITY AT OIL AND BASE
QUANTITY; "BESILMw -- BASE CUANT ITY IN EACh PERIODS "DILSET" --
REFERENCE PRICE AT BASE UUANTIfTV EXPRESSEC AS A RATIO 14 CIL.
NOTE PRICES ARE 19758/GJ.
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL; =1.L.1.2.....9
CILI CIL2 CIL3 RIL REGION
13.3100 3.8500 35.0000 1.1400 US
19.1000 5.17000 35.0000 1.1400 kEUR+CAN
13.3100 3.8500 35.0000 1.1400 JANZ
13.3100 3.8500 35.0000 1.1400 EUSSR
13.3100 3.8500 35.0000 1.1400 ACENP
13.3100 3.8500 35.0000 1.1400 MIDEAST
13.3100 3.8500 35.0000 1.1400 AFR
13.3100 3.8500 35.0000 1.1400 LA
13.3100 3.8500 35.0000 1.1400 SEASIA
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL: BESILM VALUES IN EJ
YEAR
1975
1.0000
1. 0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
2000
4.4700
3.0400
1.1600
3.1500
0.2200
0.1100
0.1100
1.6800
0.1 100
2025
25.7200
11.4900
6.6800
18.1300
2.0000
0.3800
1.0000
9.9500
1.0000
2050 UILSEI
79.3100
47.5500
18. 1500
49.2800
24.3600
1.3400
12.1800
39.4500
12. 1800
1.3500
2.0000
1.3500
1.3500
1.3500
1.3500
1.3500
1.3500
1.3500
2000 2025 2050 Region
A, C, El
F, H' J
K .0
REGION
US
WEUR+CAN
OECD PAC
EUSSR4
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFR
LA
SEASIA
10.75
8.43
1.35
19.12
4.42
7.32
22.12
7.65
2.16
3.57
2.57
1.13
2.65
0.28
0.15
0.15
1.55
0.15
32.00
22.88
6.87
34.10
6.20
7.59
23.01
15.92
3.05
15.8
11.4
5.0
11.7
1.8
0.4
1.0
7.1
1.0
85.74
52.44
18.34
63.25
28.56
8.55
34.19
45.42
14.23
41.2
26.6
11.8
27.5
15.1
1.3
8.4
72.7
8.4
US
WE/CAN
OECD PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
US
WE/CAN
OECD PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
All Periods Region
L
10.75
8.43
1.35
19.12
4.42
7.32
22.12
7.65
2.16
US
WE/CAN
OECD PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
M Oil BESILM is 1.0 for all periods, all regions
HYDRO IL
0.4204
0.3j61
0.2416
-1.9979
-3.2069
-3.6418
-3.9701
-2.5238
-2.723
HYDR02L
0.0651
0.0120
0.0688
0.0931
0.0900
0.1549
0.0997
0.0910
3.1006
t,:1
UNCONVENTIONAL
CIL. CIL2
3.1000 3.1000
3.1000 3.7000
3.1000 3.1000
3.1000 3.1000
3.1000 3.1000
3.1000 3.1000
3.1000 3.1000
3.1000 3.1000
3.1000 3.7000
GAS$ ImlLaL.2.....9
CIL3 RIt REGION
1.0000 0.4100 US
1.0000 0.4700 WEUR*CAN
1.0000 0.4100 OECD PAC
1.0000 0.4700 EUSSR
1.0000 0.4100 ACENP
1.0000 0.4100 N10EAST
1.0000 0.4100 AFR
1.00j0 0.4100 LA
1.0000 0.4100 SEASIA
UNCONVENTIONAL GAS& BESILN VALUES IN EJ
YEAR
1975
15.0000
1.7000
0.0
22.3000
2.8500
17.2000
5.6000
6.4000
2.6000
2000 2025 2050
15.0000 15.0000 15.0000
1.7000 7.1000 7.7000
1.1000 1.1000 1.1000
22.3000 22.3000 22.3000
2.8500 2.8500 2.8500
17.2000 11.2000 11.2000
5.6000 5.6000 5.6000
6.4000 6.4000 6.4000
2.6000 2.6000 2.6000
COAL CIlIl CIL2. CIL39 RILI Lte...e9
C7LI
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
CIL2
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
0.2600
CIL3
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
COAL BESILN VALUES IN- EJ
YEAR
1975
17.1190
9.6020
2.6670
25.7130
15.00 10
0.0290
2.1840
0.3440
2.6800
2000
32.6350
15.7530
8.99 10
31.0610
32.0140
0.2000
1I. 1850
4.0350
8.49 10
2025
61.9960
25.8450
27.0220
53.2630
79.6950
1.6500
27.4550
29.8170
38.8130
RIL
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
0.2000
2050
111.7140
42.4010
61.0090
a1.2380
169.9 110
4.5000
10.6610
89.6930
95.6190
DILSET
1.0973
1. 1913
1.1913
1.1973
1.1913
1.1913
1.1973
1.1913
1.9173
REGION
US
WEUR4CAN
GECD PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
NIDEASt
AFR
LA
SEASIA
DILSET
1.9100
6.8100
3.2700
2.0000
1. 9100
3.2100
3.2100
3.5400
3.5400
REGION
Us
WEURCAN
CECD PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
I40EASt
AFR.
LA
SEAS IA
GAS
A, C, E, F CIL2 - 4.50
H, J, L, M CIL3 - 40
Case
A
COAL
A
B, C, E,
H, J, M
L
Cases
B, C, E, F,
H, J, L
REGION
US K6EUR+CAN
JANZ
EUSSR -
ACE NP
MIDEAST
AFR
LA
SEAS IA
H
-I
-I
All Regions
Gas BESI LM
Region EJ in all periods
us 26.0
WE/CAN 15.0
OECD PAC 2.0
EUSSR
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
CIL3 - 25.0 yrs
F, I CIL2 - 1.1
CIL3 - 25 yrs
40.0
6.0
41.0
11.0
12.0
5.0
DILSET for WE/CAN - 5.0
CIL2 - 1.1, CIL3 - 75.0
Coal BESILM
Region
us
WE/CAN
JANZ
EUSSR.
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
us
WE/CAN
JANZ
EUSSR.
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
us
WE/CAN
JANZ
EUSSR
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
2000
25.00
14.00
6.00
30.00
30.00
0.10
8.00
5.00
10.00
32.0
14.6
7.5
30.2
28.6
.15
8.75
2.8
7.1
25.00
14.00
6.00
30.00
30.00
0.10
8.00
5.00
10.00
2025
35.00
20.00
10.00
40.00
40.00
0.50
18.00
5.00
10.00
51.1
22.3
19.1
47.8
62.0
6.9
18.8
15.3
25.9
17.00
10.00
3.00
25.00
15.00
0.10
2.00
1.00
3.00
2050
50.00
25.00
20.00
50.00
50.00
1.00
35.00
30.00
30.00
88.2
33.9
38.2
68.4
99.0
2.1
41.9
38.9
55.9
10.00
5.00
1.50
12.50
7.50
0.10
1.00
0.50
1.50
ud
0
NUCLEAR ANJ SOLAR COSTSS CILl. CIL2. CIL3; L1Is...,9
CILI,
6.83
6.83
6.83
6.83
25.80
7.36
25.80
t.36
1.36
NUCLEAR
CIL2
6.83
6.83
6.83
6.83
6.83
6.83
6.83
6.83
6.d3
CIL3
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
30.00
70.00
30.00
30.00
30.O
CILI
200.60
402.40
? a1.60
402.40
321.40
t28.60
144.00
321.40
200.60
SOLAR
CIL2
17.10
18.00
15.48
21. Ja
19.80
17.15
19.20
19.08
19.80
CIL3
50.Go
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50.00
50. 00
SYNFUEL PAAAAETERS
IPARAMETERS INCLUDE A CONVERSION EFFICIENCY lGCiI, ACD UN
COSTS IHCILtI ANO AN ELASTICITY CONTRL PARAMETER IRCI).
HCILt1 IS THE INITIAL VALUE. HCIL12 [HE FIAAL VALUE#
AND HCILF3 [HE NUMBER OF YEARS WO REACH THE FINAL VALUE.
TiE MODEL EXPONENTIALLY INTERPOLATES FOR .INIERMEDIATE
YEARS)
SYNCRUDE SYNGAS
HCILTI HCILT2 HCILT3 - HCILIl HCILI2 HCILT3
100.00 4.55 25.00 100.00 3.30 25.00
100.00 4.55 25.00 100.00 3.30 25.00
100.00 4.55 25.00 100.00 3.30 25.00
100.00 4.55 25.00 100.00 3.30 25.00
100.00 4.55 50.00 100.00 3.30 50.00
100.00 4.55 100.00 100.00 3.30 100.00
12.54
12.54
100.00
4.55
4.55
4.55
SYNCRUDE GCI -
SYNCRUDE RCI a
25.00
25.00
50.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
2.13
-6.00
3. 30
3.30
3.30
25.00
25.CO
50.00
REGIO
us
WEUR#CAN
GECO PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
MI0EASI
AFR
LA
SEASIA
Cases
A, C, F
H
J
CIL 2. CIL3
9.0
100
1.0
50
14.85 50
SOLAR - All Regions
Cases
D, E, H,
J, L, M
F
CIL2 CIL3
9.50 35
20 35
SYNCRUDE - All Regions
REGION
US
kEUR+CAA
OECO PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFRICA
L AMER
SCE ASIA
SYNGAS GCI a 1.50
SYNGAS RCI * -6.00
ENERGY SERVICE INPUT-OUTPUT COEFFICIENTS
TABLE 1.
ENERGY TRANSFORMAIION BY SECTOR
IGJK. GJ1
Cases
A, B, C,
E, F, H,
L, M
SYNGAS
Cases
A, B, C, D,
E, F, H, J,
L, M
All cases:
I
HCILT2 HCILT3
6.00 35
HCILT2 HCILT3
4.50
GCI = 1.50
40
ELECTRIC
0.8600
1.0500
1.0500
0.9500
SECTOR
RES/CON
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT
AGGREGATE
YARIABLE
GJK.J*1.NJ X-1
GJK#J-1.NJ R*2
GJK.J-INJ X-3
GJ. J=1.NJ
TABLE 2.
NON-ENERGY 1-0 COEFFICIENTS BY SECTOR
IHJK. HJi
ELECTRIC SECTOR
3.4100 RES/CON
1.1600 JNDUSTRY
153.1100 TRANSPORT
1.1500 AGGREGATE
VARIABLE
hJKJ-1.hJ
HJK.J-i#NJ
HJK.J01 NJ
HJ* JO1.NJ
KUL
K=2
Kw3
OIL
1.6700
1.9200
3.0000
2.0000
GAS
1.5400
1.9000
3.0000
1.7000
COAL
2.5000
2.0000
3.3300
2.0500
OIL
4.9000
0.4100
96.8800
2. 1000
GA S
3.2400
0.3200
200.0000
2.0300
COAL
2.8100
0.0000
200.0000
1.1800
NUCLEAR 
- All Regions
SASt ENERGY SERVICE CONSUMPTION WEIGH'S
BY FUEL BY SECTOR BY REGION
$JKLP IUNITS-UNDIMENTIONED) AND BSKL 4UNITS-EXAJOULES)
OIL
0.1550
0.0910
1*3690
0.3590
0.2600
1,69620
0.4430
0.2240
2.6720
0.2130
0.1560
0.6610
0.4310
0.6350
0.5160
OIL
0.3585
0.1671
0.7030
0.5492
0.3t64
0.0136
0.4533
0.1948
0.0299
0.4795
0.5764
0.6032
0. 7670
0.7910
0.5508
GAS
0.6830
0.3450
0.0
0.1220
0.0650
0.0
0.0880
0.0320
0.0
0.1940
0.0050
0.2120
0.0090
0.1480
0.0680
COAL
0.0110
0.1290
0.0
0.1120
0.1310
0.0030
0.2010
0.2610
0.0010
0.3360
0.1640
0.0090
0.3400
0.0440
0. 1720
ELECTRIC
0.3190
0.1450
0.0010
0.3720
0.2120
0.0280
0.4620
0.2630
0.0500
0.1970
0.0740
0.0930
0.2140
0.1740
0.2440
8SKL
15.2317
9. 1881
6.6411
11. 14 16
9.4047
,3.3914
2.0876
3.9391
0. d941
26.3832
9.1210
L.81i3
2.2834
5.0414
4.2498
SECTOR
RES/CON
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT
RES/CON
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT
RES/CON
INOUSTRY
IRANSPORI
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGAIE
AGGREGATE
AaGREGAIE
AGGREGAIE
8SJKLM - LOGIT FUNCTIUN SCALE PARAMEIERS
IUNITS 8SJKLN-UNIMENSIONtiI
YEAR a 1915
GAS
0.0548
0.0124
0.0
0.0814
0.0831
0.0
4.0622
0.0420
0.0
0*0380
.0018
0.0451
0.0004
0.0186
0.0089
COAL
0.0008
0.0047
0.0004
0.0118
0.0122
0.5008
0.0058
0.0091
0.5779
0.0339
0.1465
0.0025
0.0213
0.0054
0.0260
ELECTRIC
0.5858
0.7958
0.2966
0.3577
0.5863
0.4256
0.4787
0. 7541
0.3922
0.4486
0.2753
0.3492
0.2113
0.1850
0.4143
SECTOR
RES/COm
INDUSRY
IRANSPORT
RES/COM
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT
RES/COm
INDUSTRY
IRANSPORT
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGAIE
AGGREGATE
REGION
USA
USA
USA
WEUR+CAN
WEUR*CAN
6EUR*CAN
OECD PAC
DECO PAL
dECD PAC
USSR
CHINA
MIDEAS1
AFRICA
L AMER
SEE ASIA
REGION
USA
USA
USA
WEUR+CAN
WEUR+CAN
6EUR&CAN
OECO PAC
DECD PAC
OECO PAC
USSR
CHINA
MIDEAST
AFRICA
L AMER
SEE ASIA
BSJKLM - LOGIT FUNCTION SCALE PARAMEIERS
(UNITS BSJKLM-UNOIMENSIDNED0
OIL
0.2600
0.1871
0.7030
0. 5492
0.3184
0.0736
0.4533
0.1948
0.0299
0.4195
0.5200
0.6032
0.6700
0.6001
0.6500
GAS
0.0548
0.020 1
0.0
0.0814
0.0831
0.0
0.0622
0.0420
0.0
900190
0.0200
6.0451
0.0287
0.0423
8.018 1
YEAR -
COAL
0.0006
0.0047
0.0004
0.0118
0.0122
0.5008
0.0058
0.0091.
0.5 119
0.0339
0.1039
0.0025
0.0213
0.0054
0.0260
2000
ELECTRIC
0.5858
0.7958
0.2966
0.3577
0.5863
0.4256
0.4181
0.7541
0.3922
0.4486
0.2153
0.3492
0.2800
0.2111
0.4400
SECTOR
RES/COm
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT
RES/COM
iNDUSIRY
TRANSfORT
RES/C6N
INDUSTRY
IRANSPCRT
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
REGION
USA
USA
USA
WEUR*CAN
WEUR*CAN
WEUR+CAN
OECD PAC
DECD PAC
DECD PAC
USSR
CHINA
MIDEAST
AFRICA
L AMER
SEE ASIA
i
NO CHANCES
H
BSJKLM -- LOGIN FUNCTION SCALE PARAMETERS
IUNIIS BSJKLM-UNDIMENSIONED0
OIL
0.2600
0.111
0.7030
0.5492
0.3184
0.0736
0.4533
0.1948
0.0299
0.4 195
0.5764
0.6032
0.5800
0.6001
0.4500
GAS
0.0548
0.0207
0.0
0.0814
0.0831
0.0
0.0622
0.0420
0.0
0.1125
0.0400
0.0451
0.0487
0. 0423
0.02 13
YEAR =
COAL
0.0003
0.0041
0.0004
0.0118
0.0122
0.5008
0.0058
0.0091
0.5119
0.0198
0.0106
0.0025
0.0213
0.0054
0.0260
2025
ELECTRIC
0.5858
0.1958
0.2966
0.3577
0.5863
0.4256
0.4781
0.7541
0.3922
0.4486
0.2753
0.3492
0.3400
0.2383
0.4500
SECTOR
eRES/COM
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT
RES/CGM
INDUSTRY
TRANSPGRI
RESICOM
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGAIE
REGION
USA
USA
USA
WEUR*CAN
WEUR+CAN
hEUR*CAN
DECO PAC
OECD PAC
DECO PAC
USSR
CHINA
MIDEAST
AFRICA
L AMER
SLE ASIA
8SJKLM -- LOGIF FUNCTION SCALE PARAMEITRS
fuNiTS BSJKLMuUNOIMENSIONED)
OIL
0.2600
0.1811
0.1030
0.5492
0.3184
0.0736
0.4533
0.1948
0.0299
0.4195
0.4323
0.6032
0.4800
0.6001
0.3900
GAS
0.0548
0.0207
0.0
0.0814
0.0831
0.0
0.0622
0.0420
0.0
0.1425
0.0800
0. 0451.
0.078 1
0.0423
0.0374
YEAR =
COAL
0.0008
0.0047
0.0004
0.0118
0.0122
0.5008
0.0058
0.0091
0.5719
0.0128
0.0347
0.0025
0.0213
0.0054
0.0260
2050
ELECTRIC
0.5858
0. 1958
J.2966
0.3517
0.5863
0.4256
0.4181
0.7541
0.3922
0.4486
0.2753
0.3492
0.4000
0.2650
0.4600
PRICE ELASTICITY CONTROL PARAMETERS
AtO OiL GAS COAL
RPKK RPJK
-1.3000 -3.0000 -3.0000 -3.0000
-0.9000 -3.0000 -3.0000 -3.0000
-5.5000 -13.0000 -13.0000 -13.0000
RPK RPJ
-1.0000 -2.5000 -2.5000 -2.5000
SEC IOR
RES/CON
INOUSIRY
TRANSPORT
AES/COM
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT
RES/CON
INDUSTRY
IRANSPORT
AGGREGATE
AGGREGAFE
AGGREGATE
AGREGAIE
AGGREGATE
AGGREGATE
NO CHANGESREGION
USA
USA
USA
WEUR#CAN
WEUR+CAN
WEUR+CAN
DECD PAC
DECD PAC
OECD -PAC
USSR
CHINA
MIDEAST
AFRICA
L AMER
SLE ASIA
ELECTRIC SECTOR
-3.0000
-3.0000
-13.C000
RES/CON
INDUSTRY
TRANSPORT
RPKK.JK,-1
RPKKJK#Rma
RPKK.JKqIKa3
-2.5000 AGGREGATE RPKRPJ txO
INCONE ELASTICITY CONTROL PARAN4ETERS
OIL GAS COAL ELECTRIC SECTOR
RYKK
1.0000
0.0
1.0000
RYJK
-0.1000 0.3000
0.0 0.1000
0.0 0.0
RYK
0.2500 -0.1000
0.4000
-0.2000
-0.3000
0.0
RYJ
0. 1000 -0.2000
0.1000 RES/CuN RYKK.JKK-1
0.3000 IhDUSTRY RYKX#JKS*.2
0.0 TRANSPORT RYKK*JK.K3
0.1000 AGIACeSI RYK,J.NT-a
AGOLOCeSRYX.JNT-2
*In all cases RYK (income elasticity
for Regions 4-9) was changed to RYKLT.
This change allows this elasticity to be
applied to region L (L=1 is USSR, L=2 is
LDC's) and T = 1 for ultimate elasticity
and T = 3 for the number of years to T = 2.
In all cases, this parameter equals zero at
75 years after 1975.
ENERGY-GNP FEED8ACK ELASTICITY
-0.0500 af
CDI - CARSON RELEASE BY SOURCE
(IN TERAGRAMS OF CARBON PER EXAJO0LE)
OIL
BURNUP
19.10
GAS
BURNUP
13.80
RYJ - general income substitution
elasticity for fuel
RY - higher energy prices cause
a depresstion of GNP
COAL COAL LI0- CDAL GAS- SHALE OIL
BURNUP UIFACfION IFICATION PRODUCTION
23.90 18.90 26.90 21.90
BIOMASS
0.C
RY = -0.10 in all cases
PROPORTION OF FLARED GAS BURNED ISBURNLI T-1 IS INITIAL
41915) SHARE, 1-2 IS ULTIMATE SHARE, T-3 IS NUMBER OF WEARS
TO SBURNLZ. PROPORTION OF BACKSTOP FUEL FROM CARBONATE ROCK
ISHALET. 1-1.2.3) HAS IDENTICAL INFERPKEIAIIUN.
SHALE2
0.59
0.45
0.59
0.90
0.25
C.25
u.25
0.25
CASES
SHALE3 REGION
10.00 LS
10.00 IEURCAA
10.CO OECD PAC
7C.00 EUSSR
10.00 ALENP
10.E0 PIDEAST
70.00 AFRICA
70.00 L AMER
10.CO SLE ASIA
A, B, C D9 M
F, H9JsL, M Others
Region SBURNL3
1.0
15.0
FEEDSTOCK USES OF FOSSIL FUELS ISF EDIL) -- SHARE OF EACH
FOSSIL FUEL USED AS A FEEUSTOCK.
OL
0.0450
0.0120
0.0920
0.0910
0.0100
0.1410
0.0300
0.0660
0.0820
GAS
0.0290
0.0290
0.0290
0.0290
0.0290
0.0290
0.0290
0.0290
0.0290
COAL
0.0070
0.0010
0.0010
0.0070
0.0010
0.00 10
0.0070
0.0010
0.0010
REGION
US
kEUR+CAN
OECO PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEASI
AFRICA
L AMER
SEE ASIA
AGG
0.13
0.41
1.00
1.00
100
0.90
0.35
0.85
S9URNLZ
0.13
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
SBURNL3
1.00
25.00
35.00
35.00
35.00
35.00
35.00
25.00
35.00
SHALEL
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.J
0.01
t~j
BIOMASS COEFFICIENTS: THE SUPPLY FUNCTION FOR BIOMASS
INCLUDES WASTE AND "ENERGY FARMS" AS SEPARATE TECHNOLOGIES.
THE CODED FUNCTIJNS ARE REPRESENTED BY LIlEAR SEGMENTS.
THE JPARAMETERS ARE CRITICAL PGINTS FOR THE FLNCTICN AND
REGIONAL RESOURCES. 810PSM ARE CRITICAL PRICE/SHARE
C6M8INATIONS. dILLM ARE MAXIMUM KESOUNCE AMOUNTS - WASTE
IS DEPENDENT ON ECONOMIC ACTIVIIY. THE UASTE TOTAL IS
BASED ON 1915 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY £PRICE--1915 S/GJ, QLANIIV--EJj
dI uPSN) EltE
SHARE
0.1000
0.3000
0.8000
0.8000
ENERGY FARMS
IaIOLMI
82.29
0.0
13.19'
98.43
q. 0
0.0
173.44
225.45
0.0
RGV OARMN 81OPSM)
PRICE SHARE
0.0 0.0
2.1000 0.0
2.6000 0.2000
4.6000 0.8000
REGION
US
WEUR#CAN
OECO PAC
EUSSR
ACENP
MIDEAST
AFRICA
L AMER
SLE ASIA
BIOMASS
A 0.0
A, II, E, 0.0
LF M 0.0
L 0.0
Waste
Price Share
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
Energy Farms
Price Share
0.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.0
BIOLM
Wasted
2.89
4.20
1.43
4.61
3.72
0.52
3.02
4.15
5.50
30.0
Energy Farms
10.0
5.0
0.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
85.0
WASTE
PRICE
0.4000
1.6000
4.A000
5.6000
WASTE
(BIOLM)
5.48
I.95
2.71
8.13
1.04
1.00
5.71
1.81
10.40
txi
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APPENDIX C
THE ELEVEN MIT/IEA ENERGY SCENARIOS, INPUTS
Note: Pages are numbered consecutively at the top
of each page; originally assigned case numbers
are retained at the bottom, to aid recognition.
C-2
Case A Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output coefficient of coal into primary
equivalent.
GCI = 1.50
TJKLM - Technological change parameter for end-use of
energy.
Arithmet ic progression
OECD Regions Non-OECD Reg ions
Res/Com Ind Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by fuel I in period
M, region L
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000 = 0.0100
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025 = 0.2000
RESIL - Total resource of conventional fuels in region L
after 1975 (EJ)
Region Oil Gas
USA 1106 791
WE/CAN 513 544
JANZ 20 79
SU/EE 1502 1279
ACENP 353 202
ME 2135 1044
AFR 702 398
LA 702 451
SEA 207 187
GLOBAL 7240 4976
-Case A page 2-
C-3
BIL - Year of peak production of conventional fuel in
region L.
Region 1 (USA)
Oil
1960.1
Gas
1960.0
EASTIM - Exogenous supplies of conventional oil and gas in
the Middle East.
Oil
Gas
2000
35.0
10.6
2025
30.0
10. 0
2050
30.0
10.0
FLRL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate flaring
rate FLRL2. Note that flared gas consists of two
portions: reinjected and burned.
Reg ion
ME
AFR
LA
FLRL3
30
30
20
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate
fraction of flared gas which is burned.
Reg i on
USA
Ot hers
SBURNL3
1.0
15. 0
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number o-if years to reach CIL2.
The following values
Unconventional Oil
Unconvent ional Gas
Coal
Nuc 1 ear
are for all regioncrs.
CIL2 CIL3
6.00 35 (CIL2=Base Case)
4.50 40
0.26 25 (CIL2=Base Case)
9.00 1.0
-Case A page 3-
C-4
BESILM - Base quantity of unconstrained fuel I in region L,
period M. (EJ)
Unconventional Oil
Region 2000 2025 2050
USA 10.75 32.00 85.74
WE/CAN 8.43 22.88 52.44
JANZ 1.35 6.87 18.34
SU/EE 19.12 34.10 65.25
ACENP 4.42 6.20 28.56
ME 7.32 7.59 8.55
AFR 22.12 23.01 34.19
LA 7.65 15.92 45.42
SEA 2.16 3.05 14.23
Unconventional Gas
Region All Periods
USA 26.0
WE/CAN 15.0
JANZ 2.0
SU/EE 40.0
ACENP 6.0
ME 41.0
AFR 11.0
LA 12.0
SEA 5.0
HCILT2 - The ultimate conversion add-on cost for
synfuels ($/GJ).
HCILT3 - The number of years to reach HCILT2.
Synoil in all regions:
HCILT2 = 6.00
HCILT3 = 35
Syngas in all regions:
HCILT2 = 4.50
HCILT3 = 40
-Case A page 4-
C-5
BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters. Price/share
combinations for waste and energy farms.
(Price=$/GJ)
Waste Energy Farms
Price Share Price Share
0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 1.0 3.0 0.5
0.0 1.0 5.0 1.0
0.0 1.0 5.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum biomass resource available in region L.
Region Waste Energy Farms
USA 2.89 10.0
WE/CAN 4.20 5.0
JANZ 1.43 0.0
SU/EE 4.61 10.0
ACENP 3.72 0.0
ME 0.52 0.0
AFR 3.02 20.0
LA 4.15 20.0
SEA 5.50 20.0
GLOBAL 30.04 85.0
-Case A page 5-
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Case B Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output coefficient of coal into primary
equivalent.
GCI = 1.50
TJKLM - Technological change parameter for end-use of
energy.
Arithmet ic progression
OECD Reg i ons Non-OECD Reg ions
Res/Com Ind Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by fuel I in
period M, region L
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000 = 0.0100
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025 = 0.2000
FLRL3 - The number of years to reach the ult imate flaring
rat e FLRL2. Note that f lared gas consists of t wo
portions: reinjected and burned.
Region FL RL3
ME 30
AFR 30
LA 20
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ultiriate
fract ion of flared gas which is burned.
Region SBURNL3
USA 1.0
Others 15.0
-Case B page 2-
C-7
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CIL2.
The following values are for all regions.
CIL2 CIL3
Coal 1.10 25
DILSET - Scale factor applied to the breakthrough price of
unconstrained fossil fuels in each region.
DILSET for WE/CAN = 5.0 (Other regions remain as in
the Base Case)
BESILM - Base quantity of unconstrained fuel I in region L,
period M. (EJ)
Coal
Region 2000 2025 2050
USA 25.00 35.00 50.00
WE/CAN 14.00 20.00 25.00
JANZ 6.00 10.00 20.00
SU/EE 30.00 40.00 50.00
ACENP 30.00 40.00 50.00
ME 0.10 0.50 1.00
AFR 8.00 18.00 35.00
LA 5.00 5.00 30.00
SEA 10.00 10.00 30.00
HCILT2 - The ult imate conversion add-on cost for
syrifuels ($/GJ).
HCILT3 - The number of years to reach HCILT2.
Synoil in all regions:
HCILT2 = 6.00
HCILT3 = 35
Syngas in all regions:
HCILT2 = 4.50
HCILT3 = 40
-Case B page 3-
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BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters. Price/share
combinat ions for waste and energy farms.
(Price=$/GJ)
Waste
Price Share
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
Energy Farms
Price Share
0.0 0..0
3.0 0.5
5.0 1.0
5.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum biomass resource available in region L.
Reg ion Wast e Energy Farms
USA 2. 89 10.0
WE/CAN 4.20 5.0
JANZ 1.43 0.0
SU/EE 4.61 10.0
ACENP 3.72 0.0
ME 0.52 0.0
AFR 3.02 20.0
LA 4.15 20.0
SEA 5.50 20.0
GLOBAL 30.04 85.0
-Case B page 4-
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Case C Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output
equivalent.
GCI = 1.50
coefficient of coal into primary
TJKLM - Technological change parameter for end-use of
energy.
Arithmetic progression
OECD Regions Non-OECD Regions
Res/Com Ind Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by fuel I in period
M, region L
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000 = 0.0100
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025 = 0.2000
RESIL - Total resource
after 1975 (EJ)
Region
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
GLOBAL
Oil
1106
513
20
1502
353
2135
702
702
207
7240
of conventional fuels in region L
Gas
791
544
79
1279
202
1044
398
451
187
4976
-Case C page 2-
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BIL - Year of peak production of conventional fuel in
region L.
Region 1 (USA)
Oil
1960.1
Gas
1960.0
EASTIM - Exogenous supplies of conventional oil and gas -in
the Middle East.
Oil
Gas
FLRL3 -
2000
35.0
10.6
2025
30.0
10.0
2050
30.0
10.0
The number of years to reach the ultimate flaring
rate FLRL2. Note that flared gas consists of two
portions: reinjected and burned.
Rea ion
ME
AFR
LA
FLRL3
30
30
20
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate
fraction of flared gas which is burned.
Region
USA
Others
SBURNL3
1.0
15.0
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CIL2.
The following values are f:r all regions.
CIL2 CIL3
Unconventional Oil 6.00 35 (CIL3=Base Case)
Unconventional Gas 4. 50 40
Coal 1.10 25
Nuclear 9.00 1.0
DILSET - Scale factor applied to the breakthrough price of
unconstrained fossil fuels in each region.
DILSET for WE/CAN = 5.0 (Other regions remain as in
the Base Case)
-Case C page 3-
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BESILM - Base quantity of
period M. (EJ)
Unconventional Oil
Region 2000
USA 10.75
WE/CAN 8.43
JANZ 1.35
SU/EE 19.12
ACENP 4.42
ME 7.32
AFR 22.12
LA 7.65
SEA 2.16
Coal
Reg i on
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
2000
25.00
14.00
6.00
30.00
30.00
0.10
8.00
5.00
10.00
unconstrained fuel I in region L,
2025
32.00
22.88
6.87
34.10
6.20
7.59
23.01
15.92
3.05
2025
35.00
20.00
10.00
40.00
40.00
0.50
18.00
5.00
10.00
2050
85.74
52.44
18.34
65.25
28.56
8.55
34.19
45.42
14.23
2050
50.00
25.00
20.00
50.00
50.00
1.00
35.00
30.00
30.00
HCILT2 - The ultimate conversion add-on cost for
synfuels ($/GJ).
HCILT3 - The number of years to reach HCILT2.
Synoil in all
Syngas in all
reg ions:
HCILT2 =
HCILT3 =
regions:
HCILT2 =
HCILT3 =
-Case C page 4-
6.00
,3=5
4.50
40
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BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters. Price/share
combinations for waste and energy farms.
(Price=$/GJ)
Waste
Price Share
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum
Region
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
GLOBAL
Energy Farms
Price Share
0.0 0.'0
3.0 0.5
5.0 1.0
5.0 1.0
biomass resource available in region L.
Waste
2.89
4.20
1.43
4.61
3.72
0.52
3.02
4.15
5.50
30. 04
Energy Farms
10. 0
5.0
0.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
20.0
20.0
20. 0
85.0
-Case C page 5-
C-13
Case D Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
SC I - Input-output coefficient
equivalent.
GCI = 1. 50
of coal into pr imary
TJKLM - Technological change parameter for end-use of
energy.
Arithmet ic progress ion
OECD Regions Non-OECD Regions
Res/Com Ind Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by fuel I in
period M, region L
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000 = 0.0100
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025 = 0.2000
FLRL3 - The number of years to reach the
rate FLRL2. Note that flared gas
port ions: reinjected and burned.
Reg i on
ME
AFR
LA
ultimate flaring
consists of two
FLRL3
30
30
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate
fraction of flared gas which is burned.
Reg ion
USA
Others
SBURNL3
1.0
15.0
Case D page 2
C-14
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CIL2.
The following values are for all regions.
CIL2 CIL3
Solar 9.50 35
HCILT2 - The ult imate conversion add-on cost for
synfuels ($/GJ).
HCILT3 - The number of years to reach HCILT2.
Synoil in all regions:
HCILT2 = 6.00
HCILT3 = 35
Syngas in all regions:
HCILT2 = 4.50
HCILT3 = 40
BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters.
combinat ions
(Pr ice=$/GJ)
for waste and ener
Price/share
gy farms.
Waste
Price Share
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum
Reg ion
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
GLOBAL
Energy Farms
Price Share
0.0 0.0
3. 0 0.5
5.0 1.0
5.0 1.0
biomass resource available in region L.
Waste
2.89
4.20
1.43
4.61
3.72
0.52
3.02
4. 15
5. 50
30.04
Energy Farms
10.0
5.V
0.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
20.0
20.0
20. 0
85.0
Case D page 3
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Case E Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output coefficient of coal
equivalent.
GCI = 1.50
TJKLM - Technological change parameter
into pr i mary
for end-use of
energy.
Arithmetic progression
OECD Regions Non-OECD Renions
Res/Com Ind Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01 0. 004
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by
M, region L
fuel I in period
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000 = 0.0100
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025 = 0.2000
RESIL - Total resource
after 1975 (EJ)
Region
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
GLOBAL
Oil
1106
513
20
1502
353
2135
702
702
207
7240
of conventional fuels in region L
Gas
791
544
79
1279
202
1044
398
451
187
4976
-Case E page 2-
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BIL - Year of peak production of conventional fuel
region L.
Region 1 (USA)
Oil
1960.1
Gas
1960.0
in
EASTIM - Exogenous supplies of conventional oil and gas in
the Middle East.
Oil
Gas
2000
35.0
10.6
2025
30.0
10.0
2050
30.0
10.0
FLRL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate flaring
rate FLRL2. Note that flared gas consists of two
portions: reinjected and burned.
Region
ME
AFR
LA
FLRL3
30
20
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate
fraction of flared gas which is burned.
Region
US A
Others
SBURNL3
1.0
15.0
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CIL2.
The following values
Unconventional Oil
Unconventional Gas
Coal
So1ar
are for all regions.
CIL2 CIL3
6.00 35 (CIL3=Base Case)
4.50 40
1.10 25
9.50 35
-Case E page 3-
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DILSET - Scale factor applied to the breakthrough price of
unconstrained fossil fuels in each region.
DILSET for WE/CAN = 5.0 (Other regions remain as in
the Base Case)
BESILM - Base quantity of unconstrained fuel I in region L,
period M. (EJ)
Unconventional Oil
Region 2000 2025 2050
USA 10.75 32.00 85.74
WE/CAN 8.43 22.88 52.44
JANZ 1.35 6.87 18.34
SU/EE 19.12 34.10 65.25
ACENP 4.42 6.20 28.56
ME 7.32 7.59 8.55
AFR 22.12 23.01 34.19
LA 7.65 15.92 45.42
SEA 2.16 3.05 14.23
Coal
Reqion 2000 2025 2050
USA 25.00 35.00 50.00
WE/CAN 14.00 20.00 25.00
JANZ. 6.00 10.00 20.00
SU/EE 30.00 40.00 50.00
ACENP 30.00 40.00 50.00
ME 0.10 0.50 1.00
AFR 8.00 18.00 35.00
LA 5.00 5.00 30.00
SEA 10.00 10.00 30.00
HCILT2 - The ult imate conversion add-on cost for
syrifuels (S/GJ).
HCILT3 - The number of years to reach HCILT2.
Synoil in all regions:
HCILT2 = 6.00
HCILT3 = 35
Syngas in all regions:
HCILT2 = 4.50
HCILT3 = 40
-Case E page 4-
BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters. Price/share
combinations for waste and energy farms.
(Price=$/GJ)
Waste
Price Share
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum
Region
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
GLOBAL
Energy Farms
Price Share
0.0 0.0
3.0 0.5
5.0 1.0
5.0 1.0
biomass resource available in region L.
Wast e
2.89
4.20
1.43
4.61
3.72
0.52
3.02
4.15
5.50
30.04
Energy Farms
10.0
5.0
0.0
10.0
0.0
0.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
85. 0
-Case E page 5-
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Case F Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output coefficient of coal into primary
equivalent.
GCI = 1.50
TJKLM - Technological change parameter for end-use of
energy.
OECE
Arithmet ic progression
Regions Non-OECD Regicons
Res/Com Ind Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by fuel I in period
M, region L
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000 = 0.0100
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025 = 0.2000
RESIL - Total resource
after 1975 (EJ)
Reg ion
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEp
GLOBAL
Oil
1106
513
20
1502
353
2135
702
702
207
7240
of conventional fuels in region L
Gas
791
544
79
1279
202
1044
398
451
187
4976
-Case F page 2-
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BIL - Year of peak production of conventional fuel
region L.
Region 1 (USA)
Oil
1960.1
in
Gas
1960.0
EASTIM - Exogenous supplies of conventional oil and gas in
the Middle East.
oil
Gas
2000
35.0
10.6
2025
30.0
10.0
2050
30.0
10. 0
FLRL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate flaring
rate FLRL2. Note that flared gas consists of two
port ions: reinjected and burned.
Reg i on
ME
AFR
LA
FLRL3
30
30
20
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate
fraction of flared gas which is burned.
Reg ion
USA
Others
SBURNL3
1.0
15.0
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CIL2.
The following values are for all regions.
CIL2 CIL3
Unconventional Oil 6.00 35 (CIL3=Base Case)
Unconventional Gas 4.50 40
Coal 1.10 25
Nuclear 9.00 1.0
Solar 20.00 35
-Case F page 3-
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DILSET - Scale factor applied to the breakthrough price of
unconstrained fossil fuels in each region.
DILSET for WE/CAN = 5.0 (Other regions remain as in
the Base Case)
BESILM - Base quantity of unconstrained fuel I in region L,
period M. (EJ)
Unconventional Oil
Region 2000 2025 2050
USA 10.75 32.00 85.74
WE/CAN 8.43 22.88 52.44
JANZ 1.35 6.87 18.34
SU/EE 19.12 34.10 65.25
ACENP 4.42 6.20 28.56
ME 7.32 7.59 8.55
AFR 22.12 23.01 34.19
LA 7.65 15.92 45.42
SEA 2.16 3.05 14.23
Coal
Reqion 2000 2025 2050
USA 25.00 35.00 50.00
WE/CAN 14.00 20.00 25.00
JANZ 6.00 10.00 20.00
SU/EE 30.00 40.00 50.00
ACENP 30.00 40.00 50.00
ME 0.10 0.50 1.00
AFR 8.00 18.00 35.00
LA 5.00 5.00 30.00
SEA 10.00 10.00 30.00
HCILT2 - The ult imate corversionr add-on cost for
syrifuels ($/GJ).
HCILT3 - The number of years to: reach HCILT2.
Synoil in all regions:
HCILT2 = 6.00
HCILT3 = 35
Syngas in all regions:
HCILT2 = 4.50
HCILT3 = 40
-Case F page 4-
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BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters. Price/share
combinations for waste and energy farms.
(Price=$/GJ)
Waste,
Price Share
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
Energy Farms
Price Share
0.0 0.0
3.0 0.5
5.0 1.0
5.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum biomass resource available in region L.
Reg i on Wast e Enerny Farms
USA 2.89 10.0
WE/CAN 4.20 5.0
JANZ 1.43 0.0
SU/EE 4.61 10.0
ACENP 3.72 0.0
ME 0.52 0.0
NFR 3.02 20.0
LA 4.15 20.0
SEA 5.50 20.0
GLOBAL 30.04 85.0
-Case F page 5-
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Case H Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output coefficient of coal into primary
equivalent.
GCI = 1.50
TJKLM - Technological change parameter for end-use of
energy.
Arithmetic progression
OECD Regions
Res/Com Ird Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01
Non-OECD Regions
0.004
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by
M, region L
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025
fuel I in period
= 0.0100
= 0.2000
RESIL - Tottal resource of convent ional fuels in regi on L
after 1975 (EJ)
Reg ior Oil Gas
USA 1106 791
WE/CAN 513 544
JANZ 20 79
SU/EE 1502 1279
ACENP 353 202
ME- 2135 1044
AFR 702 398
LA 702 451
SEA 207 187
GLOBAL 7240 4976
-Case H page 2-
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BIL - Year of peak production of conventional fuel in
region L.
Region 1 (USA)
Oil
1960.1
Gas
1960.0
EASTIM - Exogenous supplies of conventional oil and gas in
the Middle East.
Oil
Gas
2000
35.0
10.6
2025
30.0
10.0
2050
30.0
10.0
FLRL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate flaring
rate FLRL2. Note that flared gas consists of two
port ions: reinjected and burned.
Reg i on
ME
AFR
LA
FLRL3
30
30
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ult imate
fraction of flared gas which is burned.
Region
USA
Others
SBURNL3
1.0
15.0
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CILE.
The following values are for all regions.
CIL2 CIL3
Unconventional Oil 6.00 35 (CIL23=Base Case)
Unconvent ional Gas 4. 50 40
Coal 1.10 25
Nuclear 100.00 50
Solar 9.50 35
-Case H page 3-
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DILSET - Scale factor applied to the breakthrough price of
unconstrained fossil fuels in each region.
DILSET for WE/CAN = 5.0 (Other regions remain as in
the Base Case)
BESILM - Base quantity of
period M. (EJ)
unconstrained fuel I in region L,
Unconventional Oi 1
Reg i :'i
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
Coal
Reg ion
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
2000
10.75
8.43
1.35
19.12
4.42
7.32
22.12
7.65
2.16
2000
25.00
14.00
6.00
30.00
30. 00
0.10
8.00
5.00
10.00
2025
32.00
22.88
6.87
34.10
6.20
7.59
23.01
15.92
3.05
2025
35. 00
20.00
10.00
40.00
40.00
0.50
18.00
5.00
10.00
2050
85.74
52.44
18.34
65.25
28.56
8.55
34.19
45.42
14.23
2050
50.00
25.00
20.00
50.00
50.00
1.00
35.00
30.00
30.00
HCIt.T2 - The ult imate conversion add-on cost for
synifuels ($/GJ).
HCILT3 - The rumber of years to reacn HCILT2.
Synil in all
Syngas in all
reg i rs:
HCILT2 =
HCILT3 =
reg ions:
HCILT2 =
HCILT3 =
-Case H page 4-
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4.50
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BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters. Price/share
combinations for waste and energy farms.
(Price=$/GJ)
Waste Energy Farms
Price Share Price Share
0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 1.0 3.0 0.5
0.0 1.0 5.0 1.0
0.0 1.0 5.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum bioriass resource available in region L.
Req i on Waste Energqy Farms
USA 2.89 10.0
WE/CAN 4.20 5.0
JANZ 1.43 0.0
SU/EE 4.61 10.0
ACENP 3.72 0.0
ME 0.52 0.0
AFR 3.02 20.0
LA 4.15 20.0
SEA 5.50 20.0
GLOBAL 30.04 85.0
-Case H page 5-
C-27
Case J Incuts
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output coefficient of coal
eq u i va 1 ent.
GCI = 1.50
into primary
TJKLM - Technological change parameter for end-use of
energy.
Geometric progression
OECD Reqions
Res/Corn Ind Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01
Non-OECD Reqicons
0.01
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by fuel
M, region L
I in period
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000 = 0.0100
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025 = 0.2000
RESIL - Total resource of conventional fuels in region L
after 1975 (EJ)
Region
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
GLOBAL
Oil
1106
513
20
150 '=-
353
2135
702
702
207
7240
Gas
791
544
79
1279
1044
398
451
187
4976
-Case J page 2-
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BIL - Year of peak production of conventional fuel in
region L.
Region 1 (USA)
Oil
1960.1
Gas
1960.0
EASTIM - Exogenous supplies of conventional oil and gas in
the Middle East.
Oil
Gas
2000
37.0
10.6
2025
0.0
10.0
2050
0.0
10.0
FLRL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate flaring
rate FLRL2. Note that flared gas consists of two
port ions: reinjected and burned.
Reg ion
ME
AFR
FLRL3
30
30
20
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate
fraction of flared gas which is burned.
Region
USA
Others
SBURNL3
1.0
15.0
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CIL2.
The following values
Unconventional O i 1
Unconventional Gas
Coal
So 1 ar
are for all regions.
CIL6 CIL3
7.00 35 (CIL3=Base Case)
4.50 40
1.10 25
9500 35
-Case J page 3-
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DILSET - Scale factor applied to the breakthrough price of
unconstrained fossil fuels in each region.
DILSET for WE/CAN = 5.0 (Other regions remain as in
the Base Case)
BESILM - Base quantity of unconstrained fuel I in region L,
period M. (EJ)
Unconventional Oil
Reqion 2000 2025 2050
USA 10.75 32.00 85.74
WE/CAN 8.43 22.88 52.44
JANZ 1.35 6.87 18.34
SU/EE 19.12 34.10 65.25
ACENP 4.42 6.20 28.56
ME 7.32 7.59 8.55
AFR 22.12 23.01 34.19
LA 7.65 15.92 45.42
SEA 2.16 3.05 14.23
Coal
Region 2000 2025 2050
USA 25.00 35.00 50.00
WE/CAN 14.00 20.00 25.00
JANZ 6.00 10.00 20.00
SU/EE 30.00 40.00 50.00
ACENP 30.00 40.00 50.00
ME 0.10 0.50 1.00
AFR 8.00 18.00 35.00
LA 5.00 5.00 30.00
SEA 10.00 10.00 30.00
HCILT2 - The .tlt imate conversion add-or cost for
syrifuels ($/GJ).
HCILT3 - The number of years to reach HCILT3.
Synoil in all regions:
HCILT2 = 6.00
HCILT3 = 35
Syngas in all regions:
HCILT2 = 4.50
HCILT3 = 40
-Case J page 4-
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BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters. Price/share
combinations for waste and energy farms.
(Price=$/GJ)
Waste
Price Share
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum
Reg i on
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AF R
LA
SEA
GLOBAL
Energy Farms
Price Share
0.0 0.0
3.0 0.5
5.0 1.0
5.0 1.0
biomass resource available in region L.
Wast e
2.89
4.20
1. 43
4.61
3.72
0.52
3.02
4.15
5. 50
30.04
Enerqv Farms
10.0
5.0
0. 0
10.0
0.0
0.0
20. 0
20.0
20. 0
85.0
-Case J page 5-
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Case K Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output coefficient of coal into primary
equivalent.
GCI = 1.50
TJKLM - Technological change parameter for end-use of
energy.
Geometric progression
OECD Regions Non-OECD Regicons
Res/Com Iid Tran
0.0 0.01 0.0 0.004
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CIL2.
The following values are for all regions.
CIL2 CIL3
Nuclear 14.85 50
BESILM - Base quant ity of unconstrained fuel I in region L,
period M. (EJ)
Unconventional Oil
Region 2000 2025 20,50
USA 3.57 15.8 41.2
WE/CAN 2.57 11.4 26.6
JANZ 1.13 5.0 11.8
SU/EE 2.65 11.7 27.5
ACENP 0.28 1.8 15.1
ME 0.15 0.4 1.3
AFR 0.15 1.0 8.4
LA 1.55 7.1 22.7
SEA 0.15 1.0 8.4
-Case K page 2-
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BESILM continued
Coal
Region 2000 2025 2050
USA 32.00 51.10 88.20
WE/CAN 14.60 22.30 33.90
JANZ 7.50 19.10 38.20
SU/EE 30.20 47.80 68.40
ACENP 28.60 62.00 94.00
ME 0.15 0.90 2.10
AFR 8.75 18.80 41.90
LA 2.80 15.30 38.90
SEA 7.10 25.90 55.90
-Case K page 3-
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Case L Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output coefficient of coal
equivalent.
GCI = 1.50
TJKLM - Technological change parameter
energy.
i n t o pr i rlary
for end-use of
Geometric progression
OECD Regions
Res/Com Ind Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01
Non-OECD Rem ions
0.01
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by fuel I in period
M, region L
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000 = 0.0100
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025 = 0.2000
RESIL - Total resource
after 1975 (EJ)
Regtion
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
GLOBAL
Qi 1
1106
513
20
1502
353
2135
702
702
207
7240
of convent ional fuels in region L
Gas
791
544
79
1279
202
1044
398
451
187
4976
-Case L page 2-
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BIL - Year of peak production of conventional fuel in
region L.
Region 1 (USA)
Oil
1960.1
Gas
1960.0
EASTIM - Exogenous supplies of conventiional oil and gas in
the Middle East.
Oil
Gas
2000
35.0
10.6
2025
30.0
10.0
2050
30.0
10.0
FLRL3 - The number of years to reach the ult imate flaring
rate FLRL2. Note that flared gas consists of two
port ions: reinjected and burned.
Region
ME
AFR
LA
FLRL3
30
30
20
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate
fraction of flared gas which is burned.
Region
USA
Others
SBURNL3
1.0
15.0
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CIL2.
The following values
Unconventional Oi 1
Unconvent ional Gas
Coal
Solar
ar'e for all regions.
CIL2 CIL3
6.00 35 (CIL3=Base Case)
4.50 40
1.10 75
9500 35
-Caae, L page 3-
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DILSET - Scale factor applied to the breakthrough price of
unconstrained fossil fuels in each region.
DILSET for WE/CAN = 5.0 (Other regions remain as in
the Base Case)
BESILM - Base quantity of unconstrained fuel I in region L,
period M. (EJ)
Unconventional Oil
Region All periods
USA 10.75
WE/CAN 8.43
JANZ 1.35
SU/EE 19.12
ACENP 4.42
ME 7.32
AFR 22. 12
LA 7.65
SEA 2.16
Coa 1
Req i on
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
2000
25.00
14.00
6.00
30.00
30. 00
0.10
8.00
5.00
10.00
2025
35.00
20.00
10.00
40.00
40.00
0.50
18.00
5.00
10.00
2050
50.00
25.00
20.00
50.00
50.00
1.00
35.00
30.00
30.00
HCILT2 - The ult imate conversion add-or cost for
synfuels ($/GJ).
HCILT3 - The number of years to reach HCILTE.
Synoil in all
Syngas in all
reg 1 ons:
HCILT2 =
HCILT3 =
regions:
HCILT2 =
HCILT3 =
-Case L page 4-
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BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters. Price/share
combinations for waste and energy farms.
(Price=$/GJ)
Waste
Price Share
0.0 1.0,
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
0.0 1.0
Energy Farms
Price Share
0.0 0.0
3.0 0.5
5.0 1.0
5.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum biomass resource available in region L.
Region Waste Energy Farms
USA 2.89 10.0
WE/CAN 4.20 5.0
JANZ 1.43 0.0
SU/EE 4.61 10.0
ACENP 3.72 0.0
ME 0.52 0.0
AFR 3.02 20.0
LA 4.15 20.0
SEA 5.50 20.0
GLOBAL 30.04 85.0
-Case L page 5-
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Case M Inputs
RYJK - Non OECD income elasticity.
Region 4 (SU/EE) = 1.00
Regions 5-9 (LDC's) = 1.40
RY - Feedback elasticity of energy prices on GNP.
RY = -0.10
GCI - Input-output coefficient of coal into primary
equivalent.
GCI = 1.50
TJKLM - Technological change parameter for end-use of
energy.
Geometric progression
OECD Regions
Res/Com Ind Tran
0.01 0.01 0.01
Non-OECD Regions
0.01
BSUILM - Share of electricity generated by fuel I in period
M, region L
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2000 = 0.0100
For solar in Region 5 (ACENP) in year 2025 = 0.2000
RESIL - Total resource
after 1975 (EJ)
Region
USA
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
GLOBAL
Oi_ 1
1106
513
20
1502
353
2135
702
702
207
7240
of conventional fuels in region L
Gas
791
544
79
1279
202
1044
398
451
187
4976
-Caa M page 2-
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BIL - Year of peak production of conventional fuel in
region L.
OilI Gas
Region 1 (USA) 1960.1 1960.0
EASTIM - Exogenous supplies of conventional oil and gas in
the Middle East.
2000 2025 2050
Oil 37.0 0.0 0.0
Gas 10.6 10.0 10.0
FLRL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate flaring
rate FLRL2. Note that flared gas consists of two
port ions: reinjected and burned.
Region FLRL3
ME 30
AFR 30
LA 20
SBURNL3 - The number of years to reach the ultimate
fraction of flared gas which is burned.
Region SBURNL3
USA 1.0
Others 15.0
CIL2 - The ultimate breakthrough price of fuel I in region
L.
CIL3 - The number of years to reach CIL2.
The following valuAes are for all regions.
CIL2 CIL-
Unconventional Oil 6.00 35 (CIL3=Base Case)
Unconvent ional Gas 4. 50 40
Coal 1.10 25
Solar 9.50 35
DILSET - Scale factor applied to the breakthrough price of
unconstrained fossil fuels in each region.
DILSET for WE/CAN = 5.0 (Other regions remain as in
the Base Case)
-Case M page 3-
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BESILM - Base quantity of unconstrained fuel I in region L,
period M. (EJ)
Unconventional Oil
For all periods in
Coal
Req i on
USA -.
WE/CAN
JANZ
SU/EE
ACENP
ME
AFR
LA
SEA
2000
25.00
14.00
6.00
30.00
30.00
0.10
8.00
5.00
10.00
all regions =
2025
17.00
10.00
3.00
25.00
15.00
0.10
2.00
1.00
3.00
2050
10.00
5.00
1.50
12.50
7.50
0.10
1.00
0.50
1.50
HCILT2 - The ultimate conversion add-on cost for
synfuels ($/GJ).
HCILT3 - The number of years to reach HCILT2.
Synoil in all
Syngas in all
regions:
HCILT2 = 6.00
HCILT3 = 35
reg i ons:
HCILT2 = 4.50
HCILT3 = 40
-Case M page 4-
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BIOPSM - Biomass supply schedule parameters. Price/share
combinat ions for waste and energy farms.
(Price=$/GJ)
Waste Energy Farms
Price Share Price Share
0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 1.0 3.0 0.5
0.0 1.0 5.0 1.0
0.0 1.0 5.0 1.0
BIOLM - Maximum biomass resource available in region L.
Region Waste Energy Farms
USA 2.89 10.0
WE/CAN 4.20 5.0
JPNZ 1.43 0.0
SU/EE 4.61 10.0
ACENP 3.72 0.0
ME 0.52 0.0
AFR 3.02 20.0
LA 4.15 20.0
SEA 5.50 20.0
GLOBAL 30.04 85.0
-Case N page 5-
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APPENDIX D
GLOBAL PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTIONS
IN THE MIT/IEA SCENARIOS, AND SPECIFIED
CARBON EMISSIONS IN SELECTED CASES.
DATA FROM COLOMBO AND BERNARDINI, LOVINS,
AND IIASA SHOWN FOR COMPARISON.
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&JAL PRIMRY EERYY CEMPTICN (EJ/yr = Q/yr = 8.831 TW)
A AVERE Wti. RATES (EJ/yr per year)
BY EERMY SOURCE FOR CSES: D, E, F
Source Year
1975
oil
Gas
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
Source
Oil
Gas
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
ydro
Total
Source
Oil
Gas
Coal
Synfuel
uclear
Solar
Ryero
48.3
72.3
8.6
3.8
8.8
16.8
263.8
Year
1975
1im 6
48.3
72.3
8.
3.8
8.8
16.8
263.8
Year
1975
122.6
48.3
72.3
8.8
3.8
8.8
16.8
Total 263.8
C A S E D
Rate Rate Rate
Between 2W Between 2825 Between 2058
1.24 153.6 -8. 46 142.2 2.88 192.2
1.42 819 1.88 188.9 -8.84 87.9
3.15 151.1 4.82 251.6 5.85 377.9
8.8 .1 8.66 16.6 1.65 57.9
8.88 25.8 1.87 72.5 2.41 132.7
8.83 .7 1.28 327 1.81 57.9
2.29 57.3 1.36 91.4 1.18 118.9
9.82 472.5 9.74 715.9 12.38 1825.4
CASE E
Rate Rate Rate
Between 2M Between 225 Between 2858
-1.52 84.7 8.7 86.5 1.29 118.7
-. 15 44.5 8.26 51.1 8.51 63.9
2.88 122.3 8.25 128.5 1.62 168.9
8.13 3.3 1.44 39.2 1.88 64.1
1.78 48.2 3.28 138.1 3.46 216.7
8.85 1.2 2.29 58.4 1.44 94.5
2.27 56.7 1.% 185.6 8.56 119.5
4.56 368.9 9.54 599.4 9.88 846.3
CASE F
Rate Rate Rate
Between 29H Between Between 2058
-1.42 87.2 8.58 181.7 1.66 143.2
-4.13 45.1 8.27 51.9 8.83 72.6
2.14 125.7 8.81 145.9 2.17 28.2
8.18 2.6 1.67 44.3 1.17 73.6
8.98 2.3 2.74 96.8 2.68 161.9
8.81 .3 8.46 11.7 8.29 18.9
2.27 56.7 1.43 92.4 1.18 119.8
3.% 345.9 7.95 544.7 9.82 79.2
D-4
G.. PRIMRY E)NEY CCNS.MTICN (EJ/yr = Q/yr = .831 TW)
A AVEM *W80L RATES (EJ/yr per year)
BY B Y SCURE FOR CAES: H, J,K
C A S E H
Source
Total 263.8
Year
1975
Oil
Gas
coal
Synfuel
4uclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
Source
Oil
sas
Coal
Synfuel
Nclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
Source
Oil
Gas
Coal
Synfuel
*clear
Solar
Hydro
122.6
48.3
72.3
.6
3.8
.6
16.6
263.8
Year
1975
122.6
48.3
72.3
.8
3.8
.8
16.1
263.1
Year
1975
122.6
48.3
72.3
.
3.8
.0
16.6
Rate Rate Rate
Between 2W Between 2825 Between 2950
-1.33 89.3 6.63 185.1 1.76 149.2
-4.11 45.5 8.26 51.9 8.89 74.2
2.47 134.1 .62 149.5 2.34 298.1
.12 3.1 1.67 44.9 1.17 74.1
-L .s 1.9 -&.87 .2 L.0 .2
.67 1.8 3.92 99.7 2.55 163.4
2.27 56.7 1.44 92.6 1.89 119.9
3.42 3. 4 8. 46 543.9 9.81 789.1
C A S E J
Rate Rate Rate
Between 29M Between 29 Between 258
-1.74 79.1 -1.18 49.5 -4.82 29.1a
-4.18 43.7 .38 53.3 8.29 58. 3
1.49 169.5 --. 31 161.7 . 42 112.1
.39 2.2 1.62 42.8 1.54 81.4
1.61 44.1 2.81 94.3 1.44 131.4
.84 1.1 1.66 42.6 8.57 %.8
2.26 56.6 1.36 96.7 .40 188.8
3.57 336.3 5.54 474.3 3.76 568.9
CASE K
Rate Rate Rate
Beten 2m Betwee 282 Between 2O5
1.24 153.6 -2.52 9.6 -1.79 45.8
1.36 82.2 1.26 113.6 8.22 119.2
3.81 147.6 1.87 194.3 2.38 251.8
.25 6.3 4.14 189.8 7.14 238.4
.62 19.3 8.97 43.5 .18 47.9
2.29 .1 .57 14.3 .41 29.3
2.29 57. 2 1.36 91.3 &.41 181.5
8. 77 466.3 7.64 657,.4 9.86 W8. 9
D-5
.. PWIlWY timby u uPiall tti/yr = U/yr = V.31 TW)
AD AVFJGE FNRUI. RTES (EJ/yr/yr)
BY EMCiY SMCE FOR CASES: A, B, C
CASE L
Source
oil
Gas
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
Source
Oil
Gas
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Year
1975
122.6
48.3
72.3
9.8
3.8
.8
16.8
263.
Year
1975
122.6
48.3
72.3
8.8
3.8
8.8
16.9
Total 263.8
Average Average Average
EJ/yr/yr EJ/yr/yr EJ/yr/yr
Between 28M8 Between 2025 Between 258
-1.82 77.1 -8.22 71.6 8.81 , 71.8
--. 24 42.3 8.26 48.8 -0.19 44.1
3.88 149.2 -. 42 138.8 -. 76 119.8
8.12 3.1 1.41 38.4 9.71 56.2
1.18 33.4 2.83 84.2 2.08 136.1
8.84 .9 1.49 38.1 0.85 59.3
2.26 56.4 1.36 90.4 6.44 181.3
4.62 362.4 5.92 518.3 3.13 588.6
CASE N
Average Average Average
EJ/yr/yr EJ/yr/yr EJ/yr/yr
Between 20W8 Between 2825 Betwee 295
-1.82 77.2 -8.28 78.3 -0.39 68.6
-. 18 43.7 0.26 58.3 8.28 55.4
1.49 109.5 -9.94 m.9 -. 86 64.3
8.89 2.3 8.84 23.3 8.18 27.7
1.61 44.1 2.33 182.4 1.91 150.1
8.84 1.1 1.88 46.2 0.77 65.5
2.27 56.7 1.38 91.2 8.44 182.1
3.58 334.6 5.40 469.6 2.24 525.7
D-6
&JL PRIMARY DENY CDNSUPTION (EJ/yr = 9/yr = .531 TW)
AM AVERME MM RTES (EJ/yr per year)
BY DERSY SURCE FOR CM & ERNADINI AND LVINS, ET. FL
C39m & BE MINI
Year
1975
oil
6as
Coal
Synfuel
Muclear
Solar
Hydro
Other
Total
Source
oil
Gas
Coal
Synfuel
Nclear
Solar
Hydro
Other
122.6
48.3
72.3
6.8
3.8
8.6
16.8
.6
253.6
Year
1975
122.6
48.3
72.3
.6
3.8
6.
16.8
.6
Total 263.8
Rate Rate
Between 288 Between 2638
.55 136.3 -0.72 114.6
6.97 72.6 6.23 79.4
1.68 112.3 1.16 147.2
0.0 .8 6.88 6.8
1.32 36.8 2.73 118.7
6.16 2.6 .13 6.4
6.31 23.7 L.32 33.3
6.21 5.1 .21 11.5
5.6 389.4 4.6 511.1
LDINS, ETA.
Rate Rate
Between 2 Between 2838
-2.64 56.6 -1.63 7.7
6.88 48.3 -1.25 1.8
-. 63 56.5 -1.48 12.2
8 8 I 8 N .6
-0.15 .6 a .6s 8.6
1.44 36.1 1.14 78.2
.18 2.5 L.52 36.1
6.34 8.5 6.73 38.3
-1.46 226.5 -1.97 167.3
GLOBAL PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION (EJ per YEAR) in year 2125
A S C D [ F H J K L M
MIT/lEA CASES
F a Fossil Fuels
N = Nonfossil
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LOVINS. et al.
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APPENDIX E
MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
AND FOR THE MIT/IEA SCENARIOS
E-2
Summary Table 7.1 of the main text was the result of a literature
search and, in part, an industry survey. The data obtained from the
research is contained in Tables E.1 through E.5. The sources cited in
the tables are listed at the end of this Appendix.
One source cited in all the tables is John Holdren, co-author of
Environmental Aspects of Renewable Energy Sources. 1Holdren, along with
co-authors Gregory Morris and Irving Mintzer, has compiled a table of
materials used for construction of energy facilities. Their table contains
an extensive list of references verifying the range of values given. From
examination of the table, it can be seen that the ranges of materials needed
for nonrenewable technologies are much smaller than those for renewables.
This is due to the fact that the nonrenewable technologies are well estab-
lished, thus the values given are more accurate, whereas many of the values
given for technologies such as solar and wind are estimations. As mentioned
by Mintzer 2, many of the values given (most likely the upper bounds of the
ranges) are for plausible system designs, but not necessarily efficient
designs. Thus tables D.2 - D.5 are a compilation of data obtained from
additional research to more accurately determine material requirements
for solar photovoltaics, LWR-fission, wind energy conversion, and
hydroelectric technologies.
Although the values chosen for Table 7.1 were selected from within
the ranges specified in Tables E.1 - E.5, emphasis was placed on the source
of the data. For example, in Table E.2 many of the values taken from
Holdren are estimates whereas the information from ARCO Solar are actual
E-3
working values. Similarly in Table E.3, data from Windtech, Energy
Sciences, and Hamilton Standard are actual working values. Furthermore,
the information obtained from DOE was developed and verified by
technical specialists in the Technology Assessment Division, Office of
Environmental Assessments, who conducted a survey of the respective
industry.
Another aspect considered was larger energy facilities tend to be
less material intensive. Thus while attempting to be conservative and
select higher values of material requirements, we were influenced by the
idea of large central utilities for solar photovoltaics and large wind
farms. But the notions of small nuclear power plants (about 200 MW ()
and small-head hydro influenced us towards higher values.
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Table E.1 Material Requirements from Holdreni
(106 metric tons per EJ/yr)
Energy System Steel Concretea Nonferrouab
Coal Electricc 1.1-2.0 4.5-6.6 0.03
Synfuelad 0.4-0.8 0-60.0
Biomasse 0.2-8.1 1.5-20.1
*Data not available
aConcrete is a mixture of sand, gravel, water, and cement.
Cement is approximately 20% of the total mass.
bNonferrous refers mainly to aluminum and copper.
CThe data are for 900 to 1000 MW(e). Load factor is 0.7.
dFrom coal only. Range covers five types of gasification and
liquefaction plants.
eFor fluid fuel. Range covers four types of biomass
conversion plants and facility sizes from 103 to 106 GJ per year
plant. Larger individual facilities require fewer materials per
unit energy produced.
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Table E.2 Solar Photovoltaic Material Requirements
(106 metric tons per EJ/yr)
Source.
Holdren
MITRE 1980
Kreider
Sandia
GE 1977
ARCO Solare
Steela Concreteb Nonferrousc
0-36.0 4.2-480.0
13-21.0
*
*
4.5
210.0
400.0
210.0
*
*
0-54.0
2.5-3.5
59.Od
Glass
2.4-14.1
12.0-17.0
5.3
0
422.0 18.2
*
*Data not available.
aSteel and aluminum are substitutable as construction
materials.
bConcrete is a mixture of sand, gravel, water, and cement.
Cement is approximately 20% of the total mass.
cNonferrous refers mainly to aluminum and copper.
dThis value refers to aluminum only.
eData refers to the 1 MW plant installed February 1983, in
Hesperia, California.
Silicon
0
*
*
<0.1
1.8
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Table E.3 LWR-fission Material Requirements
(106 metric tons per EJ/yr)
Source
Holdrenc
DOE 1980
MITRE 1980
Kreider
DOE 1980d
Steel
1.2-1.8
3.3
2.0
2.4
0.7-0.9
Concrete4
7.5-12.0
23.3
3.0-8.0
13.4
1.0-1.4
Nonferrousb
0.01
0.13
*
*
0.02-0.03
*Data not available.
eConcrete is a mixture of sand, gravel, water, and cement.
Cement is approximately 26% of the total mass.
bNonferrous refers mainly to aluminum and copper.
cUnit size for LWR's is 1000 MW(e). Load factor is 0.7.
dThese values are total material requirements for the follow-
ing uranium processes: mining, milling, conversion, enrichment,
and fabrication.
E-7
Table E.4 Wind Energy Conversion Material Requirements
(106 metric tons per EJ/yr)
Source Steel Concretea Nonferrousb
Holdrenc 3.6-25.0 5.7-33.0 0.2-0.9
DOE 1980 5.3-17.0 20.8-52.8 0.1-0.2d
MITRE 1980 3.0-5.0 30.0-35.0 1.5
Windteche a 80.0-100.0
Energy Sciencesf 2.4 41.7
Hamilton Standard9  7.4 34.0 a
*Data not available.
aConcrete is a mixture of sand, gravel, water, and cement.
Cement is approximately 20% of the total mass.
bNonferrous refers mainly to aluminum and copper.
CLow figure for windmill of 4 MW(e) rated capacity, operating
with load factor of 0.34. Higher figures cover a range of unit
sizes from 5 kw(e) to 4 MW(e) and a range of capacity factors.
dThese values refer to copper only.
eThese values are for a 70 kw wind turbine.
fThese values are for an 85 kw wind turbine.
9 These values are for a 4000 kw wind turbine.
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Table E.5 Hydroelectric Material Requirements
(106 metric tons per EJ/yr)
Source Steel Concrete4  Nonferrouab
Holdrenc 1.4-3.6 21.9-330.0 0-0.02
DOE 1980 4.0 43.0 0.2
aConcrete is a mixture of sand, gravel, water, and cement.
Cement is approximately 20X of the total mass.
bNonferrous refers mainly to aluminum and copper.
cLow values for a single 200 MW(e) dam.
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ERAE AWRL. MTERIAL RGUIRDENTS FRCM 2M to 22 +
(Thousands of metric tons per year)
I I A S A L 0 W
steel
S
234
18355
4400
2345
19129
ccrrete nonferrous
*
6219
462M
4aese
I
182
518
6600
134
733
glass
264
2F46
silicon
6
396
I I A S A H IG H
steel
81
4182
1625
8400
2345
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
concrete nonferrous,
297
4m
16
299
846
12695
134
13M6
+ Values don't include requireents
* Data not available.
- Relatively insignificant.
for replaceent plants.
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
glass
5646
5540
silicon
756
756
" - hig_ _. 11. _._.. ,, _1 lii n i i i i 1- --
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VRAE MRA. MATERIA REJIREENTS FRCN 2M to 225 +
(Thousards of metric tons per year)
COLOMBO & BERNAD INI
steel
1748
a
26
1129
12285
concrete nonferrous
63886
4956
2738
192
93839
35
341
39
64
4348
glass
0
1568
1568
silicon
-
234
234
LOV INS, ET AL.
concrete nonferros
239406
31296
342W
184
glass
I
13688
1368
silicon
S
S
2052
2952
* Values do not include requireents for replacmnt plants.
- Rlatively insignificant.
Source
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
Source
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
steel
I
I
S
22866
12M
2462
E-11
VERE ]AMR. MTERIA. REOURE1 f FRCX 2M to 225 +
(Thousands of metric tons per year)
C A S E
steel
S4
1898
3750
7686
4865
23745
concrete nonferrous
29688
*
798M8
8348
113
95
188
11486
278
12873
C A S E
steel
1875
126
95M6
68
497
25871
concrete nonferrous
6875
*
57W88
93M
852M
239375
38
6
475
129M
284
1373
C A S E
A
glass
4568
4568
silicon
684
684
B
glass
5168
5168
silicon
774
774
C
concrete nonferrous
4235
*
39459
13238
8588
261785
23
5.
329
1898
286
19588
glass
7568
7568
silicon
1134
1134
Values do not include requirements for replacement plants.
Data not available
Relatively insignificant
Source
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Total
steel
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
1155
6575
126M8
5M653
2a37
+
*
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QWUME AWNA. MTERIA REWIRENTS FRCN 2M to 292 +
(Thousands of metric tons per year)
C A S E
steel
6838
3%6
4675
25688
4768
41461
concrete nonferrous
22118
28858
81686
4W8568
121
28
234
3848
272
39M6
C A S E
steel
375
864
82"8
458M
6868
62999
concrete nonferrous
1375
492m8
489
11768M
64975
8
43
410
68780
392
69553
C A S E
D
glass
15368
15368
silicon
2384
2384
E
glass
27486
27488
silicon
4122
4122
F
coIcrete nonferrous
4455
411W8
96608
85888
glass silicon
24
58
343
138M
236
145S3
Values do not include requirents for replacement plants.
Data not available.
Relatively insignificant.
Source
Coal
Synfuul
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
SoWc
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
steel
1215
685
Sao
5885
Soure
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydroa
Total
+
*I
.828
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AVEE NWAL MTERIAL REWIIEENTS FROM 29 to 2M5 +
(Thousards of etric tons per year)
C A S E
steel
938
784W
8572
conrete nonferrous
3419
*
823206
86400
913818
19
58
8
11760
288
117957
C A S E
steel
465
972
332M
4768
concrete nonfrrous
1785
*
30150
816m
462655
H
glass
I
4748
47948
silicon
W7M6
7856
J
glass silicon
9
5381
C A S E
19929
19929
K
2968
concrete nonferrous
lam
*
1455
11978
816Wl
226135
56
124
121
17138
272
17674
+ Values do not include requireents for
* Data not available.
- Relatively irsignificant.
replacment plants.
Source
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
Coal
Synful
Nuclear
Solar
yro
Total
steel
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
2885
2484
245
1140
4768
23874
glass
6848
6841
silicon
1826
lea
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AVERASE ANNUAL MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS FROM 2000 to 2025 +
(Thousands of metric tons per year)
C A S E
steel
0
846
5075
29800
4760
40481
concrete nonferrous
30450
312900
81600
424950
0
42
254
44700
272
45268
C A S E
steel
0
504
5825
36000
4830
47159
concrete nonferrous
*
34950
378000
82800
495750
L
glass
17880
17880
silicon
2682
2682
M
class
0
25
291
54000
276
54592
silicon
3240
3240
Source
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
Source
Coal
Synfuel
Nuclear
Solar
Hydro
Total
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APPENDIX F
A TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
RECIPROCAL ACCESS ACT,
REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER 8.4
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UNIFORM TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
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and
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RICHARD COSWAY, University of Washington, School of Law, Seattle, WA
98105
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UNIFORM TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
RECIPROCAL ACCESS ACT
Drafted, Approved and Recommended for Enactment
by the
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
and
UNIFOR1 LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA
Prefatory Note
In 1979. the Canadian Bar Association and the American Bar Association each
adopted a report prepared by a joint committee of the two Associations on "The
Settlement of International Disputes Between Canada and the United States of
America." One of the areas on which the report focussed was the equalization
of rights and remedies of citizens in Canada and the U.S.A. affected by pollution
emanating from the other jurisdiction. The Committee drafted enacting legisla-
tion on this topic. in treaty form, basing its draft upon the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development's Recommendation for the Implementation
of A Regime of Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to
Transfrontier Pollution.
The ABA-CBA Committee's Report suggested that a liaison group ought to be
established between the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, the two organizations in their
respective countries dedicated to the promotion of uniformity of law. The group
was to have a mandate covering review. co-ordination and drafting of legislation
on topics of mutual interest. The liaison committee was established in 1979 and
has held five meetings in Canada and the U.S. to discuss the drafting of a Trans-
boundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act.
Pollution is no respecter of artificial lines on maps. Damage can occur in one
jurisdiction from pollution produced in another jurisdiction. Reported caselaw
reveals many examples of this phenomenon. A discharge of waste into a river in
one jurisdiction can damage property in states downstream: see for example
Missouri v. Illinois, 26 S.Ct. 268, 200 U.S. 496, 50 L.Ed.2d 572 (1906). Smoke
can blow from one adjoining city to another: see for example Michie et al. v.
Great Lakes Steel Division. National Steel Corporation, 495 F.2d 213 (6th Circ.),
certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 310, 419 U.S. 997, 42 L.Ed.2d 270. Metal smelters can
generate pollutants that can travel into other jurisdictions: see for example The
Trail Smelter Arbitration. 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941) or Ducktown Sulphur,
Copper and Iron Company v. Barnes et al., 60 S.W. 593 (Teun.1900). At times,
pollution from a number of jurisdictions may contribute to the damage: see for
example Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. et al.. 91 S.Ct. 1005. 401 U.S. 493,
2S L.Ed.2d 256 (1971). Pollution crossing boundaries may take a variety of
forms ranging from simple escapes between adjacent land to immensely difficult
problems, such as acid rain and nuclear emissions whose very complexity renders
them as intractable to coherent policy or legislative treatment as they are to de-
finitive scientific analysis and explanation.
It is a generally recognized rule of law in the Anglo-American tradition that
actions for damages'for trespass. nuisance, or negligent injury in respect to lands
located in another state are local actions and may be brought only in the state
where the land is situated. This rule has been criticized, but most courts still
follow it. Its significance is that unless the alleged tortfeasor can be "found" in
the state where the injury took place, an action for damages is for all intents
and purposes precluded.
When only states of the United States are involved, the increasing number of
state long-arm statutes may reduce the significance of this rule because valid in
persounm jurisdiction over the defendant can be obtained under a long-arm stat-
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ute and judgment rendered, and that judgment is entitled to full faith and credit
within the United States. But even if a long-arm statute is involved, two suits
may be necesary-the first to obtain the judgment and a second in another state
to enforce the judgment. Furthermore, whether equitable relief will be granted
by the seconl state. is open to question.
If there is no long-arm statute, or it is not as extensive as it might be, and the
ptrospective defendant is not "found" within the jurisdiction where the injury oe-
eurred. then the plaintiff, for all practical purposes, is without a forum. The
problem ean heone acute in an international setting. Suppose that on the
northern shore of Lake Ontario there is a manufacturing plant that regularly
#'mirs highly toxic materials into the air and these are carried by the prevailing
winds avross Lake Ontario and into the State of New York. A fish hatchery
there is severely damaged. Assuming that a person in New York. who is dam-
sageil can establish causation. can he bring suit?
Thile Canadian courts will probably not entertain the action because of the rule
in British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mozambique, (1893] AC 602 (H.L.).
The New York state courts could entertain the action, but would they be able to
acquire personal jurisdiction over the Canadian defendant in order to permit the
action to proceed? Under the New York State long-arm statute. N.Y.C.P.L.R. §
302, perhaps it could; and perhaps New York would reduce the claim to a money
judgment. But no Canadian court would be bound by the doctrine of full faith
and credit. and the ebances are great that a judgment of a United States court
reached upon a long-arni statute would nor be honored by a Canadian court.
In British South Afriea Company v. Compatntia de Mozambique, the House of
Lords decided that only the courts of a jurisdiction where an immovable is situat-
ed ean adjudicare upon its title. An English court thus had no jurisdiction to try
a daimage action for trespass to land situated abroad. Courts in Canada have ex-
tended this rule to an extreme. Dealing with an action in New Brunswick for
damages to Quebec land caused by the negligent blocking of an interprovincial
river. Chief Justice Baxter of New Brunswick stated:
whether title to land comes into question or not appears
to be immaterial. The moment it appears that the controversy relates
to land in a foreign country our jurisdiction is excluded:"
Albert v. Fraser 'ompanies Ltd.. [19371 1 D.L.R. 39, 45, 11 M.P.R. 209, 216
{N.B.C.A.]. Applying this rule to transboundary pollution, it would prevent an
American citizen from suing in Canadian courts for damage caused by a Canadian
polluter, if the controversy relates in any way to land in the United States. The
same obstacle for Canadians is created in the United States by the "local action
rule." established in Livingston v. Jefferson. 15 Fed.Cas. 660 (No. 8411) (Cir.
Ct.D.Va.1S11).
This Act is designed to eliminate this particular problem with respect to pollu-
tion. While conceptually the Act could be extended to deal with all unintentional
tort actions affecting property, the Committee's mandate. and indeed the earlier
work of the Joint ABA/CBA Committee and rite OECD, was limited to inter-
jurisdictional pollution problems and the difficulties which the local action ruh-
presented in preventing non-resident litigants getting inside the courthouse door.
Whether the pollution originated in Ontario or Ohio. a New Yorker injured in
New York thereby, would be entitled to go into a Canadian court or an Ohio
court and Itainraill an action for damages for injury to New York hantd. In other
words. this proposeil statture abrogates the rules in Livingstot v. Jefferson and
British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de 3Mozanibique. which many believe to be
anachronisms in any event.
While the joint committee of the ABA/CBA had recommended that the local
action rule should be changed by way of bilateral treaty, the joint uniform law
committee took a different position. Because of the difficulty of achieving such a
treaty and thte desirability of providing local rather tian federal solutions to
problems. the Committee decided at an early stage that changing the rules could
be done more effectively and expeditiously through the enactment of uniform
state and provincial laws than through a treaty.
The basic thrust of reform is to change the local action rules and provide equal
access for the victims of transfrontier pollution to rite courts of the jurisdiction
where the contaminant originated. As Stephen McCaffrey puts it "the mere ex-
istence of a political boundary line should prevent neither the 'upstream' stato
from considering the transfrontier effects of an activity, nor the 'downstream'
state from having an input into the decision-making process concerning the per"
missibiHity of that activity. Nor should the boundary line constitute an impedi-
6
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F-7ment to victims of transfrontier pollution seeking redress in the same country":
Stephen McCaffrey, "Transhoundary Pollution Injuries: Jurisdictional Considera-
tion in Private Litigation Between Canada and the United States" (1973), 3 Cal.
W.Int.L.J. 191.
The proposed statute also provides that in the event suit is brought in the
province or state where the alleged pollution actually originated, the local law of
that state (as distinguished from its whole law including conflict of laws rule)
applies. This means that an alleged polluter sued in the state where the alleged
pollution originated is governed by the substantive laws of that jurisdiction. In-
sofar as the courts of that state are concerned, he has one standard to meet, and
lie has the opportunity to defend the action on the basis of the substantive and
procedural rules with which lie is most familiar. Everyone would prefer to be
sued in the courts of his own jurisdiction.
Of course, if service of process is achieved in the state where the pollution ac-
tually caused harm, then that state would he free, within constitutional re-
straints. to apply either its own law or the law of the state where the alleged
pollution originated. That situation is not changed by this Act. Although total
uniformity and predictability are not established, an injured party will know when
choosing a particular court what law will be applied. The Act is designed to fill
a procedural gap. and is not intended to alter substantive laws or standards, or
change the ground rules under which individuals, corporations, or governments
conduct their affairs.
UNIFORM TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
RECIPROCAL ACCESS ACT
Sec.
1. Definitions.
2. Forum.
3. Right to Relief.
4. Applicable Law.
5. Equality of Rights.
6. Right Additional to Other Rights.
7. (Alternative for the U.S.A.]
Waiver of Sovereign Inmunity.
Sec.
7(a). (Alternative for Canada] Act
Binds Crown.
7(b). (For Canada only] Regulations.
S. Uniformity of Application and Con-
struction.
9. Title.
10. Time of Taking Effect.
I 1. Definitions
As used In this (Act]:
(1) "Reciprocating jurisdiction" means a state of the United States of
America, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a terri-
tory or possession of the United States of America, or a province or territory
of Canada, which has enacted this (Act] or provides substantially equivalent
access to its courts and administrative agencies.
(2) "Person" means an individual person, corporation, business trust, estate,
trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government in its private or
public capacity, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal entity.
Comment
The definition of "jurisdiction" per-
forms a number of functions. It en-
ables the Act to he applied in inter-
state and inter-provincial pollution tic-
tions. in addition to actions involving
pollution spanning the U.S./Canada
International boundary. The Act does
not apply to U.S./Mexico transboun-
dary pollution or to pollution from any
other nation.
The reciprocal aspect of the Act is
achieved by Section 1(1) providing
that both the "polluting" and "pollut-
ed" jurisdictions must have -enacted
this Act" or "provide substantially
equivalent access to the courts and ad-
ministrative agencies." The require-
ment of reciprocity applies to access
only. This threshold test is applied
by the courts in the U.S. on a case by
case basis, it being regarded as a ques-
tion of fact whethier a particular juris-
diction is a reciprocating jurisdiction.
In Canada. by contrast, it is usual for
reciprocity to be formally recognized
through provincial governnents desig-
nating by regulation lists of reciprocat-
ing states, where they are satisfied
that reciprocity exists. Section 7(b) is
designed to permit this procedure to be
followed. For jurisdictions, such as
Minnesota by judicial decision and New
York by statute, that already provide
access to their courts for non-resident
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pollution victims by abandoning the
rule of Livingston v. Jefferson, the
words "provide substantially equivalent
access" ensure that these jurisdictions
will be recognized as reciprocating jur-
isdictions without the need to ebact
formally the Act. Finally, it should be
noted that Section 1(1) concludes with
the words "access to the courts and
administrative agencies," a specific ref-
erence to the fact that it is 'contem-
plated that the Act will also apply to
proceedings before tribunals.
The definition of "person" derives
from standard wording used in many
uniform acts adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. It is designed to in-
clude all natural and legal persons
within the ambit of the Act. In addi-
tion, if the Attorney General, or an-
other public official of the state or
province where the injury occurred, is
able to bring an action with respect to
environmental injury, then the Attor-
ney General of another state harmed
by the "originating state's" pollution
should also be able to bring an action
in the "originating state."
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§ 2. Forum
An action or other p-roceeding for Injury or threatened Injury to property
or person in a reciprocating jurisdiction caused by pollution originating, or
that may originate, in this jurisdiction may be brought in this jurisdiction.
Comment
Together with Section 3, this section
forms the main operative provision of
the statute. Section 2 provides access
to the courts in one jurisdiction for
pollution victims in another jurisdic-
tion. A question may arise whether
the pollution originated in a particular
jurisdiction, and this is a question of
fact which the courts must decide. It
should be noted that the statute is not
restricted in its scope to civil trials: it
also extends to other proceedings be-
fore tribunals concerning environmenu-
tal injury or threatened injury.
As used in this Act, "injury" includes
wrongful death and "property" includes
both real and personal property.
It has been suggested that enactment
of this proposed statute would cause a
rush of litigants from out of state to
the state where the alleged pollution
originated or where it may originate.
So far as is known states with very
extensive long-arm statutes have not
experienced this rush of litigation, and
this suggests that it would not happen
if a new, and less convenient forum
was made available to them.
§ 3. Right to Relief
A person who suffers, or Is threatened with, injury to his person or proper-
ty in a reciprocating jurisdiction caused by pollution originating, or that may
originate, in this jurisdiction has the same rights to relief with respect to the
injury or threatened injury, and may enforce those rights this jurisdiction
as if the injury or threatened injury occurred in this jurisdiction.
Comment
This section equates the rights of an
extra-jurisdictional pollution victim to
those of a victim who is a resident of
the jurisdiction. It is designed to en-
sure that the actual or potential victim
of transfrontier pollution will have a
remedy in the courts of the jurisdiction
where the pollution originated, if a vic-
tim residing in that jurisdiction would
have had a remedy for injury or
threatened injury in the case of pollu-
tion caused locally. Whether or not
particular pollution did originate in a
jurisdiction is a question of fact for
the court to decide.
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I 4. Applicable Law
The law to be applied in an action or other proceeding brought pursuant to
this (Act), including what constitutes "pollution", is the law of this jurisdic-
tion excluding choice of law rules.
Comment
This section provides that the law of
this jurisdiction will apply in actions
brought under the Act. In the United
States this includes federal, state and
local law where applicable. The appli-
cable law is defined to exclude choice
of law rules so as to avoid the whole
problem of renvoi. While the Commit-
tee initially considered drafting a defi-
nition of "pollution" for inclusion in
this Act, it was decided that it would
be exceptionally difficult to draft such
a definition without it degenerating
into an unmanageable "shopping list"
and difficult to harmonize such a list
in practice with the definitions pro-
vided in the substantive law of a par-
ticular jurisdiction. Jurisdictions dif-
fer markedly in their treatment of
matters such as smells, radiation, vi-
bration, and visual pollution. To avoid
difficulties in interpretation, it was de-
cided that what constitutes pollution
would be decided by reference to the
law of an enacting jurisdiction; such a
definition might encompass both statu-
tory definitions as well as any applica-
ble judicial decisions under the common
law. It is contemplated that it would
include but not be limited to discharges
and emissions into land, air or water.
I 5. Equality of Rights
This [Act] does not accord a person injured or threatened with injury in
another jurisdiction any rights superior to those that the person would have
if injured or threatened with injury in this jurisdiction.
Comment
See Comment following Section 6.
§ 6. Right Additional to Other Rights
The right provided in this Act is in addition to and not in derogation of
any other rights.
Comment
These two sections clarify that the
Act is designed to put non-residents on
the same footing as residents with re-
spect to access to courts and tribunals
in claims involving transboundary pol-
lution. The rights of non-residents
under this Act will be no higher than
those of residents, and they must ac-
cept any procedural or substantive lim-
ALTERNATIVE FOR THE U.S.A.
[1 7. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
itations that may happen to exist un-
der the applicable law of the originat-
ing jurisdiction. Section 6 ensures
that the right of access provided by
the Act is supplementary and is not in-
tended in any way to diminish existing
rights under the laws of this jurisdic-
tion, which may be enforced indepen-
dently of this Act.
The defense of sovereignty immunity is applicable in any action or other
proceeding brought pursuant to this [Act] only to the extent that it would
apply to a person injured or threatened with injury in this jurisdiction.]
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See Comment following Section 7(b).
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ALTERNATIVE FOR CANADA
[I 7(a). Act Binds Crown
This (Actl binds the Crown in right of (Province or Territory) only to the
extent that the Crown would be bound if the person were injured or threat-
ened with injury In this jurisdiction.]
Comment
See Comment following Section 7(b).
SECTION T(b) FOR CANADA ONLY
[i 7(b). Regulations
The Lieutenant Governor in Council may, where he is satisfied that a juris-
diction is a reciprocating jurisdiction, make a declaratory order, to that ef-
fect, and upon the making of such order, the jurisdiction is a reciprocating
jurisdiction for the purposes of this [Act].]
Comment
The two alternative drafts, the one
applicable in Canada, and the other in
the United States. are provided to deal
with the question of sovereign or
crown immunity, and to ensure that
extra-jurisdictional actions will be
treated under the doctrines in the
same way as actions brought by resi-
dents.
Section 7(b) establishes a procedure
for Canadian provinces and territories
to develop and maintain an authorira-
tive list of reciprocating jurisdictions.
In developing such a list, regard t.u'ght
be had to the lists of enacting jurisdic-
tions contained in the Annual Haud-
book of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
8. Uniformity of Application and Construction
This [Act] shall be applied and construed to carry out its general purpose
to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this [Act] among jur-
isdictions enacting it.
1 9. Title
This (Act] may be cited as the Uniform Transboundary Pollution Recipro-
cal Access Act.
1 10. Time of Taking Effect
This [Act] takes effect on
Comment
[To be included in the Canadian ver-
sion only.
Sections 8, 9 and 10 are formal sec-
tions which, under Rule 22 of the
Drafting Rules for Writing Uniform or
Model Acts of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, must close every Uniform Act.]
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